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General Introduction
This dissertation is composed of three chapters, which can be read independently. Each
chapter is concerned with some aspect of public expenditure: the optimal size of equaliza-
tion payments, the labor market impacts of subsidies to capital and a politico-economic
determinant of government spending, electoral thresholds.
The first two chapters are concerned with policies that respond to the fact that economic
activity is distributed unequally across space within countries. In addition to the use
of (people-based) policies that do not explicitly favor certain regions (e.g. unemployment
insurance), governments across the world react to inequality across space by making use of
place-based policies, explicitly favoring certain regions. The goal is typically to facilitate
economic convergence (at least partially) of regions rather than permanent subsidization.
Two questions emerge: do place-based policies succeed in improving the situation of recipient
regions? And if so, are these policies efficient? I analyze two specific policies to contribute to
the scholarly effort to answer these questions. Chapter 1 is concerned with the assessment of
the efficiency of fiscal equalization payments in the presence of agglomeration economies.
Chapter 2 (co-authored by Sebastian Siegloch) investigates the employment and wage
effects of capital investment subsidies, paying special attention to inter-regional as well as
intraregional, inter-sectoral spill-overs.
Chapter 3 is concerned with an aspect of political economy, analyzing the electoral institution
of explicit electoral thresholds. Excluding parties failing to reach a minimum vote share
from representation, such thresholds have the potential to decrease the number of parties
mechanically and by affecting the behavior of parties and voters. Economists have hypothe-
sized that a large number of parties involved in budgeting may lead to higher government
spending. I explore the effects of removing a threshold in the election of municipal councils
on the number of parties represented and on expenditure.
In the remainder of this introduction, I briefly present each chapter.
1
Chapter 1: Evaluating the Efficiency of Fiscal Equal-
ization in the Presence of Agglomeration: The Case of
Germany
The first chapter theoretically and empirically studies conditions for optimality of fiscal
equalization payments. In many federal countries, such payments are an important source
of revenue of local governments. While the public debate is often focused on distributional
effects of equalization schemes, the question of the payments’ efficiency is typically neglected.
In the absence of government intervention, an efficient allocation of labor across space is in
general not achieved by market forces due to the presence of externalities and distortions.
Equalization payments can correct inefficient incentives on the part of workers to locate in
unproductive or congested regions (e.g. via their effect on the ability of local governments to
provide public goods). The existing literature quantifies optimal equalization payments by
taking into account the distortive effects across space of federal income taxation and public
good congestion. I consider an additional externality, agglomeration economies, i.e. the fact
that productivity is a function of employment density. If the strength of agglomeration
effects varies across space, there is scope for an improvement over the market outcome since
firms do not take into account the positive productivity effects when choosing labor.
I begin by extending the canonical spatial equilibrium model with equalization payments for
agglomeration economies. Using administrative employment and wage data from Germany,
I then estimate optimal payments as implied by the model and contrast them with actual
equalization payments. Finally, I compute the dead-weight loss resulting from deviations
of actual from optimal equalization payments. I find that actual payments, contrary to
what is optimal, incentivize workers to locate in low-productivity regions. This leads to a
dead-weight loss of approximately 0.5% of GDP. I also find that accounting for agglomeration
profoundly alters the calculus of optimal equalization payments. The dead-weight loss of
inefficient equalization is understated by a factor of 25 if agglomeration externalities are
neglected.
Chapter 2: Efficiency and Equity Effects of Place-Based
Policies: Evidence from Capital Subsidies in East Ger-
many
This chapter is co-authored by Sebastian Siegloch. We estimate the causal effects on
employment of capital investment subsidies mostly targeted at East German manufacturing
firms post reunification. The policy analyzed was intended to revitalize the East German
economy after reunification. Given the substantial differences in productivity between East
2
and West Germany more than 25 years after reunification, the high degree of subsidization
and the large volume of other transfers paid to regions in the East have received a lot of
criticism. Some of the skepticism about the subsidies’ efficacy also derives from the mobility
of workers and firms, potentially leading to re-allocation across space as in a zero-sum game.
Our variation comes from quasi-experiments in the regional targeting of capital subsidies.
In the late 1990s, policy-makers decided that due to the unequal economic development
in East German regions, the intensity of subsidization should not continue to be uniform
across space. Based on an indicator measuring economic well-being, counties were ranked
and counties whose indicator value was above a certain cutoff value were assigned lower
funding priority. The implication was that the maximum assistance rate, i.e. the maximum
fraction of the cost of investment projects that could be covered by subsidies, was lowered in
the affected regions. Similar changes in subsidy prioritization occurred in later years.
We compare counties below and above the cutoff values, making use of administrative data
on employment at the firm level and on wages, in addition to data on subsidies. The event
study research design we use allows us to compare treatment and control regions in multiple
years before and after a reform occurs. This enables us to verify the identifying assumption
and to explore the dynamics of treatment effects. We find that in counties in which subsidy
payments are decreased, manufacturing employment reacts negatively. Overall employment
is not affected, suggesting that one of the main variables targeted by the policy does not
react. Wages of low-skilled workers decrease. However, when we conduct the analysis at the
level of labor market regions (which include a number of counties each), the magnitude of
effects is considerably smaller, suggesting that large spill-over effects are at play.
Chapter 3: Political and Economic Effects of Explicit
Electoral Thresholds: The Case of German Municipali-
ties
Electoral thresholds prevent parties from entering parliaments in many countries. Knowing
more about their effects is important since thresholds are thought to have both disadvantages
and advantages. On the one hand, thresholds lead votes to be disregarded and restrict
party competition. On the other, they may prevent extreme fragmentation and may prevent
excessively high spending by governments. In chapter 3, I explore their impact on political
outcomes, such as the number of parties represented, and on government expenditure.
Exploiting the quasi-experimental removal of thresholds at the municipal level at different
times in different German states, I implement an event study research design complemented
by difference-in-differences estimates. The abolishments were triggered by court decisions,
providing exogenous variation. The panel data set used is constructed from municipal
election results and data on municipal finances. I find that the number of competing
3
parties and the number of parties represented increase significantly when a threshold is
removed. Concentration, measured by the Herfindahl index, decreases. The political effects
are significantly larger in more populous municipalities. One reason for this heterogeneity
is the higher number of seats on councils of larger municipalities, since implicit thresholds,
which arise from the allocation of vote shares to seats, are decreasing in the number of seats.
As for economic effects, the literature on the common pool problem predicts that when the
number of parties involved in the budget process increases, so will spending. The reason
is that each party only partially internalizes the cost of projects which are financed from a
common pool of resources but enjoyed primarily by their own voters. I find that spending
indeed increases as a result of threshold removals, in line with the theoretical prediction.
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Chapter 1
Evaluating the Efficiency of Fiscal
Equalization in the Presence of
Agglomeration: The Case of Germany
1.1 Introduction
Market incomes vary enormously across space not only between but also within coun-
tries. Governments and supra-national organizations across the world use fiscal equalization
payments to partially equalize incomes across regions. Within the European Union, the
Structural and Investment Funds provide targeted funds to eligible regions but are financed
from the common budget. In many federal countries (e.g. in Germany and Canada), condi-
tional and unconditional fiscal equalization payments provide revenues to local governments
whose revenues would otherwise not be sufficient to fulfill their assigned responsibilities. The
payments also redistribute income across regions, making them oftentimes very controversial.
Catalonia, for example, has long complained about its status as net-payer into Spain’s
re-distributive scheme, contributing to the rise of the independence movement (Heinemann,
2017).
While equity considerations dominate the political debate about the extent of regional re-
distribution, equalization payments can, if set correctly, help to achieve an efficient allocation
of labor across regions. The reason is that equalization payments affect the incentives
of mobile workers choosing their region of residence. Even if regional governments act
optimally, labor is in general not allocated efficiently among locations due to externalities
and distortions. One such externality is the congestion of publicly provided goods, the
severity of which in different regions depends on the allocation of workers across space.
Federal income taxation is distortive across space since if workers care about real wages
(i.e. wages net of housing rents), they are indifferent between high-wage (and therefore
high-productivity) locations where rents are high and low-wage locations where rents are
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low. However, income tax payments are higher in regions were (nominal) wages are high.
Federal equalization payments can correct these effects and ensure that an optimal outcome
obtains. Assessing the efficiency of a country’s equalization scheme amounts to estimating
Pareto-optimal equalization payments and comparing them to actual equalization payments.
In this paper, I investigate the impact on optimal equalization payments of an externality
neglected by the literature, agglomeration economies in production. Beginning with Ciccone
and Hall (1996), a vast literature on the reduced-form effect of employment density on
productivity has documented the importance of this externality (see Rosenthal and Strange
(2004) for a summary). Such effects may result from various underlying mechanisms, three
of which are proposed already in Marshall (1920): knowledge spill-overs among workers, the
availability of intermediate goods whose production exhibits increasing returns to scale and
labor market thickness improving the quality of matches.1
The model builds on the long run spatial equilibrium framework of Albouy (2012). On
top of an exogenous regional productivity component e.g. due to the availability of natural
resources, the presence of a research institution or airport, it is the density of employment
that endogenously determines the productivity of firms producing tradable goods in a region.
Since the positive impact on regional productivity is not taken into account by firms when
they add a worker, wages only reflect part of the marginal product. If the responsiveness
of output to the density of employment varies across regions, an inefficient allocation may
then obtain since moving a worker from one region to another has the potential to reduce
output in the origin region by less than the increase that materializes in the destination
region. Appropriately chosen equalization payments can ensure internalization on the part
of workers when they make their location choice. I estimate agglomeration effects along
with other distortions and check whether equalization in Germany corrects for inefficient
incentives.
Using German data, I analyze a country whose equalization scheme is particularly interesting
since, in addition to payments between states (Bundeslaender), equalization occurs within-
state. I aggregate equalization payments received by municipalities and counties to the
level of labor market regions which are defined as groups of counties, taking into account
commuter flows. Relying on the structural approach to estimate agglomeration elasticities
at different levels of density introduced by Kline and Moretti (2014a), I analyze regional
heterogeneity in agglomeration economies. In order to identify differential wage income tax
payments, I estimate an individual-level wage equation using administrative micro data.
The empirical results show that agglomeration forces can fundamentally alter the distribution
of efficient equalization payments. The estimated distortive effects of wage income taxation
and congestion are dwarfed in magnitude by the agglomeration effects. Actual equalization
1 Additional channels have been proposed and the relative importance of channels has been analyzed
empirically (Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). However, for the present paper, what matters is the reduced-form
relationship.
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payments do not correct for inefficient incentives. On the contrary, I estimate a correlation
coefficient between actual and efficient payments of −0.42. The main reason is the bias of
payments towards East Germany, where productivity remains low even close to thirty years
after reunification. Importantly, also the agglomeration effects are lower, meaning that re-
allocation of workers to the West increases output by more than the resulting reduction in the
East. Since equalization payments inefficiently lower incentives to migrate to the West, East
Germany is overpopulated relative to the optimum. I calculate a dead-weight loss of existing
equalization payments of approximately 0.5% of GDP. Calculating optimal equalization
payments under the assumption of zero agglomeration effects yields a dead-weight loss smaller
by factor 25.
I contribute to the literature on optimal equalization payments by quantifying the role of
agglomeration economies. Boadway (2004) provides a good summary of the canonical model
and extensions. Flatters et al. (1974) and Boadway and Flatters (1982) develop the basic
two-region model and establish the result that mobile labor is in general located inefficiently
in equilibrium in the presence of congestion of the public good and that equalization
payments can restore optimality. Albouy (2012) incorporates amenities, regionally varying
productivities and introduces the distortion induced by federal wage income taxation based on
nominal incomes in spatial equilibrium (analyzed first in Albouy (2009)). Albouy (2012) also
provides the model’s first empirical application. Looking at Canada, he finds that inefficient
equalization among provinces results in a dead-weight loss of approximately 0.4% of GDP,
ignoring agglomeration economies. Recently, Henkel et al. (2018) have analyzed the efficiency
of fiscal equalization in Germany in a calibrated model, illustrating the potential importance
of agglomeration forces. However, they do not estimate agglomeration’s effects, the regional
heterogeneity of which is crucial to assess the optimality of equalization payments.
A related strand of the literature considers the incentives on the part of local governments that
arise due to fiscal equalization. Buettner (2006) theoretically predicts and empirically finds
that German municipalities raise their local business tax rate when they face equalization
payments that decrease more strongly in the local tax base.2 Janeba and Peters (2000),
Bucovetsky and Smart (2006) and Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2002) analyze this incentive in conjunction
with tax competition and find that it can offset the incentive of individual regions to set tax
rates below the efficient level in equilibrium.
I also add to the recent literature on local labor markets which is broadly concerned with
place-based policies that affect a country’s regions differentially, of which Kline and Moretti
(2014b) and Moretti (2011) provide a good summary. Busso et al. (2013) investigate the
efficiency of the Federal Urban Empowerment Zone program in the U.S. which includes,
among its various instruments, a wage subsidy to poor neighborhoods of large cities. They
find a low dead-weight loss due to a low elasticity of employment with respect to the subsidy.
Glaeser and Gottlieb (2008) establish the result that reallocation of economic activity is
2 In the typical scheme, equalization payments are lower when the tax base is higher.
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a zero-sum game unless the magnitude of agglomeration economies varies across locations.
Kline and Moretti (2014a) use a spatial equilibrium model to structurally estimate the size
of agglomeration economies at different density levels for the U.S. as part of an evaluation of
spatially targeted infrastructure investments. Following their approach, I consider how the
optimal design of another place-based policy, fiscal equalization, is affected by agglomeration
economies.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: I outline the model in section 1.2,
which is followed by sections on institutional details and the data. Section 1.5 outlines the
research design. Empirical results are presented in section 1.6. I then compute the policy’s
dead-weight loss in section 1.7. Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Model
I extend Albouy (2012)’s spatial equilibrium model with equalization payments, allowing
for agglomeration in the production of tradable goods. In the tradition of Flatters et al.
(1974), it is the impact that equalization payments have on the allocation of labor across
space that is of central interest, rather than equity considerations. Essential is therefore the
location choice mobile workers make. In the spirit of Rosen (1979) and Roback (1982), the
model’s equilibrium is characterized by a no-arbitrage condition, according to which utility
does not vary across space such that there are no incentives to move. I characterize efficient
equalization payments by first solving the social planner’s problem and then using budget
constraints of workers and governments and market prices.
There is a continuum of mass one of workers, of which N j choose region j3 and derive utility
U (x, y, gj, Qj) from exogenous amenities Qj, the consumption of a tradable good x (the
numeraire), housing y and a publicly provided good Gj. The publicly provided good is
congested according to the parameter ω ∈ [0, 1], which includes the possibilities of it being a
purely public or purely private good: gj = Gj(Nj)ω . Amenities reflect quality of life, e.g. due
to proximity to a natural body of water. Each worker inelastically supplies one unit of labor
in the region of residence.
Production of the tradable good X using as inputs mobile capital KX , mobile labor NX
and the fixed factor land LX in region j is described by FX
(
KjX , L
j
X , N
j
X , A
j
X
)
, where
AjX = AX
(
N jX
)
denotes a region’s productivity. Here, I endogenize productivity and allow
for agglomeration externalities in reduced form as in Glaeser (2008) by assuming that firms
take regional population as given when they choose inputs. The supply of capital is fixed
at the national level. Land is variable from a firm’s perspective, consistent with constant
returns to scale. However, at the regional level, the fact that land is a fixed factor leads to
decreasing returns to scale. Since agglomeration economies are not modeled explicitly, all
3 In the empirical part, the baseline geographical entity is the labor market region, whose definition
ensures that the lion’s share of commuting occurs within region (see section 1.3 for institutional details).
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above-mentioned channels are consistent with this specification (e.g. knowledge spill-overs).
Land owners are the residual claimants in this model and the portion of the marginal product
not reflected by wages therefore accrues to them. Production of housing (FY ) and the
government good (FG) also use capital (KY and KG), land (LY and LG) and labor (NY and
NG) but are characterized by exogenous productivity levels.4 Prices are taken as given on
all markets. Production in all sectors takes place within region.
Households pay federal wage income taxes (depending on local wages) and own a portfolio of
land and capital. The portfolio pays the same return regardless of where agents reside and
is therefore not modeled. Importantly, they also receive a location-dependent equalization
payment F j (which may be positive or negative) from the federal government.5 Local
governments efficiently produce the publicly provided good Gj and raise revenues using
source-based taxes on land and capital (τ jL and τ
j
K).6 The federal government uses wage
income taxes (τFw ) to finance equalization payments to workers.7 Other expenses by the
federal government are assumed to benefit workers equally in all regions and are therefore
irrelevant for workers’ location decision. The federal government is assumed to move first,
anticipating the other actors’ reactions, followed by local governments. Firms and workers
finally choose production levels and location, respectively.8
Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary first order conditions characterize the social planner’s solution
(see Appendix for details). Using market conditions9 for prices, I arrive at the following
condition that equalization payments F j received by workers in region j satisfy if they are
4 The evidence in Bru¨lhart and Mathys (2008) suggests that agglomeration economies do not play a role
in the construction sector. In addition, the channels underlying agglomeration effects mentioned above seem
to matter little in the public sector.
5 While unrealistic, this assumption is necessary to derive the dead-weight-loss due to inefficient payments
in section 1.7. Nevertheless, I explore the implication of local governments receiving the payment instead in
the Appendix.
6 More precisely, I assume provision of the publicly provided good consistent with the Samuelson condition
amended for congestion, following the literature (Boadway, 2004) Doing so allows for a direct comparison of
my empirical results with existing estimates that are based on models that ignore agglomeration economies.
The drawback of imposing Samuelson provision is that it does not characterize optimal local government
behavior under distortionary taxation. In addition, local governments are effectively assumed to behave
strategically naive. However, in a model without local public goods, uniqueness would still obtain under my
assumptions due to the fixed factor land. Furthermore, ignoring local public goods would leave the main
results unaffected, as is evident from the empirical analysis.
7 Since equalization payments may be positive or negative, a net-scheme requiring no revenues on the
federal government’s part is also feasible.
8 This assumptions is not innocuous. If local governments move first and the federal government cannot
commit to its choice, local governments might overspend, counting on a bailout by the federal government
(see Ko¨thenbu¨rger (2007) for details).
9 Sufficiency, the existence of an interior solution and uniqueness of the market outcome are discussed in
the Appendix for particular functional form assumptions. In particular, I assume that local labor demand is
downward sloping by assuming that crowding of the fixed factor land outweighs endogenous productivity
gains when employment in the tradable sector increases. This assumption is backed by my empirical results.
Note that the empirical strategy does not rule out multiple equilibria ex-ante but that the results suggest
uniqueness.
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efficient, i.e. if they act to set migration incentives appropriately10:
F j
? = τFwwj − ω
τ jLr
jLj + τ jKiKj
N j
+ ∂F
j
X
∂AX
∂AjX
∂NX
+ F (1.1)
where wj is the wage in region j, rj is the price of land11 and i the price of capital. The
location-independent transfer F ensures that the federal budget constraint is satisfied (see
Appendix for details).
This equation tells us that equalization payments should offset differential federal wage
income tax payments which lure households away from highly productive (and thus high wage)
areas. These tax payments based on nominal income make high-wage regions unattractive
to workers even though the real wage (after housing cost) is equal across locations in spatial
equilibrium, distorting the allocation of labor towards low-productivity regions. Congestion
of the publicly provided good should be penalized (to the extent that it varies across regions)
in proportion to local government spending since agents do not take into account that their
consumption is (partially) at the expense of existing residents. If ω is small, meaning that
congestion is relatively unimportant, the corresponding term receives a lower weight.
The novelty is the term capturing the increase in output as a result of higher density. The
intuition is that moving a worker from one region to another produces a density-induced
output loss in one region and a gain in another region. If the loss perfectly offsets the gain, a
correction is unnecessary. If however the absolute value of the two effects differ, a reallocation
is beneficial. Optimal equalization payments thus include a Pigouvian correction for public
good congestion and for agglomeration externalities. Note that the price of housing does not
appear, consistent with the fact that housing markets are not distorted.
The elements of this equation are either observable directly or estimable such that the
hypothesis of actual equalization payments in Germany being efficient is empirically testable.
Before I proceed by quantifying the components of equation (1.1), I will briefly outline the
relevant institutions and the data.
10 In the tradition of the literature, I focus on the allocation of labor (Boadway, 2004) However, I briefly
discuss the condition relating to capital in the Appendix.
11 More precisely, there is a price for each of the fixed factors used in the three sectors of production: LX ,
LY and LG. I assume that they are all taxed at the same rate. τ jLrjLj represents total local tax revenues
from the taxation of land.
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1.3 Institutional details
In Germany, fiscal equalization takes place both between and within states (Bundeslaender).12
Transfers between states matter for this paper only to the extent that they affect local
governments via within-state equalization schemes, which are less well-known but provide an
important source of revenue for municipalities13 and county (Kreis-) governments (Buettner
and Holm-Hadulla, 2008). There are some minor differences in the design of these schemes
across states, but the basic features are very similar: municipalities and counties pay into
the system or receive payments according to whether their fiscal capacity exceeds a measure
of their fiscal need and the state typically contributes own funds to the scheme.
The system of tax revenue sharing is also an important source of revenue for local governments
(also see descriptive statistics in the next section). Quantitatively, the two most important
revenues for municipalities of this category are their shares of the wage income tax and value
added tax. Together, they account for 43% of municipal revenue from taxes.14 I treat these
revenues as equalization payments, implicitly assuming that the sharing agreement can be
adjusted unilaterally by the federal government. In the Appendix, I relax this assumption.
I aggregate equalization payments received by municipalities and counties15 to the labor
market region, regardless of whether they originate at the federal or state level.16 Labor
market regions are the natural entities for the analysis of agglomeration economies: they
consist of one or more counties and are defined based on commuting patterns with the
goal of obtaining regions resembling the theoretical concept of local labor markets more
closely than counties do (a county always belongs to only one labor market region entirely).
The drawback is that these regions are not of administrative nature and have no budget
12 In a nutshell, between-state equalization for the time period observed comprises four steps: first, federal
and state governments and municipalities share the revenues from a number of taxes (e.g. from income
tax revenues, the federal government receives 42.5%, state governments receive 42.5% and municipalities
15%). Second, the states’ share is distributed among the individual states, partly based on where tax
revenue is collected and partly based on need, which achieves equalization in revenues to a certain
degree. In the next step, explicit redistribution between states occurs based on a comparison of per
capita financial capacity, which leads to further but not to complete equalization in revenues. Finally,
the federal government grants further payments to particularly poor states and local governments (see
https://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_
Finanzen/Foederale_Finanzbeziehungen/Laenderfinanzausgleich/Eng-Der-Bundesstaatliche-FAG.
pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=1, retrieved February 1, 2018). A recent reform of the between-state
scheme, passed in 2017 and hence not applicable to the time period observed in this paper (1995-2010), has
formally ended cross-payments by states (Hentze, 2017) and each state will receive more funds under the
new scheme at the expense of the federal government. However, quantitatively, major changes in differential
payments received by states are not to be expected.
13 E.g. on average, 20% of revenues came from such a scheme in the state of North Rhine-Westphalia in
the year 2005.
14 Own calculation based on the municipalities’ official budgetary reports: http://www.staedtetag.de/
imperia/md/content/dst/veroeffentlichungen/gemeindefinanzbericht/gemeindefinanzbericht_
2017_langfassung.pdf, retrieved February 1, 2018.
15 See Appendix for a detailed list of the payments considered.
16 To the extent that goods and services (rather than payments) are provided by state governments directly,
these are not accounted for in my calculations. Similarly, differences in the efficiency of public good provision
may be relevant for workers’ location choices. However, both aspects are reflected in the model by Qj .
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themselves. Note that in the model, all payments are federal payments. For the purpose of
this paper, I therefore disregard the role of states and assume that the federal government
can control payments to local governments.
Municipalities can influence their revenues by choosing multipliers for the property tax
(Grundsteuer) on land and the local business tax (Gewerbesteuer) on profits.17 The local
business tax rate is the product of a federal rate, uniform across locations, and the local rate
chosen by a municipality’s council while the tax base is also determined federally. Similarly,
the property tax rate is determined by the product of a federal rate and a locally chosen
multiplier.18 Combined, they make up 55% of municipal revenue from taxes.19 I take the
local business tax and the property tax as the equivalents to the model’s source-based taxes
on capital and land.
1.4 Data
I rely on publicly available data by the statistical offices20 to compute equalization payments
and tax revenues at the labor market region level, using data for the time period 1995-2010
(in the baseline of the empirical part, I look at the year 2005 but explore the sensitivity of
my analysis to this choice). Equalization payments are received by municipalities and by
counties and I aggregate both payments to the labor market region level. Source-based tax
revenues accrue to municipalities in the form of local business taxes and property taxes. I
also aggregate them to the labor market region level.
As for labor market specific wage premia, I rely on the weakly anonymous Sample of
Integrated Labor Market Biographies (SIAB)21 provided by the Institute for Employment
Research (IAB) (Antoni et al., 2016) in Nuremberg. This data set consists of a two percent
random sample of worker biographies recorded in the German social security system going
back to 1975 (for West Germany), resulting in biographies of roughly 1.8 million workers.
Public servants and self-employed are not included since they do not normally pay social
security contributions. Detailed information is included on wages, the place of work, the
employer’s sector, education and other relevant individual characteristics.
In terms of firm data, I use the waves of 1980, 1990, 2000 and 2010 of the weakly anonymous
Establishment History Panel (BHP)22 also provided by the IAB (Schmucker et al., 2016),
17 The local business tax is paid by all firms outside the agricultural and public sectors. In addition,
corporate firms pay corporate taxes (Koerperschaftsteuer) and non-corporate firms pay personal income
taxes (Einkommensteuer).
18 More specifically, there is a property tax on agricultural land (Grundsteuer A) and a property tax on
non-agricultural land (Grundsteuer B), each with its own multiplier.
19 Own calculation based on the municipalities’ official budgetary reports (see footnote above)
20 http://www.regionalstatistik.de, available permanently
21 Data access was provided via on-site use at the Research Data Centre (FDZ) of the German Federal
Employment Agency (BA) at the IAB and remote data access.
22 See footnote above on data access.
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to estimate agglomeration elasticities. This fifty percent random sample of establishments
is based again on social security records.. The annual number of establishments observed
varies between 640 000 and 1.5 million. The BHP allows for aggregation of employment
and wages by labor market region and – crucial for this paper – by sector. I exclude the
construction sector and governmental institutions from the set of all industries to obtain
employment in the tradable sector since this follows the model most closely.
Finally, the German internal migration database (Sander, 2014) forms the basis for estimating
the elasticity of population with respect to equalization payments, which will be required in
section 1.7. This panel of annual movements (changes in permanent residence) between each
pair of counties makes use of the German population register. I use county border definitions
valid in the year 2014 and map data recorded for deviating border definitions to the 2014
definitions.
Table 1.1: Summary statistics at the labor market region level
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Land 4128 1374 937
Population 4128 318528 405329
No. of counties 4128 1.56 1.03
Local government revenue (per capita)
Fees 4128 217 103
Credit 4128 128 119
General equalization payments 4128 689 212
Investment subsidies 4128 153 101
Wage income tax (via sharing) 4128 273 101
VAT (via sharing) 4128 27 16
Local business tax 4128 247 129
Property tax A 4128 7 5
Property tax B 4128 104 29
Yearly gross earnings 23175028 22197 20707
Notes: There are 258 labor market regions which are observed for 16 years: 1995-2010.
Gross wages are based on 1975-2010. Land is measured in square kilometers, all monetary
variables are measured in e.
Table 1.1 presents descriptive statistics at the labor market region level. On average, about
320 000 people live in a region consisting of 1.6 counties. By far the most important source
of revenue are equalization payments, amounting to roughly e690 per capita, followed by
wage income taxes (via revenue sharing) at about e270 per capita and local business tax
revenue. Yearly earnings (the average of which is e22 200) are based on both full-time and
part-time employment.23
23 Note that wage data from the SIAB is right-censored, i.e. payments are only recorded up to the highest
amount relevant for the social security system.
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1.5 Empirical research design
In accordance with the literature, I define the net fiscal benefit (NFB) as the difference
between actual equalization payments and optimal payments from equation (1.1), ignoring
the location-independent transfer:
NFBj := F j − τFwwj −
∂F jX
∂AX
∂AjX
∂NX
+ ωτ
j
Lr
jLj + τ jKiKj
N j
(1.2)
Using this definition, if equalization payments are optimal, it must be true that NFBj = F
for all j and some constant F .
In this section, I describe how I empirically quantify the NFBs’ components. Below, I outline
the strategies used to obtain estimates of wage income tax payments and the agglomeration
effects. Actual equalization payments F j are observable directly. The same applies to per-
capita source-based tax revenues from the property tax and the local business tax. Finally, I
set ω equal to one following Bergstrom and Goodman (1973), exploring the sensitivity of
results to this assumption in the Appendix.
1.5.1 Wage income tax payments
Labor market region specific wage premia wj have to be estimated to quantify differential
wage income tax payments and agglomeration effects. In order to obtain the causal effect of
working in a region j on the wage earned, I follow Glaeser and Mare´ (2001) and Hirsch et al.
(2016) and estimate
lnwijt = δj + δi + µt +Xitβw + wijt (1.3)
where wijt is the wage of individual i in region j at time t. The inclusion of individual-specific
fixed effects δi implies that identification of the log labor market specific wage premium
δj = lnwj comes from workers who move across regions. This specification ensures that the
estimated wage premia are not contaminated by sorting of workers based on unobservables
(e.g. highly productive workers sorting into high-productivity areas). I also add individual
controls Xit. lnwj represents the portion of the log wage in region j that is due to location.
This labor market region-specific premium may be due to productivity differences that are
the result of agglomeration economies.24
The SIAB includes worker characteristics such as education, age and gender but falls short
of providing detailed wage income tax-relevant information. Mainly, it is the lack of tax
code information that prevents calculation of the tax payment. I approximate the wage
income tax payment using a linear tax rate of about 25%, also accounting for social security
24 Productivity is a function of population, which is reflected in wages when firms take productivity as
given, in contrast to ∂F
j
X
∂AX
∂Aj
X
∂NX
. Model details can be found in the Appendix.
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payments which depend on the wage.25 In the Appendix, I provide approximations based on
assumptions on individuals’ tax code. Note that the distortion induced by the wage income
tax as described does not depend on the progressivity of the actual tax schedule (however,
progressivity leads to a larger variance of tax payments).
1.5.2 Agglomeration effects
In order to be able to estimate the agglomeration effects in the tradable sector, I follow
Kline and Moretti (2014a) and assume production of tradable goods to be Cobb-Douglas:
FX(.) = AjX
(
KjX
)α (
LjX
)β (
N jX
)1−α−β
, where productivity is assumed to obey lnAjX =
g
(
NjX
Rj
)
+ νj. The constant region-specific productivity effect νj is due to fixed factors such
as the availability of natural resources, of an airport or the proximity to a research institution.
In contrast, agglomeration is an endogenous force that depends on the density of employment
(Rj denotes an area’s size) in the tradable sector which may affect productivity through a
variety of different channels, as discussed above. According to this definition, the magnitude
of agglomeration economies is region-specific only to the extent that density varies across
locations, which facilitates estimation. This functional form implies
∂F jX
∂AX
∂AjX
∂NX
= σj w
j
1− α− β (1.4)
where σj = ∂ lnA
j
X
∂ ln
(
N
j
X
Rj
) = g′ (NjX
Rj
)
NjX
Rj
is the elasticity of productivity with respect to the
density of employment in the tradable sector and wj is again the labor market region-specific
wage premium.
It is the functional form of g(.) that is of primary interest here. If g(.) is log-linear in density
of employment, implying a constant σ, reallocation of labor among regions exhibiting the
same wage is a zero-sum game: the resulting increase in productivity in one region is exactly
offset by the decrease in productivity in the other region.26. When wages differ, reallocation
is not a zero-sum game and the variance of wages determines the variance of agglomeration
effects. If g(.) is non-linear in logs, however, moving a worker from a low-σj region to a
high-σj region may be beneficial as output increases by more in one region than it decreases
in another. In addition, σj is informative about the slope of local labor demand in a given
region at different levels of density27
25 In the year 2005, an unmarried person earning e22200 paid approximately 25 % in taxes and social
security contributions (if pension insurance contributions are subtracted, as these determine pension
entitlements at least partially).
26 Note that σ is unrestricted. In particular, the assumption of log-linearity required for sufficiency and
the existence of an interior solution of the planner’s problem as well as for uniqueness of the market outcome
as stated in equation (A.9) of the Appendix is not required for estimation of σ
27 This is the case since labor demand contains the level of density in lnAjX . Details can be found in the
Appendix.
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In order to estimate this elasticity, I interpret the static model’s equilibrium in section 1.2
as the steady state of a dynamic model which obeys the production function in each time
period t, measured in decades, with the addition that agglomeration is allowed to operate
with a decadal lag (see equation (A.10) in the Appendix). As in Kline and Moretti (2014a),
this lag makes the model estimable and prevents unrealistic large changes in density between
two periods that could occur without a lag.
Since the functional form of the productivity-density relationship is unknown, it is desirable
to estimate this relationship in a very flexible manner. I assume that the agglomeration
function can be written as g
(
NjX,t
Rj
)
= ∑3k=1 θkgk (NjX,tRj
)
. The spline functions gk(.) are
chosen as the logarithm of tradable employment density at different levels of density28,
consistent with g(.) being piecewise log linear. I divide the density range into three intervals
(k = 1, 2, 3).29 The θk then represent the agglomeration elasticity for the relevant interval. It
is the model’s labor demand equation that suggests identification of agglomeration elasticities
by using data on employment and wages.30 Differencing the labor demand equation over
time31 yields the estimating equation
∆ lnN jX,t = −
1− α
β
∆ lnwjt +
3∑
k=1
θk
β
∆gk
N jX,t−1
Rj
+ ∆φt + γjt (1.5)
where ∆ represents the difference of a variable over time, φt are period fixed-effects and γjt is
an error term. The change in employment over time is therefore regressed on the change in
wages over time (a movement along the labor demand curve for a given density interval) plus
the agglomeration-induced change in labor demand, which is a function of past employment
levels.
Identification is difficult: firstly, bias may result from correlation of the error term with
shocks that affect labor supply such as shocks to amenities. For example, a natural disaster
may affect labor supply decisions while simultaneously shocking labor demand. As a remedy,
I calibrate the labor demand elasticity for a given level of productivity instead of estimating
it. In the next section, where I present the empirical results, I discuss the robustness of my
estimates with respect to different choices of the elasticity’s magnitude.
Furthermore, serial correlation of the error term may threaten identification since trends
in employment might be confused with agglomeration effects. This is due to the fact that
serial correlation would induce correlation of the spline components and the error term.
Therefore, in addition to estimating equation (1.5) using OLS, I follow Kline and Moretti
28 For robustness, I also conduct the estimation using linear splines. Results are presented in the Appendix.
29 In the baseline, I use the 50th and the 75th percentile of the density distribution in the first year (1980)
as knots of division in order to get approximately the same number of observations in all intervals but explore
the sensitivity of estimates to this choice in the Appendix.
30 I use decadal wages in the tradable sector from the BHP. Note that in the model, wages are equalized
within region across sectors.
31 See equation (A.7) of the Appendix.
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(2014a) and instrument the spline functions of employment density with its decadal lags,
i.e. ∆gk
(
NjX,t−2
Rj
)
.
In order for these instruments to be valid, employment density in period t− 1 is required to
be correlated with employment density ten years earlier (instrument relevance) but this twice
lagged density must not be correlated with today’s value of γjt (the exclusion restriction). The
former is implied by the model since density affects employment with a lag via agglomeration.
The latter assumes that productivity shocks today are not related to productivity shocks
two decades ago.
The instruments chosen exploit the fact that even if productivity shocks are correlated in
the short run, they may not correlated over the course of twenty years. While the literature
provides evidence for this hypothesis in general (Eeckhout, 2004), in the context of Germany’s
economic development since 1990, East German regions constitute a special case. Their
catching up to GDP levels closer to those of West German regions indeed suggests the
presence of persistence in shocks (Burda and Hunt, 2001). I therefore conduct the estimation
for West German regions separately in addition to an estimation using all regions and also
include state-decade fixed effects throughout. Below, I interpret the differences in results
from OLS and 2SLS estimation.
1.6 Empirical results
In this section, I present my empirical results of the components of the net fiscal benefit
(NFB) as defined in equation (1.2), beginning with quantities that are observable directly
and do not require estimation, namely equalization payments and source-based tax revenues.
The distribution of equalization payments relative to the mean in the year 2005 is presented
in figure 1.1. Payments do not vary substantially over the period 1995-2010 (as demonstrated
in figures A.10a and A.10b) and the same holds for the other terms of equation (1.2).32
As expected, the per capita amounts are high predominantly in East Germany, where the
states receive large payments from the state-level equalization scheme which they evidently
pass on to a considerable extent to local governments. Nevertheless, there is substantial
heterogeneity in payments received by regions in West Germany. The distribution of payments
is summarized in table 1.2 along with distributions of the other components of the NFB
which I will explain in what follows. Source-based tax revenues from local business and
property taxes exhibit the lowest degree of variability. Figure A.3a (in the Appendix) shows
the geographical distribution which is clearly inversely related to equalization payments.
32 Since I check an optimality condition that corresponds to a long-run equilibrium, it is important that
the model’s empirical counterparts are sufficiently stable over time.
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Table 1.2: Components of the NFB
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Equalization payments 258 1073 166
Source-based revenues 258 382 130
Wage income tax payment 258 3925 574
Agglomeration effect 258 16257 2376
Notes: The amounts are in Euro per capita, measured at the labor market
region level for the year 2005 (wage premia are estimated using data covering
1975-2010, agglomeration elasticities are estimated using data covering 1980-
2010).
Figure 1.1: Equalization payments (year 2005)
(143,654] (54,143]
(-26,54] [-743,-26]
Notes: This map shows equalization payments in Euro per capita relative to the population weighted mean for each labor
market region. The distribution is partitioned into four intervals containing an equal number of observations. Darker colors
indicate higher values.
1.6.1 Wage income tax payments
The second term of the NFB is the wage income tax payment that is due to the labor
market region-specific wage. The labor market region-specific wage premia wj are estimated
with high precision, as can be seen from table A.1. The estimates in column 1, which
are used henceforth, are based on the log wage equation (1.3) without controls. Since the
dependent variable is the log wage, the estimates can be interpreted as percentage deviations
from the base category (the labor market region Husum). For example, wages in Hamburg
exceed those in Husum by on average 9% while wages in Dresden are lower by 39%. Adding
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time-varying controls such as education or (one-digit) industry does not meaningfully alter
the estimates (recall that identification comes from individuals that move from one labor
market region to another).33
Using these estimates, I first calculate the wage premium in levels. The mean gross labor
market wage premium is about e16 000.34 Figure 1.2 presents the geographical distribution
of the results relative to the (population weighted) mean. Here, we see that wage premia
are highest in the South and in some parts of the West but lowest in the East. Munich,
Frankfurt and Wolfsburg35 are the labor market regions exhibiting the highest wage premia.
Wage income tax payments, the mean of which is shown in table 1.2, are approximated as a
quarter of the wage premium as explained in section 1.5. In the Appendix, I also calculate
the tax payment using actual tax rates in place in the year 2005.36 Figures (A.6a) and
(A.6b) show the distributions of wage income tax payments relative to the mean for the
approximation and the exact calculation. While the magnitudes are overall very similar, the
distribution of exact tax payments is skewed to the right, reflecting progressivity.
1.6.2 Agglomeration effects
As for the effects of agglomeration, I first present OLS and IV estimates of the agglomeration
elasticity with respect to the density of tradable employment based on equation (1.5).37
Column 1 of table 1.3 shows OLS estimates of θk
β
for three different levels of density (low,
medium, high). The results support the conjecture of an agglomeration elasticity constant
across density levels. Furthermore, the estimates confirm that σ < β holds38, which implies
that labor demand in a location is downward sloping.39 The IV estimates of column 2
confirm this hypothesis: the coefficients are generally similar and differ only in absolute but
not in relative magnitude. An F-test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal coefficients.40
33 The estimated effects are stable over time, as can be seen in figures A.9a and A.9b.
34 Overall mean gross earnings (which include the worker-specific and year-specific effects next to the
region-specific part) are equal to about e22 200. I have part-time workers in the baseline sample but explore
the robustness to excluding them (compare table A.1).
35 Wolfsburg is located to the West of Berlin and is home to the VW automotive manufacturing company.
36 I add the mean individual fixed effect to region-specific wage premia before calculating taxes. Lacking
information on marital status, I assume individual filing. In these calculations, I do not take social security
payments into account.
37 Recall that I use decadal data from 1980 onwards. This is necessitated by the instruments used
(employment densities lagged twice and three times). Therefore I cannot include East Germany. However, I
report OLS results using all German regions in the Appendix. In addition, note that I cannot separately
estimate agglomeration elasticities for different time periods. However, the agglomeration effects relevant for
optimal equalization payments also depend on wage premia, which are estimated to be very stable over time,
as mentioned above.
38 Since θˆkβ < 1 for k = 1, 2, 3.
39 The fact that agglomeration elasticities are constant across density levels matters within region since if
they were not, labor demand might jump if a certain density value is exceeded (the labor demand elasticity
is equal to σ−β1−α , as explained in Appendix section A.1.2).
40 p-value: 0.98
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Figure 1.2: Wage income tax payments
(251,1380] (-130,251]
(-596,-130] [-1445,-596]
Notes: This map shows wage income tax payments relative to the population weighted mean for each labor market region.
The distribution is partitioned into four intervals containing an equal number of observations. Darker colors indicate higher
values.
The fact that the IV estimates are slightly larger in absolute value suggests a negative serial
correlation of the decadal productivity shocks.
The IV estimates taken as 0.5 imply, according to equation (1.4), an agglomeration-induced
productivity effect of approximately 1.02wj, i.e. approximately the full labor market region
specific wage premium.41 This means that re-allocation of workers is not a zero-sum game
even though agglomeration elasticities are constant, the reason being that wages differ
across locations. The conclusion from this exercise is that the other effects of equation (1.2)
are dwarfed in magnitude by the agglomeration effects as is evident from table 1.2 (the
wage income tax effect is about one fourth the size of the agglomeration effect due to the
assumption of an average tax rate of 25 %). In terms of the geographic distribution of the
effects, note that the effects are multiples of the wage income tax effects shown in figure (1.2)
(see Appendix for a visualization of agglomeration effects). The IV estimates further imply
an agglomeration elasticity of about 0.24 similar to the estimate of 0.2 obtained by Kline
and Moretti (2014a) for the US and the estimate of 0.13 obtained by Bru¨lhart and Mathys
(2008) for Europe. This means that an increase in employment density by 1% leads to an
increase in productivity of 0.24%.
Weak instruments may severely bias (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) the estimates obtained from
41 Using α = 0.3 and β = 0.47 as in Kline and Moretti (2014a).
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Table 1.3: Estimates of agglomeration elasticities
∆ log employment ∆ log employment
OLS IV
∆ log density spline low 0.468∗∗∗ 0.530∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.160)
∆ log density spline medium 0.419∗∗∗ 0.499∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.156)
∆ log density spline high 0.392∗∗∗ 0.505∗∗
(0.094) (0.202)
∆ log wage -1.5 -1.5
N 410 205
State-Decade FE yes yes
Adj R-squared 0.72 0.90
First-stage F-statistic 12.10
Spline knots (percentiles) 50,75 50,75
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Clustering of standard
errors is at the labor market region level.
two-stage least squares. I therefore report the F-statistic on the excluded instruments. The
Cragg-Donald Wald F-test produces a value of 12.10 which is well above the critical value
for three instruments of 4.23.42 I calibrate the short-run labor demand elasticity (i.e. the
elasticity for a given level of productivity) rather than estimating it due to the concern of
endogeneity, as explained above. In the baseline, I use a value of −1.5 as in Kline and Moretti
(2014a) but consider lower values (at -1.25 and -0.75) in the Appendix, which changes the
estimates only marginally. The meta-analysis of Lichter et al. (2015) suggests a smaller
absolute value than 1.5. However, larger values are plausible for this analysis since I am
interested in the regional rather than national elasticity and, in addition, make use of decadal
data.
Robustness checks presented in the Appendix include the omission of state-year fixed effects
(instead using year fixed-effects), the usage of different values for the calibration of labor
demand elasticity and spline knots in tables A.2 and A.3, basically leaving the estimates
unaffected. The fact that estimated agglomeration elasticities are lower (while still constant
across density intervals) when East German regions are included (see table A.4) points to
the possibility that the baseline estimates of agglomeration effects are conservative. The
reason is that I apply elasticities estimated using only West German regions to the East in
the baseline. Using lower values of σ for the East would lead to even smaller estimates of
agglomeration effects there. Finally, using linear spline components produces results that
42 Critical values are reported by Stock and Yogo (2002), suggesting a strong first stage. Batten and
Martina (2007) extend the critical values to the case of three instruments and three endogenous regressors.
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are in line with a concave agglomeration function g(.) since the slope declines over density
intervals. This result bolsters the choice of log spline components in the baseline.
1.6.3 Efficiency
I add up the right-hand side terms of equation (1.1) to obtain efficient payments for given
prices. Figure 1.3 plots efficient against actual equalization payments (excluding outliers),
revealing that actual payments are far from optimal: if they were optimal, they would lie on
the 45 degree line. Indeed, the correlation coefficient of the two magnitudes is −0.42.43
Figure 1.3: Efficient and actual equalization payments (year 2005), excluding outliers
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Notes: The amounts are in Euro per capita relative to the population weighted mean. Only efficient equalization payments in
the interval (−5000, 5000) are shown.
Figure 1.4 shows the geographic distribution of efficient payments which is in stark contrast
to the distribution of actual payments shown in figure 1.1. High equalization payments
should be paid to labor market regions in the South of Germany and low payments to the
East – in reality, the opposite happens.44 If agglomeration effects are ignored, this conclusion
remains valid due to the geographical distribution of wage income tax payments (see figure
A.4b for a visualization of efficient payments without agglomeration). However, the variance
of efficient payments increases dramatically due to agglomeration. The reason is simple:
endogenous productivity gains are highest where location-specific wage components are
highest (which is in the South), reinforcing the wage income tax channel.
Relative to the optimum, this means that equalization payments incentivize workers to
stay where they are unproductive and hence regions receiving high per-capita payments are
over-populated. The fact that payments are not optimal manifests itself in net fiscal benefits
43 See Appendix figure A.8 for a scatter plot that includes all observations.
44 Setting ω = 0 changes little, which can be seen in figure (A.4a).
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Figure 1.4: Efficient equalization payments (year 2005)
(1129,7532] (-814,1129]
(-2906,-814] [-6510,-2906]
Notes: This map shows efficient equalization payments in Euro per capita relative to the population weighted mean for each
labor market region. The distribution is partitioned into four intervals containing an equal number of observations. Darker
colors indicate higher values.
unequal across regions, the distribution of which is shown in Appendix figure A.7b. It is the
variance of NFB that matters for the dead-weight loss resulting from inefficient equalization
payments, as will be explained in the next section.
Efficient payments calculated are however only valid for given wages which are a function
of equalization payments via population, i.e. we can so far only check whether existing
payments are optimal. Since efficient equalization payments depend on equalization payments
themselves, I make use of a first-order Taylor polynomial to approximate optimal equalization
payments not conditional on wages in Appendix section (A.1.3).
1.6.4 Equity
Given that fiscal equalization does not seem to be efficient, I now turn to equity. The
discussion in section 1.3 suggested that it is equity considerations that motivate equalization
payments in Germany. But are the payments indeed equitable and if so, by what criterion?
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 clearly show that regions exhibiting low wage premia receive more
equalization payments per capita. However, lower housing cost could compensate for these
low wage premia45 and this is indeed the case in a number of regions. Figure (1.5) plots the
45 The effect of differences in other prices across regions in Germany are small compared to the effects of
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difference in logs of wages and annual rents (per square meter) for each region.46 Relative to
figure (1.2), some clear differences emerge: not surprisingly, high-rent labor market regions
exhibiting the highest (nominal) wage premia, such as Frankfurt, Stuttgart and Munich
are not at the top of the real-wage distribution. However, real wages in those regions are
exceeded by those of a number of regions in East Germany. This finding alone is highly
policy-relevant since eligibility of place-based policies such as capital subsidies continues
to be determined by comparison of nominal wages, neglecting differences in cost of living
(Deutscher Bundestag, 2007). Still, low real wage premia-regions are predominantly found in
the East where per-capita equalization payments are large.
Figure 1.5: Log wage premia relative to rents (year 2005)
(.14,.43] (.05,.14]
(-.06,.05] [-.29,-.06]
Notes: This map shows the difference of log wages and log annual rents per square meter relative to the population weighted
mean for each labor market region. The distribution is partitioned into four intervals containing an equal number of
observations. Darker colors indicate higher values.
On the whole, equalization payments do seem to support equity in terms of realized income
(and possibly amenities) but, in the context of the present model, they are redundant in
the sense that it is their own existence that makes them equitable: in a spatial equilibrium
differences in the cost of housing. This is due to the fact that the cost of housing varies more strongly than
other prices and the expenditure share of housing is significantly larger than shares of other consumption
categories (Kawka, 2010).
46 This log difference is referred to as real wage in what follows. With Cobb-Douglas utility, this real wage
determines agents’ utility in a given region, next to amenities and consumption of the publicly provided
good.
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without equalization payments, labor would adjust such that differences in the real wage are
offset by amenities or public good provision.47
1.7 Dead-weight loss
Given that actual equalization payments do not satisfy the model’s optimality condition
which requires that NFBs are equal across regions, it is then the magnitude of the resulting
loss in efficiency that is of central interest. If equity considerations guide policy makers when
they design equalization schemes, the loss in efficiency can be interpreted as their implicit
willingness to pay for achieving equity-motivated goals.48
I treat NFBs differing across regions as a locational subsidy (or, if negative, as a city-specific
head tax). Recall that the NFB measures the deviation of equalization payments from their
optimal value. It is here that the assumption of equalization payments being received by
workers instead of local governments is crucial (see section 1.2). Albouy (2009) and Albouy
(2012) derive the dead-weight-loss (DWL) for this setting49 and arrive at the following
equation
DWL
mN
= 12 × × var
(
dNFB
m
)
(1.6)
where  represents the elasticity of population with respect to equalization payments, N
is total population, m is average income and the variance term measures the dispersion of
NFB across locations. In line with Harberger (1964), the dead-weight loss is increasing in
the elasticity and the expected value of the square of differential net benefits (relative to the
mean).
1.7.1 Population elasticity
A key component of the deadweight loss formula is the percent change in population due
to a permanent increase in equalization payments. The ideal experiment would randomly
assign permanent changes in equalization payments, allowing the identification of long-run
responses in population. Lacking such an experiment, I resort to the analysis of yearly
population movements across labor market region borders. Such movements occur only
out of equilibrium, since agents are indifferent between locations under the no-arbitrage
47 In reality, moving costs might be substantial but should matter less in the long run which is the focus
of the present paper
48 To a certain extent, pursuing equity is mandated: the German constitution requires the Federal
government to ensure that equivalent (not equal) conditions of living prevail in all parts of the country (see
Article 72 (2) of the “Grundgesetz”), although this mandate does not specify precisely when conditions can
be considered equivalent.
49 Computing the DWL amounts to replacing an equalization scheme that ensures uniform NFBs across
regions by a utility-equivalent scheme with NFBs that differ across regions.
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equilibrium condition. The empirical approach I pursue below can be described as follows:
I compare regions that vary in local government expenditures but are similar in terms
of other observable characteristics, assuming that movements across region borders are
due to the differences in local government expenditures. I approximate the elasticity by
investigating the effect on population of local government expenditures per capita instead of
equalization payments due to the endogeneity of those payments since low-performing regions
receive equalization payments but lose population because of weak economic fundamentals,
obfuscating the relationship of interest.50
I first investigate what the effect of per-capita local government expenditure differentials is on
movements in the cross section of region pairs, controlling for wage (w) and unemployment
(u) differentials between two regions.51 In other words, I want to determine the yearly
flow in response to an expenditure differential. I then simulate the long-run adjustment by
multiplying this yearly flow by 10.52
The estimating equation reads
lnMij,t = ρMij + a∆ij (expt) + b∆ij (wt) + c∆ij (ut) + Mij,t (1.7)
where Mij,t is the flow from region i to j in year t, exp is per-capita local government
expenditure and ∆ij denotes the difference in a variable between the two regions. The time-
constant region pair-specific flow ρMij accounts for the fact that certain region pairs exhibit
movement patterns which are stable over time independent of economic conditions (e.g.
Berlin attracts people from all areas of Germany each year regardless of wages or expenditure).
I rely on the between-estimator to estimate a, assuming uncorrelatedness between the time-
constant movement component and expenditure differentials. The between-estimator exploits
only the variation between region pairs, neglecting variation within pairs over time, which is
consistent with the assumption that it is the long-run differences in expenditure that guide
agents’ behavior. By regressing the logarithm of the flow on expenditure differences as a
multiple of 1% of average income, I obtain the percentage increase in the flow.
Estimating equation (1.7) gives the results in table 1.4. The estimates can be interpreted as
follows: a per-capita expenditure differential of 1% of average income in favor of the origin
region relative to the destination region induces a reduction in the population outflow from
the origin region of 11 % over ten years, using the results from column 3. Equivalently, this
can be interpreted as a decrease in the population inflow into the destination region of 11
50 This assumption may not be innocuous: an increase in equalization payments could lead to a less than
one-for-one increase in expenditures, e.g. if local governments decide to cut taxes instead.
51 The theoretical model abstracts from unemployment since adding it would make the analysis more
complicated but add little to the analysis of agglomeration economies which depends on the density of
employed workers. However, neglecting unemployment when estimating the population elasticity might
induce bias.
52 Adjustment horizons extending over a larger number of years yield even higher values of the population
elasticity, leading to a larger dead-weight loss.
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% over ten years. The control variables’ signs are reassuring: an increase in the (market)
income differential (of 1% of average income ) in favor of the origin region reduces the outflow
while an increase in the unemployment rate (measured in percentage points) in favor of the
origin region increases the outflow.
Table 1.4: Estimates of population flows in response to expenditure differentials
(1) (2) (3)
∆ Expenditure -0.004∗ -0.007∗∗∗ -0.011∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
∆ Income -0.005∗∗∗ -0.003∗∗∗
(0.000) (0.000)
∆ Unemployment rate 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002)
Observations 820561 554595 554595
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.009 0.009
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). The dependent variable is
the log of the population flow from region i to region j. The expenditure differential is the difference
in expenditure between region i and region j and similarly for the other independent variables.
Next, I apply this estimate to the overall net inflow at the labor market level. That is, I
aggregate all region pair specific-flows year to get a region’s inflow and outflow (the means
of which are shown in table 1.5). Then, I apply an 11% reduction to the outflow and an 11%
increase to the inflow. Next, I compute the implied change in the overall net inflow. This is
the population change due to a per-capita expenditure differential of 1% of average income.
Dividing by population and averaging over all regions produces an estimate of the elasticity
of population with respect to an increase in equalization payments of 0.5.
Table 1.5: Predicted population effects (year 2005)
Variable Mean Std. dev.
Inflow 7524 9538
Outflow 7524 8773
Implied population change (in levels) 1655 2008
Implied population change (as fraction of population) 0.005 0.001
This estimate of the elasticity lies between existing estimates for Canada explicitly using
equalization payments as the independent variable, which are however measured at the
province level. My estimates are about three times as large as Bakhshi et al. (2009)’s, who
use a specification similar to the one in equation (1.7) but do not look at the differential
in payments. In addition, they exploit within-province variation in payments which is
problematic if it is the long-run differences that drive migration patterns. Wilson (2003)
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finds an elasticity of 3.2 over a period of six years based on changes in the equalization
scheme.53
1.7.2 Dead weight loss calculation
Computing the DWL is now straightforward and the results are presented in table 1.6.
Depending on whether agglomeration is taken into account or ignored in the NFB calculation,
the results vary substantially. Using  = 0.5 yields a DWL of roughly e11 billion or 0.5 %
of GDP.54 On the other hand, the efficiency loss amounts to only 0.02% if it is computed
without the NFB term relating to agglomeration. This means that neglecting agglomeration
understates the efficiency loss by a factor of 25. For the case of Canada, this would suggest a
DWL of approximately C$ 100 billion instead of C$ 4 billion, as estimated by Albouy (2012),
who ignores agglomeration.55
Table 1.6: Dead weight loss calculations (year 2005)
Variable With agglomeration Without agglomeration
var
(
dNFB
m
)
0.02 0.0008
elasticity  0.5 0.5
DWL
mN
0.005 0.0002
mN e2200 billion e2200 billion
DWL e11 billion e0.44 billion
1.8 Conclusions
In this paper, I have estimated the contribution of agglomeration economies to the efficiency
calculus of equalization payments. Efficient equalization payments compensate workers
for wage income tax payments that are higher in high-productivity regions and offset the
externality that results from public good congestion of movers. In addition, they should take
into account endogenous productivity effects due to agglomeration varying across space: in
some regions, increasing the density of employment has a larger impact on productivity and
this is where workers should be incentivized to locate. Neglected by the existing literature,
this type of externality has a profound impact. Since the current equalization scheme in
Germany incentivizes workers to locate in low-productivity areas, contrary to what is optimal,
the policy creates a dead-weight loss. Not accounting for agglomeration understates the
dead-weight loss by a factor of 25.
53 Labor mobility is typically thought to be higher in North America than in European coun-
tries. See e.g. http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ECAEXT/Resources/258598-1284061150155/
7383639-1323888814015/8319788-1324485944855/10_us.pdf, retrieved February 12, 2018.
54 GDP is used to approximate mN . The share of GDP of equalization payments as defined in this paper
amounts to 3.8% in 2005.
55 Albouy (2012)’s calculation is based on the above-mentioned population elasticity estimate of 3.2.
28
These results are policy-relevant: by providing more realistic estimates of equalization’s
efficiency cost, I have highlighted the equity-efficiency tradeoff inherent in such schemes.
This can inform the public debate about regional re-distribution that is oftentimes focused
primarily on equity or on the incentive effects that arise for local governments. In addition, if
it is true that knowledge-intensive industries will make up an even larger share of production
in the future, it may well be that agglomeration economies, too, will play en even larger role.
An important limitation of the current analysis the assumption of perfect mobility. Even
though mobility is likely to be quite high over the long run (i.e. across decades), which is
the focus of the current model, and the model can allow for a fraction of the population
to be immobile, it would be interesting to consider imperfect mobility by incorporating
idiosyncratic preferences for locations in the model as in Suarez Serrato and Zidar (2016). On
top of idiosyncratic preferences, unemployment insurance might be a reason for immobility in
the short run. Incorporating immobility would allow for an analysis of the equity-efficiency
trade-off when the federal government wants to achieve redistribution of income to immobile
workers.
While congestion of the publicly provided good has been modeled explicitly above, I have
abstracted from endogeneity of consumption amenities. A higher density of population may
on the one hand make a region more attractive since e.g. specialty restaurants or certain
cultural institutions are not profitable in low density areas. But there can also be downsides
such as a higher level of criminal activity or environmental pollution (Diamond, 2016). Future
work could consider the impact of these effects on optimal equalization payments.
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Chapter 2
Efficiency and Equity Effects of
Place-Based Policies: Evidence from
Capital Subsidies in East Germany1
2.1 Introduction
In many countries and federations, place-based policies are a means to support regions that
are economically lagging behind. Identification of these regional transfers is challenging,
which explains why systematic empirical evidence is still scarce. It is even more difficult
to disentangle the underlying mechanisms of the local subsidies as agglomeration effects,
inter-regional or inter-sectoral shifts of economic activity might simultaneously be at play
and have opposing effects. However, understanding these mechanisms is crucial for optimally
designing the policy as different channels have different consequences for the eventual welfare
effects of the policy – at the local, regional and national level.
In this paper, we analyze the effects of a prominent German place-based policy put into
place after the reunification to revitalize the East German economy after 50 years of socialist
economic policy. Besides estimating the policy effect on treated regions, we explicitly shed
light on the underlying mechanisms and spatial spill-overs of the policy.
The policy under study is called Gemeinschaftsaufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruk-
tur – throughout the paper, we will refer to it using the German acronym GRW. The GRW
constitutes Germany’s main regional policy scheme for underdeveloped regions (Deutscher
Bundestag, 1997) with 90% of the capital subsidies going to East Germany after reunification.
The GRW’s main instrument are capital investment subsidies for manufacturing firms in
eligible regions, which can be used for purchasing new machines or building new production
sites. The explicit goal of the policy is to incentivize investment, thereby creating new jobs
and stimulating regional growth.
1 This chapter is co–authored by Sebastian Siegloch.
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Our identifying variation comes from multiple changes of the maximum fraction of covered
investment costs. These changes in the maximum subsidy rate additionally varied across
sectors, firm sizes and – importantly – East German counties according to an indicator of
regional economic performance. This indicator is based on pre-determined performance
measures on a higher regional level and thus difficult to manipulate for the counties. Explicitly,
we compare counties that are below the threshold yielding a higher subsidy rate to counties
that are above. In other words, we zoom in on counties that are relatively similar in terms
of income, employment dynamics and infrastructure amenities prior to treatment. Eligibility
thresholds change across budgeting periods and these changes are partly triggered by EU
legislation, which is exogenous to economic developments in East Germany.
We make use of the Establishment History Panel, an administrative plant-level dataset,
provided by the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) of the German Federal Employment
Agency. For the years 1996-2013, we have access to a fifty percent random sample of
establishments in East Germany. The data cover the annual number of employees at an
establishment as well as the county in which it is located. In addition, we rely on IAB
data on wages included in the Sample of Integrated Labour Market Biographies. Official
subsidy data is provided by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. We have obtained
the universe of GRW subsidy cases, including the county, investment volume and amount in
subsidies paid. In addition, we gathered regional data to replicate the indicators determining
treatment status across all budgeting periods.
The main outcome of interest in our study is the effect of the GRW subsidy on regional
employment. Econometrically, we make use of event study designs to pin down the policy
effects. However, we do not restrict our analysis to the overall effect of the policy on the
treated regions, but also study the underlying mechanisms by analyzing inter and intra-
regional spill-overs. In order to do so, we study the policy effects on uncovered sectors and
regions by varying the level of regional aggregation (i.e. by looking at labor market regions
instead of counties).
Our main empirical findings are as follows. Changes in the main policy instrument, the
maximum subsidy rate, significantly affect actual subsidies paid (the lower the maximum
rate, the lower subsidies paid). As for employment, a one percentage point decrease in the
maximum subsidy rate leads to a decrease in county-level manufacturing employment of 1.4%
five years after the reform. After ten years, the effect stabilizes at a level of manufacturing
employment lower by 1.8%. However, overall employment in counties experiencing a decrease
in the maximum rate does not decrease and employment in sectors other than manufacturing
actually seems to increase slightly. While GDP is not affected, manufacturing wages decrease
but only for the low skilled. As a consequence, county-level inequality increases. Finally,
when we aggregate manufacturing employment to the level of the labor market region, the
effects are smaller by about 64%, suggesting that the negative employment effect in treated
counties is to a significant degree driven by reallocation of labor within the commuting zone.
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We contribute to the existing and recently growing literature on place-based policies in
several ways.2 We complement the finding by Kline and Moretti (2014a) who study the
long-term effects of the Tennessee Valley Authority, the most prominent regional subsidy
program in U.S. history.3 They find that agglomeration economies yield a long-term positive
effect on manufacturing employment in treated regions, which persists even after the program
ended. Using a place-based subsidy paid to West German regions close the Iron Curtain
from the 1970s to until reunification, Ehrlich and Seidel (2018) corroborate the positive
long-term effects of temporary subsidies. Moreover, they point to an important channel
that can explain the persistence by presenting evidence that subsidies increase local public
investment levels beyond the existence of the program. Looking at Chinese cities, Alder et al.
(2016) show that special employment zones have a strong positive effect on GDP mainly
driven by an increase in capital accumulation.
In a recent paper, Overman (2018) have analyzed an industrial policy in the UK, which is
similar to the GRW. Exploiting changes in regions’ eligibility for subsidy rates, they find
manufacturing employment effects that are quite similar to ours. We complement their
analysis by focusing on dynamic (pre-)treatment effects and studying in particular the
long-run effects of the policy. Moreover, we also study the effect on wages by skill-group and
underlying inequality effects, focusing on the redistributive effects of place-based policies,
which are often one of their main policy goals (Neumark and Simpson, 2015). Despite this
explicit goal, a comprehensive evidence of the distributional effects of place-based policies
is still scarce. One goal of this paper is to start closing this gap by studying a case where
both regional inequality in economic performance, i.e. the East-West productivity gap after
reunification, and within regional inequality was massive.
Another aim of the current study is to add to our understanding of inter and intra-regional
spill-overs of place-based policies – a key issue, which only recently has received increased
attention. Our evidence complements the contemporaneous and independently conducted
study by Dettmann et al. (2016), which focuses on GRW subsidies to West German counties.
The paper looks at the effect at the regional level, finding no aggregate effect. While the
context of the GRW for West Germany is markedly different, as the intensity of subsidization
is much lower compared to East German, our results underline the importance of looking at
firm level data as important inter-regional spill-over might not be detectable at the aggregate
regional level.
Intra-regional employment spill-overs might also explain the contrasting evidence found in a
series of papers investigating effects of the EU Structural Funds (ESF), a regional subsidy
paid by the European Union (Becker et al., 2010, 2012, 2013). Interestingly, the ESF had no
effects on employment, while it increased GDP per capita.4
2 For a current survey, see Neumark and Simpson (2015).
3 Neumark and Kolko (2010) provide a short-term analysis of state enterprise zones.
4 Another reason for the different results might be that the ESF comprise different programs, some of
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In terms of inter-regional spillovers, the existing evidence so far is mixed. While Overman
(2018) and Alder et al. (2016) find no effect on neighbors of treated regions, Ehrlich and
Seidel (2018) suggest that positive employment effects in treated regions might at least
in part be at the expense of other regions. Our findings show that more than half of the
employment effect of the place-based policy studied is absorbed when moving the analysis
to the level of the commuting zone, suggesting substantial regional, yet still quite local
spill-overs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: We explain the institutional setting
in section 2.2, followed by a section on the research design. Section 2.4 presents the data.
Empirical results are presented in section 2.5. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Institutional background
In this paper, we study a specific German regional economic policy, called Gemeinschaft-
saufgabe Verbesserung der regionalen Wirtschaftsstruktur (GRW). The GRW is jointly
coordinated and financed by the federal government and state governments. Since 1969,
the policy’s goal has been to equalize standards of living across Germany not via transfer
payments to individuals but by way of stimulating regional business activity leading to the
creation of jobs, in particular in the manufacturing sector.
In the 1970s and 1980s, the GRW targeted economically underdeveloped regions in West
Germany. With the reunification in 1990, East German regions, which were considerably
less industrialized than Western ones, became eligible for GRW subsidies. As a result, 89%
of the GRW funds since 1990 have been targeted at former East Germany. As such, the
GRW was seen as one of the main instruments aiming at re-industrializing East Germany
and bringing it to Western levels.5
From 1993 to 2013, each year on average 1 billion euros of subsidies were paid out to East
German firms. While the GRW incorporates a number of instruments itself, by far the most
important one are capital and wage subsidies paid out to firms, making up roughly two thirds
of the total budget (Deutscher Bundestag, 1997).6 These grants are used to cover a certain
which are directed at firms and others at local governments and it is therefore impossible to evaluate the
effect of the individual programs.
5 Other policy measures targeted at firms in Eastern Germany included a capital investment bonus
program (Investitionszulage), a non-discretionary capital subsidy targeted at entire Eastern Germany, and
loans provided by KfW and the European Recovery Program. Our empirical strategy outlined below makes
sure that we isolate the effect of the GRW. Another class of programs directed funds to municipalities
rather than to firms. We check that the reforms exploited for identification did not affect funds paid to
municipalities.
6 As part of the GRW, infrastructure subsidies are granted to municipalities independently of capital and
wage subsidies, accounting for the remaining budget. As shown below, we exploit reforms at the county
level for identification, which did not affect municipal infrastructure funding, the intensity of which was
not changed over the course of the years. Other quantitatively less important GRW instruments are the
financing of employee training, counseling, research and marketing for small and medium sized firms.
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cost share of a firm’s investment project. Typical eligible investment projects comprise the
acquisition of machinery, buildings but also licenses and patents. The wage bills of workers
can be subsidized only for workers directly working on the corresponding investment project.
Eligibility of a project is determined by a number of requirements which need to be fulfilled.
On a broad level, a project is eligible for funding if (a) the yearly investment cost exceeds
the average amount of the firm’s capital consumption in the preceding three years by at least
50% or if (b) the number of regular (i.e. not short-term) employees is increased by at least
15% due to the project. In addition, the following requirements have to be fulfilled: (i) the
project’s duration must not exceed three years, (ii) firms applying have to predominantly sell
their products or services outside of their county. The latter requirement means that products
worth at least one half of firm revenues must be sold outside of the respective county. The
rationale behind this requirement is that export-oriented firms generate additional income
within a county, which is in turn spent partly on regionally traded goods and services, leading
to a multiplier effect. Requirement (ii) causes that 74% of funds go to manufacturing firms
(Appendix table B.5 shows industries for which requirement (ii) was assumed to hold and
firms did not have to provide evidence). Nevertheless, apart from a small number of specific
industry branches, all industries were de jure eligible for the subsidies.
In order to receive the subsidy, firms need to apply at their respective state government,
specifying the investment project and demonstrating that the eligibility criteria are fulfilled.
States have an annual budget on subsidies to be paid out and can discretionarily grant or
deny a firm’s application. Note that in more than 90% of cases, states do not exhaust their
annual budgets, which suggests that there was de facto no rationing of the funds and no
rivalry between projects.7
Upon successful application, firms would receive subsidies to cover a certain share of the
investment cost stated in the application. There was a binding maximum subsidy rate
imposed by federal law, which varied by county, year and firm type. Note that states could
undercut the maximum subsidy rate for a given project if desired. We show below that
exogenous changes in a county’s maximum subsidy rate strongly affect total subsidized
investment. The yearly average share of the investment cost of granted projects covered by
subsidies was approximately 20% at the county level.
In the empirical part of the paper, we exploit (the exogenous components of) the variation
in maximum subsidy rates to estimate the causal effects of the policy. In the following,
we describe this variation in detail. At the onset of the GRW post-reunification program,
firms in all East German counties were treated equally, with the maximum subsidy rate
for small and medium-sized firms being 50% and 35% for large firms. Firm size is defined
by the number of employees: small firms have less than 51 workers, medium-sized firms
7 Unfortunately, no systematic information on the number of denied applications exists. Bronzini and
de Blasio (2006) exploit such information in an analysis of investment subsidies for firms in Italy. However,
they focus on firm-level outcomes instead of regional outcomes.
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51 to 250, and large one above 250. Starting in the mid-1990s, policy makers realized
that economic development was very unequal across East German regions. As a result,
policymakers introduced differential maximum rates between counties in 1997 based on a
county’s neediness. Out of the 76 counties, only 49 were were categorized to have the highest
funding priority. For these, maximum subsidy rates remained unchanged. For the remaining
27 counties, maximum subsidy rates were cut by 7 percentage points across all three firm
size groups (see Table 2.1, regimes 1 vs. 2).
Table 2.1: Subsidy regimes
Regime 1 Regime 2 Regime 3 Regime 4 Regime 5
pre 1997 1997-1999 2000-2006 2007-2010 2011-2014
Relative priority high low high low high low high low high low
small firms 50% n/a 50% 43% 50% 43% 50% n/a 50% 40%
medium firms 50% n/a 50% 43% 50% 43% 40% n/a 40% 30%
large firms 35% n/a 35% 28% 35% 28% 30% n/a 30% 20%
# counties 76 n/a 49 27 40 36 76 n/a 59 17
Sources: Deutscher Bundestag (1996), Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bun-
destag (2007)
The allocation of counties to highest or lower funding priority was conducted by the Federal
government based on an indicator of economic performance in preceding years. Importantly,
the performance indicator was calculated at the labor market region level. Labor market
regions are comparable to commuting zones in the U.S.. Counties are perfectly nested within
labor market regions.8 The indicator for labor market region r and the year 1997 is the
weighted geometric mean of three sub-indicators and described by the following formula
indicator1997r = (infr1995r )0.1 × (wage1995r )0.4 × (unemp1995r )0.5,
where infr measures the quality of a county’s infrastructure9 in 1995, wage represents
per-capita earnings in 1995 and unemp measures the unemployment rate in 1995.
All 53 labor market regions were ranked according to this indicator. Counties whose labor
market region had an index-value below a certain threshold (here: normalized to 100) were
classified as highest funding priority, counties whose labor market region had an index-value
above received a cut in the maximum subsidy rate (see Figure 2.1). In Appendix Table B.1,
we take a more detailed look at the counties around the 1997 cutoff.
Over the years, multiple changes in county border definitions occurred due to mergers of
8 The only exception is the labor market region of Berlin, where the border of the labor market region
cuts through certain counties. We drop Berlin from the analysis.
9 The infrastructure sub-indicator is based on measures of reachability of an airport and of close large
cities by car or train, of the traveling time for trucks to the next trans-shipment center, the share among all
employees of employees in applied research institutes, the share of apprenticeship training position, the share
of employees in technical occupations, the share of high school graduates, capacity of inter-company training
centers and population density.
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counties. Throughout, we make use of the county border definitions of the year 2014. If a
county that is treated in a given regime is merged with an untreated county, this has the
effect that the resulting, larger county is only partially affected by the reform. We exclude
all counties that were only partially affected by a reform in a robustness test.
For a perfectly deterministic rule, we would expect all counties below the threshold to
receive the high maximum rates. However, there are some counties below this value that
lose eligibility for high rates. This is mainly due to the fact that counties bordering Berlin
were partially reformed: municipalities close to Berlin received a cut but municipalities
further away did not receive a cut, the rationale being that there are a lot of cross-county
commuters close to Berlin. We classify the affected counties as downgraded but exclude all
counties that were only partially affected by a reform in a robustness test.10 In addition,
the Federal government (jointly with state governments) reserves the right to deviate from
the ranking when they see fit. However, this happens rarely (e.g. in 1997, two counties were
affected). Nevertheless, we pay special attention to ensuring the comparability of treatment
and control groups in our empirical analysis.
Figure 2.1: Ranking of counties based on indicator (year 1997)
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Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. Notes: This figure plots indicator values and the ranks of counties in the year
1997. The cutoff was formally at indicator value 100 (however some counties below the cutoff still lost eligibility for the
highest assistance rates).
In the year 2000, a new ranking of the counties was generated based on updated measures
of past economic performances and slight changes in the indicator function (see Appendix
B.1). As shown in Table 2.1, 40 counties received highest priority with additional counties
switching from high to low priority (compared to 1997).
In 2007, the ranking of counties was renewed. At this time, all German counties (East and
West) were ranked, while in previous years East Germany regions were assessed separately.
Due to the relatively richer West German regions, all East German counties received high
10 County mergers, explained above, are also responsible for exceptions. When counties merge, we define
the indicator as the average of the merging counties’ indicator values.
37
priority status. At the same time, the maximum subsidy rate for medium and small firms
were cut by 10 and 5 percentage points, respectively (cf. Table 2.1).
The last reassessment analyzed occurred in 2011. 17 counties were downgraded in their
priority status. The reason for this change was the EU’s enlargement from 15 to 25 member
states which resulted in a decline of EU average regional GDP per capita. According to
EU regulations, regions above the 75th percentile of GDP per capita lose eligibility for the
highest maximum rates. This cutoff effectively replaces the indicator cutoff in other years
since the EU rule trumps any national allocation schemes.
The various reforms generate substantial variation in maximum subsidy rates across East
German counties. Figure 2.2 illustrates that all counties experience at least one change in
the subsidy rate, while more than 50% experience two or three changes. We exploit these
changes in our empirical research design presented in Section 2.3.
Figure 2.2: Number of reforms in the maximum subsidy rates
1 (33)
2 (33)
3 (10)
Sources: Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bundestag (2007). Notes: This figure shows
the number of reforms in the maximum subsidy rates a county experienced. Berlin is excluded from the analysis.
2.3 Research design
We estimate the causal effect of the subsidy implementing different variants of event study
designs. Given that the policy variation described in Section 2.2 is quite complex, we develop
our preferred empirical model step-by-step for didactic reasons. We start with a situation of
one policy reform, say the switch from regime 1 to 2 described in Table 2.1. In this case, the
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treatment group are the 27 counties which are assigned a low priority status in 1997 and
which therefore experience a reduction in the maximum subsidy rate.
Basic model
The simplest version of the event study design for such a set-up is defined as follows:
ln yc,t =
A∑
k=−B
βkDc,t−k + γc + ψs,t + εc,t. (2.1)
We regress an outcome y in county c and year t on a set of dummy variable, Dc,t−k indicating
whether a change in the maximum subsidy rate occurred for the county k ∈ [−B, ..., A]
periods ago. As described in Section 2.2, the vast majority of subsidy rate changes were
decreases. Consequently, we define the indicator variable as follow: D = 1 for the typical
change, hence a rate cut, D = −1 for an increase and D = 0 if the maximum subsidy rate
did not change. Parameters −B and A denote the ends of the event window. Coefficient
β−3, for instance, measures the effect of a change in the subsidy rate three years into the
future on the outcome in year t, and β2 the lagged subsidy effect after two years. Hence,
the event study design enables us to test for flat pre-trends (k ≤ −1) and informs about
the adjustment paths of the treatment effect (k ≥ 0). Following standard practice, the end
points of the event window −B and A account for all changes that will occur in | −B| or
more periods in the future, and that have occurred A or more periods ago (McCrary, 2007).
This adjustment makes the system of event dummies perfectly collinear such that we omit
the dummy for the pre-treatment year k = −1 from the regression. All other estimates are to
be interpreted relative to the pre-treatment period. The model includes county fixed-effects
γc and state (s) times year fixed effects ψs,t.11
While we described the basic event study design using the example of one reform, it is
obvious that the set-up is flexible enough to account for the multiple reforms we experience
during our sample period from 1996 to 2013. Consider the year t = 2007 and a county c that
is treated, i.e., above the cut-off, in regime 2. For this county, event dummy Dc, t− 10 = 1
would be switched on since the 1997 reform occurred ten years ago. At the same time,
Dc, t − 0 = −1 since all counties were high-priority in 2007. We are able to separate the
effects, as long as there is per county variation in the number of treatment dummies that are
switched on simultaneously (Fuest et al., 2018). In the following, we will adjust this simple
version of the event study in two ways.
11 Standard errors are clustered at the county level throughout.
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Size-adjusted model
First, we take into account that our reforms induced subsidy rate changes of different sizes.
This is particularly important in our setting of multiple reforms. The reforms differentially
affected maximum subsidy rates for different firm sizes. For instance, rates for small firms
may increase in a given year and region while rates for large firms decrease. To exploit these
changes, we define treatment intensity Ic,t of county c and year t as
Ic,t = ∆ssmallc,t ωsmallc + ∆smedc,t ωmedc + ∆s
large
c,t ω
large
c . (2.2)
The intensity measure is a weighted average of the change in maximum subsidy rate
∆ssc,t = ssc,t−ssc,t−1 across firm types, s ∈ [small,med, large]. Respective weights are denoted
by ω and defined as the respective share of firm size specific covered employment in total
covered employment in county c in the first available data year t¯, hence pre-treatment.12
Covered employment, in turn, refers to employment in industries that are eligible for the
subsidy and is approximated by manufacturing employment. Denoting covered employment
as E, formally:
ωsc =
Esc,t¯
Esmallc,t¯ + Emedc,t¯ + E
large
c,t¯
∀s ∈ [small,med, large]
Based on these definitions, the adjusted event study design, accounting for the intensity of
the treatment is given by:
ln yc,t =
A∑
k=−B
βk [Dc,t−k · Ic,t−k] + γc + ψst + εc,t. (2.3)
Compared to the simple, conventional model given in equation (2.1), this variant of the
event study replaces the homogeneous zero/one treatment indicator with an indicator that
is specific to the event. By defining event indicators in terms of event sizes, we sacrifice the
purely non-parametric nature of the event study.13 On the other hand, with the – rather
weak and standard assumption of linearity – we can make heterogeneous reforms comparable
and therefore poolable across space and time.
Improving comparability
In the second step, we want to improve the comparability between treatment and control
group. So far we have implicitly assumed treatment assignment as random, which yields
unbiased estimates of the treatment effects βk ∀k ≥ 0. We know, however, that treatment
12 In our case, t¯ = 1995. We drop year 1995 from the data after calculating the shares.
13 Note, however, that quantifying the magnitude of an effect using a traditional event study design usually
involves an implicit linear assumption as effects are assessed by the size of the average reform size.
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was not random but based on past economic performance of the counties. Hence, it is
possible that treatment and control counties were on different trends. While pre-treatment
coefficients, βk ∀k < 0, generally inform about different pre-trends, we can further increase
the comparability of treatment and control group by restricting the sample to counties closer
to the cut-off. Denote Tr,M (Cr,M) the set of M counties closest to the performance cut-off
from above (below) following the indicator determined in reform r. Let Sr,M = Tr,M ∪ Cr,M
the set of 2M counties around the cut-off following reform r. The general rationale of the
following extension of the simple event study is to restrict the sample to counties close to
the cut-off making treatment and control counties more comparable. If common trends
assumptions were not fulfilled in the full sample, pre-trends should become flatter. In terms
of post-treatment effects, we would expect weakly larger effects due to this restriction since
well performing counties that receive a cut in the maximum subsidy rate would do better
in economic terms than under performing counties that do not receive a reduction. This
general difference in trends is arguably less pronounced around the cut-off.
Restricting the sample to counties around the cut-off is complicated by the presence of
multiple reforms. We use an example to illustrate this point: Let us consider three regimes
(1,2,3) and two reforms (1997 and 2000). In the year 1997, 27 counties were downgraded
in their priority and experienced a subsidy rate cut (cf. Table 2.1). In 2000, some of the
remaining high-priority counties were downgraded, as well. We now have 3 groups of counties:
(i) counties that were always high priority (N=40); (ii) counties that stayed high priority in
regime 2 but were downgraded in regime 3 (N=9); (iii) counties that were downgraded in
regime 2 (N=27). If we choose M = 13 ∀r ∈ {1997, 2000}14, reform 1 will yield 13 treated
and 13 control counties.15 However, out of the counties in S1997,13, some are close to the
cut-off in 2000 while others are not in the restricted sample (/∈ S2000,13) either because they
are too far away from the cut-off from above or below. These transitions further complicate
the definition of samples close to the cut-off. We deal with this issue by including only
counties which are at least once close to a cut-off. Table B.4 illustrate the year-specific ranks
of all counties along with their treatment intensity.
We implement this variation by estimating equation (2.3) on the restricted sample
ln yc,t | SM =
A∑
k=−B
βk [Dc,t−k · Ic,t−k] + γc + ψs,t + εc,t (2.4)
where SM is the union of all reform specific samples: SM = S1997,M ∪ S2000,M ∪ S2011,M .16
14 This will be our preferred restriction in the empirical analysis below.
15 In fact, as described in section 2, there are a few counties that are downgraded even though they are
below the cutoff. However, these exceptions are quite rare (see cutoff tables in the Appendix).
16 Note that there is no relevant cutoff for the year 2007 since all counties in East Germany were affected
by the reform.
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Testing for regional spill-overs
Regional spill-overs can be a result of place-based policies. In our setting such spill-overs
would imply that counties in the control group are affected by the policy changes as well.
Theoretically, these spill-overs can be positive in case local demand beyond the county lines
is stimulated or negative if economic activities move from control to treated counties as a
consequence of the policy. It is important to bear in mind that βˆk provides the overall policy
effect on treated counties, relative to non-treated. In other words, a significant policy effect
could be driven by a positive effect on treated counties and zero effect on non-treated, a
zero-effect on treated counties and a negative effect on non-treated due to spill-overs, or
some combination of both effects. What is more, if non-treated, neighboring counties benefit
from the policy, e.g. because of agglomeration forces that do not stop at county borders, the
positive policy effect is underestimated. We test for those kinds of spill-overs by moving
the analysis to a higher level of aggregation. Explicitly, we aggregate employment to the
labor market region level and re-estimate the model. The difference between the estimate
at the county-level and the estimate at the labor market region level gives an indication of
reallocation of economic activity within the commuting zone.
2.4 Data
2.4.1 Subsidy data
We make use of administrative subsidy data provided by the Federal Ministry for Economic
Affairs (via the division Bundesamt fuer Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle). For the years
1996-2013, we have the universe of GRW subsidy cases in East Germany including investment
volume, subsidy amount, duration and the receiving establishment’s county and industry.
Firms are asked how many jobs were saved and created due to the subsidy’s payment. This
information is, however, not verifiable and we will not rely on theses answers in our analysis.
Matching these data to an establishment’s employment outcome is prohibited due to data
protection laws. Therefore, we investigate the employment response of establishments in a
treated area but are unable to identify which establishment did in fact receive subsidies and
which didn’t. As mentioned above, 74% of all subsidies were paid to manufacturing firms.
Table 2 shows that the average yearly subsidy payments received by a county amount to
EUR 13 million, supporting investment projects worth EUR 64 million. This implies an
overall average assistance rate of about 20%. This is due to the fact that in many cases,
maximum rates are not exhausted. Importantly, these figures include co-payments by the
European Union via the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). Whether subsidies
were paid for by the ERDF or GRW is irrelevant for the purpose of our analysis since in
Germany, ERDF funds simply increase states’ subsidy budgets. Restrictions on subsidy
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Table 2.2: GRW descriptive statistics (1996-2013)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Granted funds (in millions of EUR) 1364 13 20
Investment volume (in millions of EUR) 1364 64 121
Saved jobs 1364 824 940
Additional jobs 1364 297 352
Sub-sample for which industry classifications are available
Granted funds (in millions of EUR) 1247 11 20
Investment volume (in millions of EUR) 1247 46 107
Saved jobs 1247 615 860
Additional jobs 1247 169 236
Manufacturing share of funds 1247 .74 .33
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (Bundesamt fuer Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle) Notes: Information on
jobs saved and created is provided by subsidy recipients. We do not make use of this information, which is not verifiable.
usage, such as sectoral restrictions and maximum assistance rates are thus identical for
ERDF and GRW funds.
2.4.2 Employment and wage data
As for employment data, we use the Establishment History Panel (BHP) based on social
security records and provided by the Institute of Employment Research in Nuremberg
(Schmucker et al., 2016). We have access to a fifty percent random sample of establishments
in Germany for the period of 1995-2013. This data set includes the yearly number of
employees by skill at an establishment as well as the county in which it is located and the
industry classification. Since we have no information on whether more than one establishment
belongs to the same firm, we use the terms “firm” and “establishment” interchangeably,
always referring to the latter. We also make use of the IAB’s Sample of Integrated Labour
Market Biographies (SIAB), to analyze wages (Antoni et al., 2016). A 2% sample of individual
earnings biographies is available, which includes individual characteristics as well as employer
information from the BHP.17
2.4.3 Observable confounders
We test both the credibility of our identification and the robustness our findings by taking a
closer look whether differences in observable confounders determine treatment status and
affect treatment effects. The identifying assumption of our main empirical model given in
equation (2.4) is that treatment and control groups are similar prior to the reform, which is
implied by flat pre-trends. In other words, there must not be systematic differences in local
17 Earnings histories are in general recorded for persons who have appeared at least once in the social
security system, either as an employee or as being unemployed, since 1975.
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business cycles that determine treatment status. We test whether identification is achieved
by looking at pre-trends in county level GDP per capita and the local unemployment rate,
which are publicly provided by state and federal statistical offices. Similarly, we estimate
the treatment effect on our main outcomes conditional on (pre-determined) business cycle
controls.
In addition, we have data on appropriations of money for investment received by municipalities
and counties, which we investigate as an additional outcome variable since these funds may
be correlated with GRW payments. To the extent that the funds were received not by firms
but by municipalities and counties, these figures include infrastructure subsidies as well
as other equalization transfers including numerous Federal funds intended to assist East
German regions post-reunification. Descriptives are shown in table 3 and reveal a very high
average unemployment rate in East counties of about 17 %. Note also that manufacturing
only makes up 18% of total employment on average.
Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics (1996-2013)
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev.
Unemployment rate 1368 .17 .04
GDP per capita (in e) 1336 20730 5080
Investment subsidies received by municipalities (in e1000) 1222 52641 32924
Employees 1368 76498 49344
Share: manufacturing 1368 .18 .07
Share: service 1368 .33 .06
Share: construction 1368 .11 .04
Share: commerce 1368 .24 .03
Share: finance 1368 .12 .05
Share: agriculture 1368 .03 .02
Share: small establishments 1368 .96 .01
Share: medium-sized establishments 1368 .03 .01
Share: large establishments 1368 .004 .002
Monthly wage (in e) 3732703 1467 1343
Sources: Statistical Offices of German States (Laender), BHP, SIAB. Notes: There are 76 counties in East Germany (excluding
Berlin) according to 2014 county definitions. Monetary variables are in 2010 euros. Wages of part-time workers are included.
2.5 Empirical results
In this section, we present the reduced form effects of the place-based policy. Subsection 2.5.1
focuses on the treatment effect on the treated, that is focusing on the labor market effects
in manufacturing firms in treated counties. Subsection 2.5.2 sheds light on the aggregate
effects of the policy beyond treated industries and regions.
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Figure 2.3: Event study estimates: first stage at county level
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Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs (Bundesamt fuer Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle). Notes: This figure plots
coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log subsidies paid to counties and log subsidized investment
on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.3). The sample includes all counties in East
Germany. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
2.5.1 Treatment on the Treated
Main effects
In a first step, we assess whether the reforms of the maximum subsidy rates affect the
subsidies paid out, that is, we test our first stage. Figure 2.3 shows the effects on log GRW
funds at the county level. We find that subsidy payments in treated counties decrease by
9.2% five or more years after a reform when the maximum subsidy rate decreases by one
percentage point. Reassuringly, before a reform occurs, treatment and control groups exhibit
a very similar development.18
Next, we test whether the strong decrease in subsidies paid decreased subsidized investment.
In theory, it is possible that total subsidized investment remains constant, but a smaller
share of the investments are subsidized due to the lower maximum rates. The event study
shows that the latter effect is not at play. Instead, the total investment volume subsidized
by the GRW decreases after the reform. In terms of magnitudes we detect a decrease of
6.3% after five years.
Having established a first-stage, we move to the employment effect, the main outcome
according to the explicit goal of the policy. Theoretically, a decrease in subsidized investment
does not necessarily lead to a decrease in employment for two main reasons: (i) it is possible
that subsidized crowds out non-subsidized investment, (ii) more expensive capital might
be substituted by labor. Figure 2.4 shows the effect of a reform in the maximum subsidy
18 We find no spill-overs in GRW subsidies across counties. In other words, the decrease in subsidies in
reformed counties does not lead to an increase in subsidies in neighboring counties (see Section 2.5.2 for
more details on spill-overs).
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Figure 2.4: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment at county level
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49
counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
rate on aggregate county-level manufacturing employment. While pre-trends are flat, our
estimates imply that a one percentage point decrease in the maximum subsidy rate leads
to a decrease in manufacturing employment of 1.4% after five years for our baseline of 49
counties.19 These estimates are remarkably similar to the main finding of Overman (2018)
of a 10% increase in manufacturing employment in response to an increase in the maximum
subsidy rate of ten percentage points.
The employment effect gradually evolves following a concave pattern – with the effect after
five years accounting for 80% of the effect after ten years. As confidence bands widen in the
long-run, we consider the specification with five lags as our (conservative) baseline estimate
for the remainder of the paper. We find that the decrease in employment is similar for the
low-skilled, medium-skilled and high-skilled (see Appendix Figure B.2).
The negative effect on total manufacturing employment at the county-level could be due to
adjustments at the extensive and intensive margin. Looking at the number of manufacturing
establishments, figure 2.5 shows small negative effects. The finding of a decrease in the
number of manufacturing establishments of roughly 0.3% for a one percentage point decrease
in the maximum subsidy rate after five or more years suggests that approximately one
fourth of the total employment response is due to the extensive margin. We do not
find evidence for relocation of firms due to the reforms. The number of newly created
manufacturing establishments decreases in treated regions, effects are, however, not significant
at conventional levels. Establishment destruction is not affected.
Last, the decrease in labor demand should lead to decreasing wages in manufacturing. Using
19 For each regime, we pick the 13 counties which are closest to the cut-off from below and the 13 counties
that are closest from above. Aggregating over regimes, we end up with 49 counties that are at least once
close to the cut-off.
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Figure 2.5: Event study estimates: number of manufacturing establishments
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of the log number of
manufacturing establishments on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample
includes the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county
level.
the SIAB, we calculate average wages at the county level. Interestingly, Figure 2.6 shows
that wages for low-skilled workers decrease, while wages for high-skilled and medium-skilled
workers are largely unaffected or even increase slightly. As employment by skill responds
homogeneously (cf. Appendix Figure B.2), it seems that the differential wage effect is driven
by differential labor supply responses, with low skilled labor being less elastic, e.g. due to
lower mobility.
Sensitivity checks
In the following we present various tests demonstrating the robustness of our main results.
First, our baseline specification improves the comparability of treatment and control group
counties by focusing on the jurisdictions that are close to the eligibility cut-off that determines
treatment status. Our preferred specification uses 26 counties around the cut-off per regime.
This is clearly an arbitrary choice, induced by the trade-off between comparability and
statistical power. Appendix Figures B.3 and B.4 present results for employment and low-
skilled wages for different cut-off samples including for the full sample.20 Interestingly, the
magnitude of the employment effect decreases as we restrict the number of counties around
the cutoff. As we move away from the cut-off, we start to include better performing counties
in our estimation sample which are likely to be on a different trend and perform better after
in the post-treatment period without being treated. Including these counties biases the
treatment effect toward zero.
Second, we use the refined treatment intensity in our baseline to more accurately account
20 Restricting the sample to counties which are among the 20 counties closest to the cutoff for at least one
reform yields 44 counties. Looking at 16 counties closest to the cutoff yields 38 counties.
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Figure 2.6: Event study estimates: wages by skill in manufacturing
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Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
wages by skill on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49
counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
for the size of different reforms, sacrificing some of the non-parametric appeal of event study
designs. As a check, we also implement the standard event study design using a discrete
treatment indicator following equation (2.1).21 Appendix Figures B.5 and B.6 compare our
baseline estimate with the estimates from discrete treatment specification scaled by the
average effect change in the maximum subsidy rate. Results are very similar, but exploiting
information on the size of the change increases the precision. Furthermore, Appendix Figures
B.7 and B.8 show that results of the discrete treatment specification also follow a similar
pattern when varying the cut-off sample.
Excluding the few never-treated counties22 from the analysis almost does not change the
results, as can be seen from Appendix Figure B.9. This suggests that the treatment effects
obtained by comparing ever-treated counties with never-treated counties is similar to the
effect of comparing within the set of ever-treated counties, but exploiting the fact that those
counties are treated at different points in time. Dropping partially treated counties also
yields larger effects, suggesting that our baseline estimate is conservative: recall that due to
changes in county border definitions, in some counties only a subset of municipalities receives
a decrease in the maximum rate, effectively reducing treatment intensity (cf. Appendix
Figure B.9).
In order to make sure that our results are not driven by the prevalence of multiple treatments,
we re-estimate our main model only using the first reform. We find larger effects, but we are
21 In 2007, the change in maximum subsidy rates is not uniform across firm size groups (cf. table 2.1). We
base the definition of discrete treatment on the change in the maximum rate of small firms since 96% percent
of firms are small. High-priority counties in regime 3 are therefore classified as not experiencing (discrete)
treatment, whereas low-priority counties in regime 3 are classified as experiencing a (discrete) increase in the
maximum rate.
22 We define a county as never-treated if it is never discretely treated (see also footnote above).
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only able to look at the first two years after the reform, after which the next reform happens
(see Appendix Figure B.10).
Adding control variables that pick up the local business cycle (and consequently affected
treatment status via the eligibility indicator) reassuringly changes the results little, as
demonstrated in Appendix Figures B.11 and B.12.23 We also test the effect of the GRW
reforms on other subsidies received by municipalities. Figure B.13 shows that the reforms
did not have a significant effect on other subsidies received by municipalities. The slight
upward trend implies that, if anything, our estimates of the GRW effect are conservative.
2.5.2 Aggregate policy effects
While the previous section has demonstrated a local industry-specific treatment effect of the
policy, we now check whether the place-based policy had an aggregate effect across industries
and counties. Hence, we focus on spill-overs within and across counties.
In order to test for possible spill-overs within county, we start by assessing whether total
county-level employment responded to the reform. As discussed in Section 2.2, policymakers
hoped that the policy would raise local demand for goods and services in other sectors as well.
Figure 2.7 shows that this was not the case. Non-manufacturing sectors did not respond
to the change in the subsidy rate. As the average share of manufacturing employment
is at around 18%, we do not detect an effect on total county-level employment either.
Breaking down the effect on non-manufacturing employment by sectors, Appendix Figure
B.14, however, provides some suggestive evidence of spill-overs. The construction sectors
tends to show short-run negative effects, which seems reasonable as a large portion of the
subsidized investments were used on buildings. Likewise, we detect a negative effect on
trade/commerce, which could be reconciled with temporary decrease in overall demand.
However, there are no spill-overs to service sector firms, which are a large share of the local
economy and drive the positive effect of non-treated industries shown in Figure 2.7. A reason
for the weak and rather short-lived within-county across-industry spill-overs might be that
we look at a subsidy rate cut, rather than an increase. Unfortunately, the institutional set-up
of the GRW does not allow us to develop a research design that is able to test for potential
asymmetries in the response.
In line, with the zero effect on total employment, we find that county-level log GDP
conditional on population does not respond to the policy (see Appendix Figure B.15). What
is more, unemployment is not affected either (see Appendix Figure B.16).24
Looking at wages in non-treated sectors, we see a similar picture as for manufacturing wages:
low-skilled workers are affected negatively while wages of medium and low-skilled workers
do not respond (cf. Appendix Figure B.17). This is in line with the negative employment
23 This is not surprising given that we find no treatment effect on these variables (GDP and unemployment)
in the next subsection.
24 Note that we do find insignificant, yet slightly negative effects, however the effects size is very small.
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Figure 2.7: Event study estimates: employment by sector
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log sectoral
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49
counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
effects for the construction and trade sectors that employ many low-skilled workers. As low
skilled wages decrease across sectors, within-county inequality increases. Figure 2.8 shows
the effects on the ratio of different percentiles of the wage distribution. Appendix Figure
B.18 shows a similar effect on the Gini coefficient.
Finally, we test whether negative manufacturing employment effects in treated counties
have effects that go beyond county borders.25 We aggregate county-level manufacturing
employment to the labor market region level and use the weighted average of counties’
treatment intensities to re-estimate equation (2.3) on the baseline sample. Figure (2.9)
shows that the treatment effect on employment shrinks by about 64%, which implies that
most of regional treatment effect is due to a reallocation of workers across counties within a
commuting zone.
25 Recall that untreated counties do not receive higher subsidy payments due to the cuts in treated
counties.
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Figure 2.8: Event study estimates: measures of inequality
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Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of inequality measures
on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49 counties
closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure 2.9: Event study estimates: labor market region manufacturing employment
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate at the labor market region level. Treatment
intensities of counties are weighted by the number of employees. The sample includes the labor market regions that contain
the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the labor market
region level.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the labor market effects of subsidies to capital in the manu-
facturing sector, using data from Eastern Germany post reunification. We exploit various
policy reforms that – in most cases – reduced the maximum share of investments that are
eligible for the subsidy. These changes in the maximum subsidy rate varied across sectors,
firm sizes and – importantly – East German counties according to an indicator of regional
economic performance. We compare counties that are below the threshold yielding a higher
subsidy rate to counties that are above.
We find that a cut in subsidies has strong negative effects on local manufacturing employment.
A one percentage point decrease in the maximum subsidy rate leads to a decrease in county-
level manufacturing employment of 1.4% five years after the reform. After ten years, the
effect stabilizes at a level of manufacturing employment lower by 1.8%. The negative demand
shock leads to a negative effect on wages for low-skilled workers. As wages for high- and
medium-skilled workers are not affected by the policy, inelastic labor supply of low-skilled
workers might be able to explain this pattern. With low-skilled wages decreasing, inequality
increases due to the subsidy cut.
We also test for sectoral and regional spill-overs. While overall employment in counties
experiencing a decrease in the maximum rate is not affected, we find suggestive evidence
for small short-run responses for construction sector employment as a consequence of the
reduction in subsidized investment. In terms of inter-county spill-overs, we find that about
two thirds of the negative employment effect are absorbed within the labor market region,
which suggests that reallocation of labor within the commuting zone is important.
Our institutional framework only allows us to study the effect of cuts in the subsidy rate.
It is very well possible that treatment and spill-over effects are different for increases
in subsidization. Further research could also focus on the analysis of channels driving
inter-regional spill-overs. Individual data on residence and place of work would allow the
investigation of commuting behavior. In addition, if researchers were allowed to link data
on firm-level investment and output to firm-level subsidy data in the future, the role of
spill-overs within region could be assessed in more detail (e.g. it would be interesting to
know the effect of a firm receiving subsidies on other firms within industry).
The policy studied in this paper being part of the broader effort to help East German regions
catch up with West German regions, we relate to the ongoing discussion about whether this
effort has been successful. Burda (2006) and Uhlig (2006) paint a mixed picture, highlighting
that labor productivity in the East had only reached two thirds of productivity in the West
by the early 2000s. Today, large differences remain: unemployment rates have converged but
nominal wages in the East have reached only roughly 80% of West wages. In addition, firms
in East Germany are still predominantly of small size, resulting in low R&D expenditure
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and contributing to a persisting gap in productivity.26 These developments cast into doubt
the efficacy of continuing large-scale transfers to Eastern regions. Given the finding of our
paper of a small overall effect of the GRW, skepticism may be in order.
26 See https://www.beauftragter-neue-laender.de/BNL/Redaktion/DE/Downloads/
Publikationen/Berichte/jahresbericht-de-2018.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2, retrieved
September 27, 2018.
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Chapter 3
Political and Economic Effects of
Explicit Electoral Thresholds: The
Case of German Municipalities
3.1 Introduction
Electoral rules in many countries require parties to obtain a certain vote share in order to
be eligible for seats in parliament. Turkey, for example, has a threshold of 10% in place for
parliamentary elections, while in New Zealand and Germany, a 5% threshold applies. The
existence of an electoral threshold implies that votes for parties failing to reach the minimum
requirement are disregarded in the allocation of seats, a violation of the principle of “every
vote counts”. In addition, competition among parties is restricted. These drawbacks are
often justified by the fact that it may become difficult to form majorities needed to pass
legislation as the number of parties represented in a parliament increases.1
Economists have argued that a small number of represented parties may be desirable for
another reason: the common pool problem, leading to inefficiently high public expenditure,
is exacerbated as the number of legislators in parliament increases (Weingast et al., 1981).
Applied to the number of parties involved in the budget process on a municipal council, the
rationale is that individual parties internalize the cost of policies that favor their voters only
partially, as part of the cost is borne by supporters of other parties (e.g. via taxation).
1 However, this justification may not be accepted by courts for sub-national or supra-national elections.
In 2011, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that a five percent electoral threshold in place
in Germany for elections to the European parliament was unconstitutional on the grounds that since no
government is elected by the European parliament, fragmentation is not as harmful as at the national level.
As a reaction, a number of parties jointly passed a proposal to establish a three percent threshold instead
which was then also ruled unconstitutional. The European parliament election in 2014 took place without
a threshold (see http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/pressemitteilungen/bvg11-070.html and
http://dipbt.bundestag.de/extrakt/ba/WP17/537/53796.html, retrieved August 28, 2018).
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Electoral thresholds can therefore be seen as a means to limit the common pool problem
since the inefficiency is less severe the fewer parties are represented on a council.
In this paper, I analyze the removal of explicit electoral thresholds at the municipal level using
German data to answer two questions: how large is the increase in the number of parties when
a threshold is removed and what is the effect on economic outcomes such as expenditure?
While some states in Germany never had a threshold in place for municipalities, others have
abolished theirs at different points in time since 1990. The removals were necessitated by
court decisions, on the basis that severe threats to the functioning of councils were not to
be expected. Anecdotal evidence suggests that the number of parties represented at the
municipal level has increased substantially in states that removed an electoral threshold.
For example, there are currently 15 parties represented in Frankfurt’s municipal council,
where an explicit threshold of 5% has been abolished in 1999, whereas only 4 parties were
represented in 1993. However, it is unclear what portion of this increase is simply due to an
increase in the number of parties over time regardless of electoral thresholds.
In order to estimate the reforms’ causal effect on political and economic outcomes, I rely on
panel data on electoral outcomes and municipalities’ budgets. Treating the abolishment of
thresholds at different times as quasi-experimental allows the application of variants of the
difference-in-differences estimator.
Fundamentally, the evaluation of electoral reforms at the municipal level sacrifices external
validity for internal validity: in contrast to cross-country studies, the advantage of the
present paper is that municipalities within Germany are characterized by a large degree of
institutional homogeneity. On the other hand, municipalities do not have legislative powers,
an important difference from national parliaments.2 The councils of large municipalities
more closely resemble parliaments than those of small municipalities: crucially for this paper,
the number of seats is larger. This causes implicit thresholds, which may prevent party entry
even in the absence of explicit thresholds, to be lower than in small municipalities (such
thresholds emerge from the mapping of continuous vote shares to a discrete number of seats).
In addition, stakes are higher and also remuneration for council members. I therefore pay
special attention to larger municipalities throughout the paper.
The analysis is complemented by survey questions submitted to the German Internet Panel
(GIP) to explore potential mechanisms and external validity. In particular, voter knowledge
is tested since next to mechanical effects of the reforms, it is likely that a change of behavior
occurred on the parts of voters and parties.
In a first step, I investigate the effect of a threshold removal on political outcomes, beginning
with the number of parties represented on a council. Having demonstrated flat pre-trends, a
difference-in-difference estimation yields an average increase of 0.3 parties. In the largest
municipalities, however, the increase is 2.8. One reason is the existence of implicit thresholds,
affecting small municipalities more strongly. In a second step, I look at municipal expenditure,
2 Municipal councils may however set tax multipliers, e.g. for local business taxes.
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Figure 3.1: Seats obtained by party in Frankfurt’s 2016 municipal council election
Source: https://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/media.php/738/FWA64_Stadtverordnetenwahl_2016.pdf, retrieved August 27,
2018.
Figure 3.2: Seats obtained by party in Frankfurt’s 1993 municipal council election
Source: https://www.frankfurt.de/sixcms/media.php/678/Kap01.pdf, retrieved August 27, 2018.
motivated by the literature on the common pool problem predicting higher spending when
the number of legislators increases. I find an increase of 3% on average. Mirroring the
heterogeneity of the political results, the increase is higher at 15% in the largest municipalities.
Revenue increases accordingly.
I contribute to the literature firstly by analyzing the political effects of explicit electoral
thresholds and secondly by considering the thresholds’ economic effects. Furthermore, the
threshold variation used may be of use to other researchers looking for exogenous variation
in representation of particular small parties, such as extremist parties.
As for the political effects of electoral thresholds, the closest papers to mine are Baskaran
and da Fonseca (2016a), Baskaran and da Fonseca (2016b) and Pellicer and Wegner (2014).
The first two papers are concerned with the political effects of implicit electoral thresholds in
the German state of Hesse. In a regression discontinuity design, the authors investigate the
abolishment of an explicit municipal threshold which has differential effects on municipalities
by population size due to different implicit thresholds. They find an increase in vote and seat
shares of smaller parties when the implicit threshold is lower but no effect on the number of
parties represented. However, their setup only allows for the estimation of relative effects,
i.e. how the effects vary between differently sized municipalities. In contrast, I estimate
the total effect, using municipalities in other states as a control group. Thus, I am able to
answer a more relevant question, namely what the effect of an explicit electoral threshold is
relative to no explicit electoral threshold. This is particularly important since in addition to
the effect varying by municipality size, there might be an effect due to changing behavior
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of voters and parties which is constant across municipalities of different size. Pellicer and
Wegner (2014) analyze the political effects of a three percentage point increase in the explicit
threshold in a subset of municipalities in Morocco. Comparing the reformed municipalities
with municipalities that hold majoritarian elections in a difference-in-differences setup,
they find a decrease in the number of parties. However, it is unclear whether voters in a
semi-authoritarian country actually believe that their vote matters.
A number of contributions in political science compare the degree of fragmentation of
parliaments in countries with different explicit thresholds (Moser, 1999; Birch, 2001; Lijphart
and Aitkin, 1994). Such cross-country comparisons suffer from well-known omitted variable
bias due to institutional and other differences on top of the differences in electoral thresholds
analyzed. In contrast, my analysis relies on reforms at the sub-national level in Germany,
ensuring a high degree of homogeneity of treated and untreated units.
As for the economic effects of electoral thresholds, this paper is the first contribution to
the best of my knowledge. If thresholds have an impact on spending only via the number
of parties represented, the reforms can also be used as instruments to estimate the effect
of one additional party represented on a council on spending. The empirical political
economy literature is broadly concerned with economic effects of institutions, in particular
with determinants of the size of budgets (Besley and Case, 2003). More specifically, there
are a number of contributions concerned with the causal relationship between the size of
municipal councils (i.e. the number of seats) and expenditure. Egger and Koethenbuerger
(2010), analyzing the German state of Bavaria, exploit the fact that council size there
is a discontinuous function of population, allowing the implementation of a regression-
discontinuity design. They find that an increase in the size of a municipal council has a
positive effect on expenditure, in line with the prediction of a common pool problem. On the
other hand, Pettersson-Lidbom (2012) finds evidence for a negative effect of council size on
expenditure exploiting similar population cut-offs in Finland and Sweden for identification.
Turning to the effect of the number of parties as opposed to the number of members on a
council, Jarman (2016) finds an increase in investment spending of almost 50 % when one
additional party is represented on a council. Analyzing the German stata of Thuringia, he
compares municipalities where a party just made it on a council with municipalities where a
party just didn’t make it in an RDD setup. Schaltegger and Feld (2009) investigate the effect
of cabinet size and coalition size on expenditure for Swiss Cantons, finding a positive effect
of cabinet size but mixed evidence with respect to the size of coalitions. However, lacking an
instrumental variable, they resort to fixed effects estimation such that it is doubtful whether
they can recover a causal effect. By using a different and credible source of variation, I
therefore add to a scant literature on the effect of the number of parties on spending.
In the remainder of the paper, I first present the institutional setting. Hypotheses to be
tested are outlined in section 3.3, followed by a section on data used. Section 3.5 explains the
research design. Empirical results can be found in section 3.6 before section 3.7 concludes.
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3.2 Institutional background
The roughly 11 000 municipalities in Germany are responsible for the provision of local
services such as, for example, canalization, kindergartens, graveyards, for land use regulation
and may offer public transport and cultural services. Expenses are financed via horizontal
and vertical equalization transfers, taxes (the local business tax being the most important),
fees and loans.
Municipalities are jointly governed by mayors and municipal councils. The mayor is typically
the head of the municipal administration and puts into execution decisions made by the
municipal council, in addition to representing the municipality. In contrast to the federal and
to state parliaments, municipal councils are also part of the executive branch, i.e. no laws are
passed.3 Councils are the decision-making bodies. In particular they pass the budget and
decide on property and local business tax multipliers next to monitoring the mayor’s and
the administration’s activities. Simple majorities are sufficient for most decisions including
the passage of the budget.4
Members of the municipal councils are elected every five years (the only exception being
Bavaria, where elections occur every six years). Party-list proportional representation with
open lists is the most common system used. The exceptions are the Saarland (which
has closed lists), North Rhine-Westphalia and Schleswig-Holstein (the latter two states
use a combination of first-past-the-post voting and party-list proportional representation).
Depending on the state, the D’Hondt method, the largest remainder method or the Sainte-
Lague¨ method are used as rules for allocating seats. Next to parties which also run in state
and federal elections, there is a large number of so-called “voter groups” running only in
municipal elections (obtaining party status is more demanding in terms of meeting formal
requirements such as detailed declaration of origin and use of funds).5
3.2.1 Threshold reforms
Seven German states have removed a municipal electoral threshold (which was at 5% except
for the state of Rhineland-Palatinate where the threshold was at 3%) since reunification in
1990, as illustrated in figure 3.3. As for the other states, they did not have a threshold in
place as of 1990.
The reforms were initiated either by the Federal Constitutional Court, by one of its state
3 I disregard the city states Berlin, Hamburg and Bremen where the municipal council is essentially the
state parliament, which means that they are not comparable with municipalities in other states since state
parliaments possess legislative powers.
4 See e.g. http://www.kommunalwahl-bw.de, retrieved August 22, 2018. With the exception of the
state of Hesse, all states follow essentially the same constitutional rules formulated in the “Su¨ddeutsche
Ratsverfassung”.
5 Independent candidates not affiliated with a party may also run in council elections in some states.
I ignore them in what follows since they do not obtain a significant share of votes. See e.g. http://www.
wahlergebnisse.nrw.de/kommunalwahlen/, retrieved August 22, 2018.
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Figure 3.3: Timing of threshold removals by German states
No reform
1999
2003
2008
Notes: This figure shows the year in which a German state removed an explicit electoral threshold for municipal elections
post-1990. City states are excluded from the analysis.
level counterparts or by a state level government.6 The Federal Constitutional Court argued
that a threshold violates both equal opportunity among parties and equal treatment of votes
(since votes for small parties are effectively discarded). At the same time, in contrast to the
state and federal levels, stable majorities are not deemed essential since no laws are passed
by municipal councils. Further reasons are the relatively strong position of mayors which
guarantees, according to the court, that administration of a municipality is not jeopardized
by a fragmented council and the existence of implicit thresholds, discussed below. In addition,
the experience of states with no threshold in place is cited. There, the court argued, the
number of parties represented had not led to deficiencies in the functioning of municipal
councils.
The plaintiffs were typically members of a small party, e.g. in 2008 the Green party and the
party “Die Linke” jointly brought the state of Schleswig-Holstein to trial before the Federal
Constitutional Court. This is likely due to the fact that small parties expected to benefit
from the threshold removal. However, it seems safe to assume that the particular timing of
a suit was unrelated to the electoral outcomes in the following municipal elections since the
duration of the trial and the performance at a particular election is hard to foresee. Small
6 See Verfassungsgerichtshof Nordrhein-Westfalen (1999), Land Hessen (2000), Landesverfassungsgericht
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (2000), Bundesverfassungsgericht (2008), Verfassungsgerichtshof Thu¨ringen (2008),
Land Rheinland-Pfalz (2008) and Landtag des Saarlandes (2008) for details.
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parties have gained higher vote shares over the past two decades at both the federal and
state levels, but this trend has been similar in all states.7
3.2.2 Implicit thresholds
When an explicit threshold is removed, implicit thresholds may still prevent a party from
entering a municipal council. An implicit threshold specifies the minimum vote share required
to gain the first seat due to the fact that continuous vote shares are mapped into a discrete
number of seats. This threshold is a function of the seat share allocation rule, of the number
of seats and the actual vote shares realized. Ex-ante, one can only compute a range for
the implicit threshold or make assumptions about the vote share distribution to obtain a
distribution of implicit thresholds. Consider the extreme example of a council consisting
of only one seat and three parties competing (with no explicit threshold in place). If two
parties each are just short of one third of all votes, the third party needs to receive just
above one third of the vote share to obtain the seat. On the other hand, if one party receives
no votes, the minimum vote share to obtain the seat is one half.
As for German municipalities, the total number of seats in a municipal council depends on
the number of inhabitants. The council size-population relationships varies across states,
but generally the number of seats is discontinuously increasing in population (see figure 3.4
below). Also, in some states, there is discretion such that municipalities can choose the
number of seats from a narrow range. Approximately, in most cases the realized implicit
threshold lies between the average vote share per seat (e.g. 5% for 20 seats) and one half of
the average vote share per seat.8 This implies that as the number of seats increases, the
approximated implicit threshold declines (i.e. entry becomes more likely, ceteris paribus).
Due to the nature of the population-seat relationship, this in turn implies that as the
population increases, the approximated implicit threshold declines.
7 See e.g. http://www.wahlrecht.de/ergebnisse/.
8 See Lijphart and Gibberd (1977) and Kopfermann (1991) for threshold theory and http://www.
wahlrecht.de/verfahren/faktische-sperrklausel.html, retrieved August 22, 2018, for simulations ap-
plicable to German municipalities.
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Figure 3.4: Population and council size
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Notes: This figure plots the number of seats on a council against population for German municipalities included in sample 1
(see section 3.4 for more information on the data set).
3.3 Hypotheses
In this section, I present hypotheses based on theoretical considerations about the effects
of the threshold removals to be tested using the data described in section 3.4 and the
methodology described in section 3.5.
Hypothesis 1: The removal of an electoral threshold leads to an increase in the number of
parties represented on a council.
This hypothesis is straightforward: votes that are ignored pre-reform due the existence of an
explicit electoral threshold may lead to additional parties gaining representation post-reform.
This mechanical effect may be accompanied by additional effects due to changing behavior of
parties and voters. For example, parties may decide to participate in an election that would
not have run in the presence of a threshold.9 Even if the same parties participate in elections,
voters may be more willing to vote for small parties in the absence of a threshold.10 This
requires, however, that voters are aware of the reforms. Below, I present survey evidence on
the salience of electoral thresholds.
9 Note that since vote shares are not available for all parties, I cannot disentangle mechanical and
behavioral effects.
10 I do not formally investigate strategic behavior. The probability of being pivotal for a given outcome is
hard to compute but likely very small even in municipal elections. Still, voters do turn out. It is possible
that some voters are not aware of the low probability of being pivotal. In addition expressive motives may
play a role for part of the electorate (Brennan and Lomasky, 1993).
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Hypothesis 2: A threshold removal leads to a smaller increase in the effective number of
represented parties than in the absolute number of represented parties.
Whether fragmentation of councils increases substantially depends on the number of seats
that additional parties obtain. If mostly small parties enter municipal councils due to the
reform, which is to be expected since large parties would have gained representation even
with thresholds in place, it may well be that fragmentation does only increase marginally. I
use the Herfindahl index ∑i s2i , where si is the seat share of party i, as an additional outcome.
It measures the concentration of power, reaching its maximum at 1 if one party holds all
seats on a council, akin to the concentration in a market. I also look at the effective number
of parties (Laakso and Taagepera, 1979), which is the inverse of the Herfindahl index and
constitutes a particularly intuitive measure of fragmentation: when seat shares are equal
across parties, the effective number of parties equals the actual number of parties. Therefore,
we can interpret this measure as indicating the number of equal-sized parties with the same
degree of fragmentation as induced by the actual number of parties.
Hypothesis 3: The political effects differ by municipality size.
The discussion of implicit thresholds above has shown that the reforms’ mechanical effects
vary across municipalities of different size. Larger municipalities which have larger municipal
councils are characterized by lower implicit thresholds, making it easier for small parties to
enter when an explicit threshold is removed. Behavioral effects, to the extent that they exist,
may vary with size, as well. For instance, if parties are aware of implicit thresholds, they
might decide to focus their efforts on large municipalities since the probability of obtaining
representation there is higher. Furthermore, behavioral effects could be stronger in larger
municipalities independently of implicit thresholds. For example, a more diverse electorate
in large cities might lead to a demand for special-interest parties. In addition, the stakes are
higher in the sense that councils’ decisions affect are larger number of inhabitants. Finally,
remuneration for members of individual councils is higher in large municipalities.
Hypothesis 4: The removal of an electoral threshold leads to an increase in municipal
expenditure (and more so in larger municipalities).
The theoretical prediction about the effect of removing an electoral threshold on expenditure
is not clear-cut: on the one hand, the literature on the common-pool problem predicts
increasing expenditure. Beginning with Weingast et al. (1981), this strand of the literature
posits that legislators only partially internalize the cost of policies that favor their constituents
since part of the cost is borne by other constituencies. An increasing number of legislators
aggravates this problem. This idea equally applies to the number of parties on a municipal
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council since typically, passing a budget requires that several parties agree on a proposal.11
If the number of parties on a council increases, individual parties obtain a smaller number of
seats such that the approval of a larger number of parties tends to be required to pass a
budget, exacerbating the common-pool problem. Larger municipalities should be affected
more strongly due to the larger expected number of additional represented parties (see
Hypothesis 3). In addition, note that the threat of competition alone may have an effect on
the behavior of parties represented in the council when the goal of preventing entry leads an
incumbent party to target a broader base of voters.12
On the other hand, extreme fragmentation of power might lead to government inaction.13
For instance, survey evidence on the reform in North Rhine-Westphalia hints at an increasing
duration of council meetings (Bogumil et al., 2015). If government inaction is severe, this
would speak against an increase in expenditure (and could lead to a decrease) since passing
the budget requires a majority in the municipal council: if a municipal council is unable to
pass a budget, a provisional budget automatically takes effect. Such a bare-bone budget
allows for expenditure due to legal obligations that are based on decisions passed in the
previous budgetary period but not for spending on new projects. In fact, the potential
inability to pass legislation motivates the thresholds still in place at the state and federal
level in Germany, as mentioned above. The veto player theory by Tsebelis (1995) formalizes
this idea. A key result is that policy change becomes less likely as the number of veto players
(here: parties) increases.
However, a permanent inability to pass a budget is unlikely since none of the parties would
then be able to realize projects requiring funding. Inability to reach agreement might
therefore be more relevant for other, non-budgetary policy proposals. Therefore, I take the
prediction of the common pool literature of increasing expenditure to the data, which is in
accordance with other empirical contributions concerned with the economic effects of the
composition of municipal councils (see e.g. Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010)).
11 Formal coalition agreements are mostly found in larger municipalities.
12 Relatedly, Lizzeri and Persico (2005) consider the efficiency rationale for electoral thresholds by analyzing
electoral competition among parties which promise either targetable transfers or public good spending. They
find that the equilibrium is not surplus-maximizing if the number of parties is large enough. However, they
do not consider the role of coalitions. Increasing political competition could be efficiency-enhancing in other
dimensions. Ashworth et al. (2014) find that efficiency of public good provision increases, akin to goods
markets, since re-election is less certain.
13 It is also possible that the relationship between the number of parties and expenditure is non-monotonous,
e.g. increasing first but decreasing as more and more parties enter.
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3.4 Data
3.4.1 Political outcomes – Sample 1
I construct a panel of political outcomes using municipal election results provided separately
by the individual state statistical offices.14 There are two restrictions when constructing
a panel of political outcomes: in a number of states, information on the number of seats
obtained is available only for relatively large parties whereas for smaller parties, only the
combined number of seats obtained by these parties is reported. These results are therefore
uninformative when it comes to calculating the overall number of parties represented (the
same issue applies to the number of parties competing and measures of concentration).
Furthermore, election years vary across states, e.g. in North-Rhine Westphalia, municipal
elections since reunification took place in 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014, whereas in Hesse,
they took place in 1993, 1997, 2001, 2006 and 2011 (see Appendix table C.7 for a list of
election years of all states).
Mergers of municipalities are a further complication. I use municipality border definitions of
the year 2014 and proceed as follows: if a municipality is never affected by a merger, I use
all available years. If a merger of two or more municipalities takes place e.g. in the year 2004
but the resulting municipality is not merged thereafter, I use election data for the resulting
municipality from 2004 onwards (similarly, for multiple mergers, I only use observations from
the year onwards in which they are consistent with the border definitions of 2014).
Given these limitations, the panel of political outcomes is constructed by excluding states that
do not hold elections in the years 1994, 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014 (the majority of states holds
elections in these years) and then excluding states where detailed information is available on
the number of seats obtained by each party. The resulting sample includes municipalities of
the states North Rhine-Westphalia, Baden-Wuerttemberg, Saarland, Saxony and Thuringia.
In what follows, I refer to this set of observations as sample 1. Descriptive statistics are
presented in table 3.1, illustrating that there are on average 3.8 parties represented in a
municipal council. However, the effective number of parties15, interpretable as the number
of equal-sized parties leading to the same degree of fragmentation as induced by the actual
number of parties, is lower at about 2.8.
3.4.2 Economic outcomes – Sample 2
Data on expenditure, revenues and local tax multipliers is publicly available for all German
municipalities (Landesbetrieb Information und Technik Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2003-2011). I
14 Results are available publicly, see Appendix for detailed data sources.
15 1∑
i
s2
i
, where si is the seat share of party i.
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max P25 P75
Sample 1
Population 9689 14786 46968 60 1046680 1503 12307
Represented parties 9689 3.75 1.51 1 13 3 5
Effective represented parties 9689 2.78 0.91 1 8 2 3.36
Competing parties 9638 4.01 1.78 1 17 3 5
Council seats 9689 19.75 12.61 2 94 12 26
Sample 2
Population 173591 6727 28382 3 1429584 663 5136
Expenditure (in e1000) 173591 15231.78 103653.50 3.00 6569848 850.79 8641.04
Revenues (in e1000) 172912 14761.56 100247.80 .14 6460044 877.97 8628.23
use data from all states for the period 1995-201416 except for the city states Berlin, Hamburg
and Bremen, as mentioned above. Using a large number of states unaffected by the reforms
adds credibility to the identifying assumption of common trends in economic outcomes,
explained in more detail below, since as the number of states increases, idiosyncratic state-
year shocks e.g. to expenditure matter less.17 In addition, reforms occur in states not covered
by the data set on political outcomes.
In contrast to Sample 1, I make use of municipalities in all years available rather than
in election years only since the reforms’ effects on economic outcomes can materialize
immediately rather than with a lag of five years (the number of years between elections).
This sample will be referred to as sample 2 below. Mergers are not an issue for economic
outcomes such as expenditure since these can be consistently aggregated when municipalities
merge (unlike election results): in the case of expenditures, the sum is easily obtained. As
is evident from table 3.1, the average municipality is smaller in sample 2, containing more
observations, than in sample 1. Expenditure and revenue figures exhibit a large degree of
variability but for the majority of municipalities, the values lie between e1000 and e2000
per inhabitant.
3.5 Research design
Exploiting the quasi-experimental removal of explicit electoral thresholds in German states at
different points in time, I implement variants of the classical difference-in-difference estimator.
The affected states constitute the treatment group while other states, which either never had
a threshold in place or are treated at a different point in time, serve as the control group. It
is also possible to restrict the sample to municipalities of states that experienced a reform
16 Some years are not available for all municipalities but it seems safe to assume that missing values are
randomly allocated.
17 Note that common trends e.g. in the number of parties represented are likely to be satisfied in the smaller
sample 1 since idiosyncratic state-year shocks are unlikely to occur for the political outcomes considered.
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at some point in time. The control group for a given reform then consists of municipalities
reformed in different years.18 The identifying assumptions are that treated municipalities and
never-treated control municipalities would have followed a common trend over time in the
absence of treatment and that the timing of treatment is random. Therefore, if pre-treatment
trends were significantly different for treatment and control groups, this would cast doubt
on the validity of the research design. In addition to implementing the classical version of
the difference-in-differences estimator, I make use of an event study design which allows me
to both analyze pre-trends as well as the dynamics of the reforms’ effect.
Looking at electoral outcomes first, implementing an event study amounts to regressing
outcomes yist in municipality i, state s and election year t on dummies indicating how far
away (in time) a reform will take place or has taken place:
yist =
3∑
d=−3,d 6=−1
βd · 1(t− es = d) + γi + αt + ist (3.1)
where es indicates the reform year in a municipality’s state and the time-constant fixed-effect
γi absorbs permanent differences in the outcome variable across municipalities. αt accounts
for election year specific effects common to all states. The coefficients βd measure the effect of
a reform that took place d periods ago (or will take place |d| periods from now, for negative
values). Following standard practice, I drop the dummy representing the pre-treatment
election such that the estimates of coefficients corresponding to the other dummies are to be
interpreted relative to the pre-treatment election.19 In addition, the dummies corresponding
to β3 (β−3) are switched on if a reform is more than three election years away. Since elections
take place only every five years, I investigate outcomes in election years prior to the reform
and after the reform. In a variation of this event study, I separately estimate time fixed-effects
for small and large municipalities due to the fact that size distributions vary across states
and trends are likely to vary by municipality size (e.g. an increase in the number of parties
over time may occur only in large municipalities).
When looking at economic outcomes, I consider a specification that differs slightly from the
one in equation (3.1): t now represents years since, as opposed to election results, data points
are available yearly. Furthermore, I include state-specific linear trends δs · t. Accounting for
secular state-specific trends may be particularly important for outcomes such as expenditure
since decisions made by the state government such as cuts to funding for municipalities
might otherwise be confused with the electoral reforms’ effects. The baseline specification
for economic outcomes reads
18 This approach will be one of the robustness tests presented below.
19 Not dropping one of the event study’s dummies leads to multicollinearity.
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yist =
10∑
d=−4,d6=−1
βd · 1(t− es = d) + γi + αt + δs · t+ ist (3.2)
where the notation is analogous.20 Again, I also separately estimate time fixed-effects (and
time trends) for small and large municipalities. Note that including state-specific trends is not
possible when analyzing electoral outcomes due to limited data availability. Differentiating
between state-specific trends and treatment effects requires sufficient observations pre-
treatment (Angrist and Pischke, 2008) but this number is very small when elections do not
take place every year. However, the empirical results presented below suggest that pre-trends
are very similar for political outcomes.
Finally, I make use of classical difference-in-differences models closely corresponding to the
event study specifications. Based on the model in equation (3.2), I estimate
yist = βDist + γi + αt + δs · t+ ist (3.3)
where Dit is equal to one if a reform occurs at time t or has already occurred and zero
otherwise (and similarly for equation (3.1)). Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) caution that
βˆ does not necessarily represent the simple average of the dynamic treatment effects of
a reform. By contrast, the estimate overweights short-run effects. However, this issue
is most severe if identification comes solely from the different of timing of reforms. The
presence of never-treated control units, of which I have a large number in the sample21,
reduces the bias which is zero if time effects are only identified from never-treated units. In
addition, one important question is whether the reform’s effect is heterogeneous with respect
to municipality size. If weighting leads to a short run bias of estimates for both small and
large municipalities, comparing the two effects is still meaningful.
Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level throughout to allow for serial correlation
of error terms. For robustness, I also perform clustering at the state-year level.22
20 Expenditure data beginning in 1995, four leads are chosen since the first reform occur sin year 1999.
Ten lags are chosen due to the constancy of the effect seven years after a reform and later, as shown below.
21 Never treated units make up 49% of sample 1 and 47% of sample 2.
22 Clustering at the state-year level is feasible only when the outcome is municipal expenditure since sample
1 contains only twenty state-year cells. Clustering at the state level would be preferable, as highlighted by
Bertrand et al. (2004), since serial correlation might be present at the state level but is infeasible due to the
small number of states.
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3.6 Empirical results
3.6.1 Political outcomes
In this section, I report the empirical results based on the estimation strategy outlined in the
previous section, starting with political outcomes. Figure 3.5 plots the coefficient estimates
of an event study based on equation (3.1) where the outcomes are the number of parties
competing and represented in municipal councils. Elections occur every five years which
is why it is number of elections the reform is away that can be found on the horizontal
axis. Omitting the pre-reform election allows for an easy interpretation of the coefficients.
Reassuringly, relative to the pre-reform election, treated municipalities’ trajectories in terms
of the number of parties before the reform do not differ from control municipalities.
Figure 3.5: Event study estimates: effect of reforms on number of parties
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Notes: This figure shows event study estimates of equation (3.1) along with 95% confidence intervals. Size-year fixed effects
are included. Sample 1 is used for all political outcomes. The outcomes shown are the number of parties represented on a
council and the number of parties competing. Election years are on the horizontal axis. Standard errors are clustered at the
municipality level.
The effect on the number of parties represented is significantly positive at the reform election
(i.e. when the threshold is just removed). Over time, the effect increases and at the third
post-reform election, on average 0.7 additional parties are represented relative to the control
group. The fact that it takes more time for the number of parties competing to increase is
intuitive: mechanically, if the number of competing parties remains constant, the number of
parties represented increases due to the threshold removal (in addition to behavioral effects).
But for the number of parties competing to increase, a change in behavior is essential and
parties and voters may only learn about the change in institutions over time. As expected,
hypothesis 1 is therefore confirmed by the empirical results. This is an important finding
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since the analysis of Baskaran and da Fonseca (2016b) did not find an effect of varying
implicit thresholds on the number of parties.
In section 3.2, I have explained the role of implicit thresholds, which are lower in larger
municipalities due to larger councils. This suggests that the estimates hide a great deal
of heterogeneity. I therefore test for heterogeneous effects by looking at small and large
municipalities separately in a difference-in-differences setup (similar to equation (3.3)),
dividing the sample into municipalities above and below 10 000 inhabitants.23 This implies
an average approximated implicit threshold of 4% in small municipalities and an average
approximated implicit threshold of 1% in large municipalities. As can be seen from table 3.2,
the effects indeed vary substantially by municipality size. Significant at the one percent level,
the estimates show that the reform led to an increase in the number of parties represented of
about 1.4 on average in large municipalities, compared with 0.08 in small municipalities. The
effects are also increasing by municipality size when the outcome is the number of parties
competing for seats. The latter does not seem to change at all in small municipalities but
does increase by 0.6 in large municipalities. This means that hypothesis 3, stating that
effects differ by municipality size, is confirmed for the outcomes analyzed so far.
As for difference-in-differences estimates, the overall effect of 0.25 for the number of rep-
resented parties is of the same magnitude as the first lag of the estimated event study.
By contrast, after three elections, the event study yields a larger estimate. This can be
explained as follows: the only state for which more than one post-reform election is observed
is the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, whereas the other two reformed states in sample
1, Saarland and Thuringia, are only observed in the year in which the reform takes place
and in one subsequent election.24 This unbalancedness exacerbates the short-run bias of the
difference-in-difference estimator discussed in Borusyak and Jaravel (2017) and described in
the last section since the long-run effects receive an even lower weight due to the fact that
the short-run observations in the sample outnumber the long-run observations.25 Therefore
the difference-in-differences estimates can be considered conservative. In addition, the two
main conclusions – an increasing number of parties represented over time and heterogene-
ity of the effect by municipality size – still remain valid since the short-run bias of the
difference-in-difference estimator equally applies to both small and large municipalities.
While the number of parties represented on a council is an important measure of concentration
of power, it is imperfect since some of the parties may be very small. Hypothesis 2 states
that fragmentation as measured by the number of effective parties increases by less than
the actual number of parties represented. Fragmentation effects are presented in table C.2.
23 The population means of sample 1 and sample 2 are approximately 15 000 and 7000 respectively.
I explore the robustness with respect to the definition of small and large municipalities below. When a
municipality’s size classification varies over time, I only consider observations after the last change.
24 Recall that the reform took place in North Rhine-Westphalia in the year 1999 but in the year 2009 in
the other two states.
25 As for the number of competing parties, the difference is even stronger due to the fact that it takes
more time till the effect materializes.
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Table 3.2: Difference-in-differences estimates: parties represented and competing
(1) (2) (3) (4)
represented represented competing competing
reform 0.251∗∗∗ 0.065
(0.042) (0.045)
small × reform 0.082∗∗ 0.009
(0.039) (0.046)
large × reform 1.372∗∗∗ 0.587∗∗∗
(0.135) (0.181)
Size-Year-FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 9689 9689 9638 9638
Adjusted R2 0.284 0.300 0.130 0.132
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 1. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
In large municipalities, the Herfindahl index decreases by 0.03, indicating a decrease in
concentration. The effective number of parties increases by about 0.2 on average in large
municipalities. That is, fragmentation increases as if the number of equal sized parties
increases by 0.2, well below the increase in parties represented (1.4), which suggests that
entering parties indeed attain only a small number of seats. Therefore, hypothesis 3, as it
applies to fragmentation is confirmed in that only large municipalities are affected. Notice that
even if fragmentation increases only slightly, an effect on expenditure might still materialize
in case of slim majorities of coalitions pre-reform.
I explore the robustness of the main result by leaving out one of the treated states at a time,
similar to a jackknife estimation and reassuringly, the results do not change significantly,
as can be seen from columns (3)-(5) of table 3.3. This suggests that the results are not
driven by state-specific shocks to the number of represented parties that happen to occur in
the reform year or afterward. Furthermore, I use different definitions for small and large
municipalities (using 15 000 and 7000 inhabitants as cutoffs, corresponding to the population
means of sample 1 and sample 2, respectively), leaving the results unchanged. In addition, I
look at three size groups instead of two to explore heterogeneity within the group of larger
municipalities. Table 3.4 reveals that municipalities having 200 000 inhabitants or more are
affected most severely. The number of parties represented increases by 2.8. However, this
group of municipalities is very small.26
26 There are only 98 observations of municipalities having 200 000 inhabitants or more in sample 1.
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Table 3.3: Difference-in-differences estimates: parties represented (robustness checks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
pop< 7000 × reform 0.059
(0.042)
pop ≥ 7000 × reform 1.268∗∗∗
(0.122)
pop < 15000 × reform 0.106∗∗∗
(0.037)
pop ≥ 15000 × reform 1.355∗∗∗
(0.142)
small × reform 0.071∗ 0.069∗ 0.710∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.039) (0.115)
large × reform 1.568∗∗∗ 1.285∗∗∗ 1.571∗∗∗
(0.182) (0.176) (0.165)
Size-Year-FE yes yes yes yes yes
Excluded state NW SL TH
Observations 9689 9689 7751 9589 6772
Adjusted R2 0.271 0.313 0.118 0.288 0.356
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 1. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
Table 3.4: Difference-in-differences estimates: parties represented (different size groups)
(1)
pop< 10000 × reform 0.082∗∗
(0.039)
10000 ≤pop< 200000 × reform 1.325∗∗∗
(0.131)
pop ≥ 200000 × reform 2.826∗∗∗
(0.198)
Size-Year-FE yes
Observations 9689
Adjusted R2 0.348
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 1.
Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
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3.6.2 Economic outcomes
Given that the abolishment of an electoral threshold has an effect on the number of parties
represented on a council, particularly in larger municipalities, what are the consequences
in terms of policy? Hypothesis 4 conjectures that expenditure increases, potentially due to
a common-pool problem, if fragmentation is not too severe. Figure 3.6 presents the event
study based on equation (3.2) where the outcome is the logarithm of municipal expenditure
and time is measured in years relative to the removal of an electoral threshold.27
Figure 3.6: Event study estimates: effect of reforms on log expenditure
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Notes: This figure shows event study estimates of equation (3.2) along with 95% confidence intervals. Size-year fixed effects
and size-year specific linear trends are included. Sample 2 is used for economic outcomes. Log municipal expenditure can be
found on the vertical axis. Years are on the horizontal axis. Standard errors are clustered at the municipality level.
While differences in the development of expenditure pre-reform are small between the
treatment and control groups, there is a marked increase one year after the reform and
then again five years later with a period of relative constancy in between and subsequently.
An increase in expenditure of about 9 percent obtains ten years or more after a reform.
This result is similar to the finding by Egger and Koethenbuerger (2010) of an increase in
expenditure by 11 percent when council size increases by 2.6 seats. Since elections take place
every five years (indicated by red vertical lines), the pattern is consistent with the political
effects found above which are increasing over elections following the reform. Furthermore,
readjustment after elections with a lag of one year is consistent with the fact that many
municipalities implement budgets extending over a period of two years. Before I turn to
potential mechanisms, I explore the effect’s heterogeneity with respect to municipality size.
Table 3.5 presents difference-in-difference estimates based on equation (3.3) where the outcome
is log expenditure for sample 2 (columns 1 and 2) and separately for the municipalities of
27 In what follows, I make use of the larger sample 2 which covers more states (and years) than the sample
used for the analysis of political outcomes.
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sample 1 (columns 3 and 4).28 The average effect is clearly higher for large municipalities at
6 percent compared to 2 percent for small municipalities in sample 2, consistent with the
stronger response of the number of parties represented for large municipalities and confirming
the second part of hypothesis 4. Again, there seems to be a severe short-run bias compared
with the event-study estimates. The effects are smaller in the municipalities of sample 1
but still, large municipalities see a relatively higher increase in expenditure. However, it
is unclear whether political effects are stronger for the complete set of states featured in
sample 2 (for which the relevant outcomes are unavailable), compared with sample 1.
Table 3.5: Difference-in-differences estimates: log expenditure
(1) (2) (3) (4)
reform 0.027∗∗∗ 0.016∗
(0.005) (0.008)
small × reform 0.022∗∗∗ 0.009
(0.006) (0.012)
large × reform 0.064∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.009)
Size-Year-FE yes yes yes yes
Linear state trends by size yes yes yes yes
Observations 173591 173591 41875 41875
Adjusted R2 0.091 0.091 0.183 0.183
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Models (1) and (2): sample
2, models (3) and (4): municipalities of sample 1. Small municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer.
Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
So far, I have focused on the reduced form effect, i.e. the reform’s effect on expenditure.
Which of the political effects of the threshold removal is likely to be responsible for the
increase in municipal expenditure? Only indirect evidence is available to answer this question
since some potential channels cannot be excluded with the data available. For example, the
threat of competition may lead incumbent parties to change their behavior (e.g. increase
expenditure) in response to the reform even before other parties decide to run for election.
Alternatively, the threat of entry could trigger a change in incumbent behavior only if
additional parties actually compete by running for election due to the reform. However,
looking again at figure 3.5, it is evident that it is unlikely that the number of competing
parties is responsible for the initial increase in expenditure since it is not before the second
post-reform election that significantly increases. The number of parties represented, on the
other hand, increases already at the first post-reform election.
28 In contrast to the analysis of political effects, I use annual observations since data on expenditure is
available for each year. In sample 2, where clustering at the state-year level is feasible, doing so leaves the
estimate for large municipalities significant at the 5% level while the estimate for small municipalities turns
insignificant. Without linear trends, estimates remain significant and point estimates change only slightly.
These results are available from the author upon request.
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If one is willing to make the assumption that the exclusion restriction holds, i.e. that the
reform affects expenditure only via the number of parties represented on a council, one can
readily use the electoral reform as an instrument: the Wald (1940) estimator implies that one
additional party represented on a municipal council leads to an increase in expenditure of
2.7
0.25 = 10.8 percent (using sample 2 for the expenditure effect).
29 Using sample 1 reduces the
effect to 6.4 percent. Even if it is indeed the number of parties represented that is responsible
for the increase in expenditure, one can still not be certain that the underlying cause is
a common pool problem. Only then would it be possible to conclude that the threshold
removal exacerbates inefficiency of the type found in such models.
For robustness, I explore the same alternative definitions for size groups as above (see
columns 1 and 2 of table 3.6), which does not matter for the results. I also conduct the
same analysis using only states that experience a reform at some point, which again does
not alter the results (columns 3 of table 3.6). Further distinguishing between large and
very large municipalities (having more than 200 000 inhabitants) reveals that the effects are
particularly large at 15 % in the latter municipalities, mirroring the political results. However,
significance is lost which is likely due to the fact that there are only few observations for this
group, as mentioned above.
Table C.5 presents estimates when one of the treatment states is dropped from the sample.
Throughout, the effect is higher for large municipalities and dropping states does not change
the magnitude of estimates substantially, the only exception being Mecklenburg-Vorpommern
(even then, the effect for large municipalities remains significant). Next, I look at log revenue
(which includes deficits, to be explored separately below) for consistency and find effects
that are nearly identical as those for expenditure (see table C.3). I then explore the effects
on different categories of expenditure in table C.6. These results should be interpreted with
caution, however: apart from investment spending (in column 3), increases in the other
categories (spending on staff and material) seem to be larger in small municipalities.30 This
finding is however consistent with Jarman (2016), who finds that it is investment spending
that reacts when one additional party enters a council.
If spending increases, an important question is which source of revenue increases accordingly.
One possibility is that parties find it hard to agree on raising tax multipliers31 and instead
postpone consolidation by borrowing. This would imply that threshold removals contribute
to higher overall government budget deficits.
In recent years, acquiring loans has become easier for municipalities (Deutsche Bundesbank,
2016). In principle, budgetary regulations allow loans only for investment expenditure and
only if loans are small relative to expected future revenue. However, these regulations were
29 In my application, the Wald estimator is simply the ratio of the expenditure effect and the number-of-
parties effect.
30 Investment spending and spending on staff each amount to 17% of overall expenditure on average, while
spending on material accounts for 15%.
31 As for the local business tax, tax competition among municipalities further complicates revenue raising.
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Table 3.6: Difference-in-differences estimates: log expenditure (robustness checks)
(1) (2) (3)
pop< 7000 × reform 0.026∗∗∗
(0.006)
pop ≥ 7000 × reform 0.059∗∗∗
(0.014)
pop < 15000 × reform 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
pop ≥ 15000 × reform 0.083∗∗∗
(0.022)
small × reform 0.027∗∗∗
(0.005)
large × reform 0.077∗∗∗
(0.023)
Size-Year-FE yes yes yes
Linear state trends by size yes yes yes
Never treated excluded yes
Observations 173591 173591 91623
Adjusted R2 0.089 0.096 0.087
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 2. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
Table 3.7: Difference-in-differences estimates: log expenditure (different size groups)
(1)
pop< 10000 × reform 0.022∗∗∗
(0.006)
10000 ≤pop< 200000 × reform 0.061∗∗∗
(0.016)
pop ≥ 200000 × reform 0.153
(0.171)
Size-Year-FE yes
Linear state trends by size yes
Observations 173591
Adjusted R2 0.092
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 2. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
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apparently not enforced in recent years such that municipalities were able to run budget
deficits on a regular basis. Nevertheless, the majority of municipalities runs a balanced
budget.32
The empirical evidence is only weakly in favor of higher borrowing. While table 3.8 reveals
that debt financing increased in reformed municipalities and more strongly so in larger
ones, three qualifications need to be made: the effect for large municipalities is insignificant
and only slightly larger than the one for smaller municipalities even though the increase in
expenditure is rather low in the latter group. Furthermore, the number of observations is
drastically lower since there are many zero-entries in the data, reflecting the fact that many
municipalities do not run deficits on a regular basis.
Table 3.8: Difference-in-differences estimates: log credit revenue
(1) (2)
reform 0.057∗∗
(0.028)
small × reform 0.051∗
(0.030)
large × reform 0.073
(0.063)
Size-Year-FE yes yes
Linear state trends by size yes yes
Observations 75537 75537
Adjusted R2 0.034 0.034
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 2. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
Looking at revenue sources other than borrowing, table C.4 confirms that the role of credit is
limited. Revenue from other sources increases in line with expenditure. This result is another
piece of evidence in support of no paralysation since councils need to reach agreement e.g. to
raise tax multipliers or fees.
3.6.3 Survey evidence from the German Internet Panel
What do voters know about electoral thresholds and how would they behave if the threshold
at the federal level were abolished? Only survey data can help to answer these questions.
By finding an answer to the first question, one can obtain suggestive evidence on whether
behavioral effects due to the reform on the part of voters are likely to be large. The second
question relates to external validity of the results at other levels of government. I have
asked a random sample of the German population about their voting behavior as part of the
32 Deficits make up only 4 % of overall revenues on average.
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German Internet Panel (GIP)’s wave 30 (Blom et al., 2018). The GIP generates longitudinal
survey data on political and economic topics based on a probability sample of the German
population (Blom et al., 2015). The current waves’ sample size is varying but approximately
includes 3000 participants.33
The topic of electoral thresholds had already been featured in wave 3 of the GIP (Blom
et al., 2016), when participants were asked about the five percent threshold in place at
federal elections in Germany (“What vote share of second votes does a party require overall
in order to be able to obtain a seat in parliament?”).34 The results reveal that a substantial
share of the population is unaware of this electoral institution: 53% of participants answered
correctly, 40% answered “Don’t know.” and the remainder answered incorrectly.
Given this rather low number of correct answers, it seems even more questionable that many
voters are informed about thresholds at the local level since municipal elections receive much
less attention than federal elections. Figure 3.7 shows the fraction of survey respondents
by state who believe that there is a threshold in place in their state of residence.35. In all
states, more than 50% of respondents think that a threshold exists while in fact there is
no threshold in place in any state (with the exception of city states). The case of North
Rhine-Westphalia is quite interesting: the state saw an abolishment in 1999, but a 2.5%
threshold was introduced in 2016 (Landtag Nordrhein-Westfalen, 2016). Consistent with this
re-introduction, the percentage of the response “yes” is visibly higher than in other states.
What matters for the existence of behavioral effects on the part of voters is whether people
learned about the change in thresholds in affected states. Since we do not know what
respondents would have answered before the reforms took place, the only statement that
can be made is that less than 50% of respondents could have learned about the change in
thresholds in affected states (because the majority in each state still thinks a threshold is in
place).
Can the behavioral effects on the part of voters be expected to vary by municipality size?
This would require voter knowledge about implicit thresholds. In order to test whether voters
are uninformed about implicit thresholds, a question about the 2014 election in Germany for
the European Parliament was implemented. Respondents were asked to guess the implicit
threshold for this election, which took place without an explicit threshold in place. Given that
there were close to 100 seats available for Germany, the implicit threshold was approximately
equal to 0.5% of all votes.36 More precisely, the party “Pirates” obtained a seat with 0.6%
of votes. Figure C.2 reveals that the vast majority did not answer correctly. Therefore, if
33 See http://reforms.uni-mannheim.de/internet_panel/Methodology/, retrieved August 21, 2018.
34 Note that each voter has the opportunity to vote both for a party (the “second vote”) and, independently,
for a candidate in the voter’s district at federal elections in Germany.
35 Results for small states are reported in conjunction with another state such that these figures are hard
to interpret. This is true in particular for the city states Hamburg (HH), Bremen (HB) and Berlin (BE).
36 Recall the formula from above, 12×seats .
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Figure 3.7: Is there a threshold at the municipal level in your state of residence?
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Source: Wave 30 of the German Internet Panel (Blom et al., 2018)
behavioral effects vary by municipality size, as claimed by Baskaran and da Fonseca (2016b),
this must be due to parties behaving differently in municipalities of different size.
The question of external validity is of course crucial since many national parliaments have
more than 100 seats which means that implicit thresholds are quite low and therefore the
number of parties may increase significantly if explicit thresholds were removed.37 It is quite
likely that salience at the federal level would be higher than at the local level such that
behavioral effects could be larger. Stakes are higher at the federal level, such that parties
might also react differently. On the other hand, voters might be less willing to experiment at
the federal level, knowing that small parties entering a national parliament can have a larger
impact than at the local level (e.g. in terms of legislation). Figure C.1 presents answers
to the question of whether respondents would have behaved differently in the last federal
election if it had taken place without an explicit threshold. Clearly, this is not the case for
almost all respondents.
3.7 Conclusions
This paper estimates the causal effect of the removal of an electoral threshold on political
and economic outcomes. The findings can be summarized as follows: both the number of
parties competing and the number of parties represented on municipal councils significantly
increase in response to an abolishment. The effect is significantly more pronounced in
large municipalities, which can be explained by differing implicit thresholds. Municipal
37 As for the effects on expenditure, it is quite likely that the common pool problem exists at the federal
level, too, since the federal government is typically composed of more than one party.
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expenditure increases, consistent with a common pool problem. Survey results reveal limited
voter knowledge about thresholds in general and about municipal thresholds in particular,
suggesting a limited role of behavioral effects.
Future research may clarify the exact size of behavioral effects, could analyze the role of
changing party behavior versus voter behavior due to the reforms and could explore additional
policy outcomes. As for the effect on spending, it would be interesting to know which exact
channel is at play. In addition, the threshold removals used for identification could serve as
an instrument for other political variables, e.g. to explore the impact of council representation
of extremist parties on policy outcomes.
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Appendix A
Appendix to chapter 1
A.1 Theoretical details
A.1.1 Derivation of efficient equalization payments
Planner’s problem
Solving the planner’s problem amounts to maximizing worker utility in a given location
under the constraint of equal utility across locations (and resource, consumption, technology
and non-negativity constraints). As in Albouy (2012), the planner’s choice for each region j
consists of the tuple
(
N j, N jX , N
j
Y , N
j
G, K
j
X , K
j
Y , K
j
G, G
j, xj, yj
)
to solve
max U
(
x1, y1,
G1
(N1)ω , Q
1
)
s.t. U
(
xj, yj,
Gj
(N j)ω , Q
j
)
≥ U
(
x1, y1,
G1
(N1)ω , Q
1
)
∀j
Defining ψ1 := 1−∑j 6=1 ψj, the corresponding Lagrangian L can be written as
L =
∑
j
ψjU
(
xj, yj,
Gj
(N j)ω , Q
j
)
+ piX
∑
j
FX
(
KjX , L
j
X , N
j
X , AX
(
N jX
))
−∑
j
N jxj

+
∑
j
pijY
(
FY
(
KjY , L
j
Y , N
j
Y , A
j
Y
)
−N jyj
)
+
∑
j
pijG
(
FG
(
KjG, L
j
G, N
j
G, A
j
G
)
−Gj
)
+
∑
j
pijK
(
Kj −KjX −KjY −KjG
)
+ κ
K¯ −∑
j
Kj

+
∑
j
pijN
(
N j −N jX −N jY −N jG
)
+ ν
N¯ −∑
j
N j

where the notation of production functions for housing and the publicly provided good (FY
and FG, respectively) is analogous to the tradable good except that productivity is exogenous.
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K¯ and N¯ represent the fixed quantities of capital and labor at the national level and the
non-negativity constraints have been omitted.
Substitution of Karush-Kuhn-Tucker necessary first order conditions implies that ∂F
j
X
∂KX
= ∂F
j′
X
∂KX
must hold for any two regions j and j′ at an interior solution.1 Existence of an interior
solution and sufficiency are discussed below for particular functional form assumptions. The
focus of this paper is on the condition with respect to labor in region j, which reads as
follows:
∂F jX
∂NX
+ ∂F
j
X
∂AX
∂AjX
∂NX
− xj −MRT jY Xyj − ωMRT jGX
Gj
N j
= ν (A.1)
where ν is a Lagrange multiplier constant across regions. This means that the number of
workers in a location should be increased if productivity (including the indirect effect via
agglomeration) is high relative to the cost of consumption and congestion of the publicly
provided good. Regions that offer higher quality of life (as reflected in amenities) exhibit
lower resource cost as they require e.g. a lower level of housing consumption for a given level
of utility equalized across locations.
Budget constraints
The workers’ budget constraint reads as follows:
xj + pjY yj + τFwwj = wj + F j (A.2)
where pY is the price of housing. Local governments finance the publicly provided good by
taxing the returns to land and capital:
pjGG
j = τ jLrjLj + τ
j
KiK
j (A.3)
The federal government pays for equalization payments using its wage income tax revenues:
∑
j
N jF j =
∑
j
N j
(
τFww
j
)
(A.4)
The market solution
Imposing market conditions, i.e. wj = ∂F
j
X
∂NX
and pjY = MRT
j
Y X on equation (A.1) and using
the definition pG := MRT jGX yields
wj + ∂F
j
X
∂AX
∂AjX
∂NX
− xj − pjY yj − ωpjG
Gj
N j
= ν (A.5)
1 The FOC condition for capital calls for capital tax harmonization. If taxes on capital differ across
regions, satisfying the condition with respect to labor does not lead to the second-best except if by chance.
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which then gives equation (1.1) after making use of equations (A.2), (A.3) and (A.4) and
solving for equalization payments. Uniqueness of the market solution is discussed below for
particular functional form assumptions.
With the price i of capital determined by the fixed supply of capital at the level, Euler’s
equation implies that the local price of land used in the production of tradable goods rjX is
rjX =
Xj −KjXi−N jXwj
LjX
(A.6)
which makes land owners the residual claimants.
A.1.2 The model for a particular functional form assumption
For illustration, I assume that utility and production in each sector obey a Cobb-Douglas
functional form. Doing so allows me to establish sufficiency of the KKT conditions, existence
of an interior solution and uniqueness of the market outcome. Furthermore, functional form
assumptions are required for the estimation of agglomeration elasticities.
Local labor demand
Production of tradables I assume production of the tradable good as
FX(.) = AjX
(
KjX
)α (
LjX
)β (
N jX
)1−α−β
. When firms take regional population as given, first
order conditions imply the log local labor demand curve
lnwj = 11− α lnA
j
X −
α
1− α ln i
j + β1− α lnL
j
X −
β
1− α lnN
j
X +
α
1− α lnα+ ln (1− α− β)
(A.7)
where the first order condition for capital has been substituted.
Equation (1.4) follows directly from the definition of σj and the fact that the wage in a
region is proportional to average output per worker:
dF jX
dNX
= F
j
X
NX
(
1− α− β + σj
)
= wj + w
j
1− α− βσ
j (A.8)
Assumption on the agglomeration function If the agglomeration function is log-linear
(as suggested by the results in Kline and Moretti (2014a)), i.e.
g(.) = σ ln NX
R
+ c (A.9)
where σ is the constant agglomeration elasticity, we have ∂ lnwj
∂ lnNjX
= σ−β1−α . If, in addition,
σ < β (also suggested by the results in Kline and Moretti (2014a)), the labor demand curve
is downward-sloping. Intuitively, this assumption restricts the magnitude of agglomeration
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economies such that the crowding of the fixed factor land outweighs the productivity gain
of adding an additional worker. Notice that when estimating agglomeration elasticities, I
do not restrict the functional form or the elasticities. The empirical evidence reported in
section 1.6 supports the assumption of log-linearity and σ < β.
Overall local labor demand Cobb-Douglas production of housing and the publicly
provided good is analogous to the tradable good except that productivity is exogenous. This
implies downward sloping labor demand as in equation (A.7) in both sectors. Summing
labor demand across sectors yields overall downward-sloping labor demand.
Local labor supply
For U (x, y, gj, Qj) = Qj (gj)γ˜ (y)α˜ (x)β˜ with α˜+ β˜ + γ˜ = 1, agents solve (in a given location)
max
x,y
lnQ+ γ˜ ln g + α˜ ln y + β˜ ln x s.t. pY y + x = w(1− τFw ) + F =: w˜,
where w˜ denotes income after taxes and transfers. This yields demand proportional to
income: x = β˜
α˜+β˜ w˜ and y =
α˜
(α˜+β˜)
w˜
r
. Regional log housing demand then reads
lnHd = lnN + ln w˜ − ln pY + c1
for some constant c1.
Production of housing is analogous to production of the tradable good (with land being
a fixed factor) but with exogenous productivity: FY (.) = AjY
(
KjY
)αy (
LjY
)βy (
N jY
)1−αy−βy
.
The implied log housing supply is a linear function of the log wage and price:
lnHs = 1− β
y
βy
ln pY +
αy + βy − 1
βy
lnw + c2
Solving for effective local labor supply amounts to solving for local housing market equilibria,
i.e. imposing
lnN + ln w˜ − ln pY + c1 = 1− β
y
βy
ln pY +
αy + βy − 1
βy
lnw + c2
which yields ln pY = (1− αy − βy) lnw + βy ln w˜ + βy lnN + c3
Equilibrium across locations requires ln U¯ = lnU j ∀j such that, using g = G
Nω
, local labor
supply N j is determined by
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Figure A.1: Local labor market equilibrium
ln N
ln
w
log labor supply
log labor demand
ln U¯ = lnQj + γ˜ lnGj − (ωγ˜ + α˜βy) lnN j + (α˜ + β˜ − α˜βy) ln(wj − T j + F j)
− (α˜(1− αy − βy)) lnwj + c4
Upward-sloping local labor supply is obtained if (α˜+β˜−α˜βy)wj > α˜(1−αy−βy)(wj−T j+F j).
Intuitively, this requires that an increase in local wages makes local agents better off, i.e.
the increase in the cost of housing due to higher local wages is relatively less important than
the increase in consumption. Notice that this condition is satisfied in particular if T j ≥ F j .2
The descriptive statistics reveal that in Germany, wage income tax payments due to differing
wage premia are considerably larger than per-capita equalization payments. Finally, the
condition ∑j N j = 1 determines U¯ . A higher level of U¯ causes an inward shift of local labor
supply in all regions.
Uniqueness of the market solution
Downward-sloping local labor demand and upward-sloping local labor supply imply unique-
ness of the local labor market equilibrium, as illustrated in figure A.1.
Existence of an interior solution
The first order condition necessary as written in equation (A.1) is valid only at an interior
solution. It is not clear that Inada conditions can be assumed to hold for the production
2 Also note that incorporating housing in the model is not essential for the main result of this paper.
Without housing, upward-sloping labor supply obtains due to the congestion of the publicly provided good if
ω > 0.
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function in the presence of agglomeration economies in general. Given that I assume log-
linearity of the agglomeration function as in equation (A.9) and σ < β however, an interior
solution obtains.
First consider what happens when N jX approaches infinity. Then, the first two terms on
the left hand side of equation (A.1), i.e. the entire marginal product of labor decrease. To
see why this is the case, note that ∂F
j
X
∂NX
= wj and that ∂ lnwj
∂ lnNjX
= σ−β1−α < 0. The second term
on the left hand side of equation (A.1) is a multiple of the first term according to equation
(1.4). The resource cost of housing is increasing in N j. I assume that it is not optimal for
regions to be empty, i.e. that the last term of equation (A.1) relating to the congestion of
the publicly provided good does not dominate as N j approaches zero (N j can approach zero
if and only if N jX , N
j
Y and N
j
G all approach zero).
Sufficiency
With a strictly quasi-concave utility function such as the one chosen above, the KKT
conditions are sufficient for a unique global maximum if the constraint functions satisfy
quasi-concavity (Sundaram, 1996). Cobb-Douglas production of the housing good and
the publicly provided good exhibiting decreasing returns (due to the fixed factor) directly
yields concavity since productivity is exogenous. Concavity of the constraint function
relating to production of tradables,
(∑
j FX
(
KjX , L
j
X , N
j
X , AX
(
N jX
))
−∑j N jxj), is less
straightforward due to endogenous productivity. However, with Cobb-Douglas production,
provided that the agglomeration function fulfills equation (A.9) and σ < β, concavity is
immediate since the exponents of the variable factors then add up to less than one.
Production in the dynamic model
In the dynamic version of the model, production of tradable goods in decade t occurs
according to FX,t (.) = AjX,t
(
KjX,t
)α (
LjX,t
)β (
N jX,t
)1−α−β
. Agglomeration is assumed to
operate with a decadal lag, i.e.
lnAjX,t = g
N jX,t−1
Rj
+ νj + φt + jt (A.10)
where φt is a period fixed-effect (equal across locations) and νj represents time-constant
region-specific productivity. The error jt is a shock to productivity in region j and decade t,
e.g. due to changes in technology.
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A.1.3 Efficient equalization payments
If equalization payments were re-directed, wages would change, affecting efficient equalization
payments derived from equation (1.1).3 In particular, if equalization payments were increased
in high-wage regions (e.g. in West Germany), crowding of the fixed factor would cause wages
to decline which in turn would decrease the portion of optimal equalization payments due to
wage income tax payments. I approximate efficient equalization payments not conditional on
wages by deriving a first-order Taylor series approximation to conditional efficient payments
and then looking for a fixed point.
In a first step I simplify by assuming that F j? = wj based on the estimate that the
agglomeration effect can be written as 1.02wj and τ = 0.25. Using observed wages and
equalization payments (wj0, F j0), we then have that for alternative equalization payments
F j
F j
? ≈ wj0 + ∂w
j
∂F j
(F j0) · (F j − F j0) (A.11)
where I then use labor demand in the tradable sector to approximate ∂wj
∂F j
. This gives
∂wj
∂F j
= wj σ−β1−α

m¯
. Actually, overall labor demand is the object of interest here. However, it is
for labor demand in the tradable sector that I have obtained estimates above.4
Imposing F j? = F j and making use of calibrated and estimated parameters5 of the estimate
for  as in section 1.7 and m¯ = 22000, I obtain
F j
? ≈ 22000w
j0 + 0.2wj0F j0
22000 + 0.2wj0
(A.12)
Approximated optimal payments are shown in figure (A.2). Compared to figure (1.4),
the general pattern remains unchanged but there is a noticeable change in magnitudes of
payments: As expected, the variance of optimal payments declines since an inflow of workers
into high-wage regions leads to lower wages there and the opposite happens in low-wage
regions (the approximation F j? = wj further lowers the variance of optimal payments).
3 In addition, the portion of efficient equalization payments due to source-based taxation would change
too, but I ignore this effect since deviations in source-based tax revenues are small compared to wage premia
differentials as shown above.
4 In a robustness check, I set σ = 0 to simulate the reaction of overall labor demand and the results
change only marginally.
5 σˆ = 0.24, β = 0.47 and α = 0.3.
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Figure A.2: Efficient equalization payments taking into account wage adjustment (year 2005)
(680,4710] (-512.5,680]
(-1839,-512.5] [-4023,-1839]
Notes: This map shows efficient equalization payments that take into account the wage adjustment in Euro per capita
relative to the population weighted mean for each labor market region. The distribution is partitioned into four intervals
containing an equal number of observations. Darker colors indicate higher values.
A.1.4 Equalization payments to local governments instead of work-
ers
If ω = 1, optimal payments in equation (1.1) remain unchanged if they flow to local
governments instead of workers. This can be seen from the amended local government’s
budget constraint: pjGGj = τ
j
Lr
jLj + τ jKiKj +N jF j.
A.1.5 Tax-sharing as residence-based taxation
Above, I treat municipal revenues from tax-sharing as equalization payments and thereby
implicitly assume that the sharing agreement can be controlled by the federal government.
If the revenue-sharing system in place cannot be altered, the condition for efficient payments
Fˆ j is now
Fˆ j
?
= τFwwj − ω
Sj + τ jLrjLj + τ
j
KiK
j
N j
+ ∂F
j
X
∂AX
∂AjX
∂NX
+ Fˆ (A.13)
where Sj is the revenue sharing payment to region j, paid for by federal government revenue.
If ω = 1, the NFB doesn’t change.
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Shared revenues from wage income taxation, to the extent that they accrue to municipalities,
can approximately be treated as residence-based taxation. The reason is that the fraction
a municipality receives from the overall income tax revenue share that all municipalities
receive is determined to a certain extent based upon total earnings in a municipality.6 Then
we have
Fˆ j
?
= (τˆFw + τSw)wj − ω
τSww
jN j + τ jLrjLj + τ
j
KiK
j
N j
+ ∂F
j
X
∂AX
∂AjX
∂NX
+ Fˆ (A.14)
where τSw is the location-independent income tax rate that is implicitly due to tax sharing
and τˆFw := τFw − τSw . Note that the residence-based revenue term cancels if ω = 1. Intuitively,
residence-based taxes do not require correction in this case since the corresponding distortion
is exactly offset by the congestion term that arises due to the contribution to local government
expenditures.
6 In fact, revenue is first allocated to groups of municipalities that belong to the same state and then
the income generated in a municipality is taken into account up to a threshold, which has an equalizing
effect among municipalities in a given state. For details, see http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.
de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Oeffentliche_Finanzen/Foederale_Finanzbeziehungen/
Kommunalfinanzen/der-gemeindeanteil-an-der-einkommensteuer-in-der-gemeindefinanzreform.
html, retrieved February 1, 2018.
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A.2 Additional empirical results
Figure A.3: Components of equation (1.2)
(-30,468] (-111,-30]
(-175,-111] [-303,-175]
(a) Source based tax revenues (year
2005)
(851,6581] (-754,851]
(-2518,-754] [-5260,-2518]
(b) Agglomeration effects
Notes: Map (a) shows source based tax revenues in Euro per capita relative to the population weighted mean for each labor
market region. Map (b) shows agglomeration effects relative to the population weighted mean for each labor market region.
The distributions are partitioned into four intervals containing an equal number of observations. Darker colors indicate
higher values.
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Figure A.4: Efficient equalization payments (year 2005)...
(1102,7961] (-884,1102]
(-3114,-884] [-6705,-3114]
(a) ...when ω = 0
(297,1090] (-60,297]
(-448,-60] [-1253,-448]
(b) ... when agglomeration is ignored
Notes: Map (a) shows efficient equalization payments when ω = 0 in Euro per capita relative to the population weighted
mean for each labor market region. Map (b) shows efficient equalization payments when agglomeration effects are ignored in
Euro per capita relative to the population weighted mean for each labor market region. The distributions are partitioned into
four intervals containing an equal number of observations. Darker colors indicate higher values.
Figure A.5: Histograms (year 2005)...
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Notes: The amounts are in Euro per capita relative to the population weighted mean.
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Figure A.6: Histograms of wage income tax payments (year 2005)
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Notes: The amounts are in Euro relative to the population weighted mean.
Figure A.7: Histograms (year 2005)...
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Figure A.8: Efficient and actual equalization payments (year 2005), all observations
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Notes: The amounts are in Euro per capita relative to the population weighted mean.
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Figure A.9: Average wage income tax payments for different time periods
(277,1061] (-55,277]
(-426,-55] [-1480,-426]
(a) Years 1993-2000
(316,1442] (-136,316]
(-617,-136] [-1604,-617]
(b) Years 2000-2010
Notes: These maps shows wage income tax payments relative to the population weighted mean for each labor market region.
The distributions are partitioned into four intervals containing an equal number of observations. Darker colors indicate
higher values.
Figure A.10: Average equalization payments for different time periods
(146,839] (51.5,146]
(-48,51.5] [-761,-48]
(a) Years 1995-2000
(168,597] (80.5,168]
(-10,80.5] [-756,-10]
(b) Years 2000-2010
Notes: These maps show equalization payments in Euro per capita relative to the population weighted mean for each labor
market region. The distributions are partitioned into four intervals containing an equal number of observations. Darker
colors indicate higher values.
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Table A.1: Estimates of log labor market region wage premia
Model (1) (2) (3) (4)
Heide -0.242*** -0.146*** -0.119*** -0.155***
Itzehoe -0.130*** -0.0228 -0.0544** -0.0291
Flensburg -0.188*** -0.0775*** -0.0868*** -0.0821***
Lu¨beck -0.152*** -0.00515 -0.0568*** -0.00870
Kiel -0.146*** -0.0386* -0.0578*** -0.0403*
Ratzeburg -0.202*** -0.0542** -0.0688*** -0.0529*
Hamburg 0.0929*** 0.0951*** 0.0414** 0.100***
Braunschweig -0.172*** -0.0358 -0.0894*** -0.0427*
Salzgitter -0.0236 0.0665** 0.00595 0.0243
Wolfsburg 0.132*** 0.0996*** 0.0368* 0.0902***
Go¨ttingen -0.262*** -0.124*** -0.121*** -0.142***
Goslar -0.251*** -0.0943*** -0.131*** -0.0981***
Helmstedt -0.244*** -0.142*** -0.0757*** -0.148***
Einbeck -0.260*** -0.122*** -0.107*** -0.160***
Osterode -0.222*** -0.115*** -0.122*** -0.136***
Hannover -0.0686** 0.0398* -0.0269 0.0387*
Sulingen -0.300*** -0.0735*** -0.0907*** -0.0803***
Hameln -0.194*** -0.0299 -0.0874*** -0.0444
Hildesheim -0.226*** -0.0308 -0.0762*** -0.0545**
Holzminden -0.216*** -0.0673* -0.121*** -0.107***
Nienburg -0.147*** -0.0355 -0.0817*** -0.0489
Stadthagen -0.260*** -0.109*** -0.0626** -0.131***
Celle -0.144*** -0.0574** -0.0914*** -0.0617**
Lu¨neburg -0.138*** -0.0256 -0.0865*** -0.0286
Zeven -0.246*** -0.0740** -0.0493** -0.0837***
Soltau -0.190*** -0.0451 -0.0579** -0.0531*
Stade -0.226*** -0.0472* -0.0513** -0.0456
Uelzen -0.238*** -0.105*** -0.135*** -0.112***
Verden -0.222*** -0.0434 -0.0614*** -0.0479
Emden -0.136*** -0.0683** -0.0756*** -0.0754***
Westerstede -0.159*** -0.0282 -0.0585** -0.0247
Oldenburg -0.185*** -0.0359 -0.0735*** -0.0360
Osnabru¨ck -0.212*** -0.0750*** -0.0657*** -0.0824***
Wilhelmshaven -0.195*** -0.0790*** -0.107*** -0.0822***
Cloppenburg -0.228*** -0.134*** -0.145*** -0.162***
Lingen -0.239*** -0.127*** -0.114*** -0.148***
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Nordhorn -0.435*** -0.244*** -0.133*** -0.255***
Leer -0.343*** -0.119*** -0.128*** -0.114***
Vechta -0.183*** -0.0885*** -0.0603** -0.111***
Nordenham -0.218*** -0.0392 -0.0626* -0.0782**
Bremen -0.152*** 0.0370* -0.0237 0.0368*
Bremerhaven -0.180*** -0.0560** -0.0744*** -0.0602**
Ho¨xter -0.294*** -0.135*** -0.113*** -0.160***
Du¨sseldorf 0.0841*** 0.103*** 0.0513*** 0.104***
Duisburg -0.128*** -0.0124 -0.0403** -0.0126
Essen -0.0839*** 0.0297 -0.0143 0.0367*
Krefeld -0.0249 0.0428* -0.0181 0.0413*
Viersen -0.112*** -0.00452 0.00316 -0.0167
Mo¨nchengladbach -0.104*** 0.00551 -0.0132 0.00629
Heinsberg -0.303*** -0.0803*** -0.0408* -0.0879***
Wuppertal -0.0231 0.0355 -0.00306 0.0274
Schwelm -0.115*** 0.0196 -0.00873 -0.00612
Remscheid -0.0199 0.0201 0.00356 0.00783
Kleve -0.221*** -0.0845*** -0.0639*** -0.0921***
Aachen -0.160*** 0.00434 -0.00801 0.00467
Ko¨ln 0.0143 0.0596*** 0.0318* 0.0673***
Leverkusen 0.0889*** 0.0977*** 0.0334 0.0862***
Bonn -0.166*** -0.108*** 0.00311 -0.0954***
Du¨ren -0.166*** -0.0175 -0.0158 -0.0182
Euskirchen -0.278*** -0.144*** -0.0575** -0.165***
Gummersbach -0.0955*** -0.00449 -0.0125 -0.0109
Gelsenkirchen -0.200*** -0.0394* -0.0604*** -0.0395*
Mu¨nster -0.184*** -0.0576** -0.0529*** -0.0626***
Borken -0.229*** -0.113*** -0.0952*** -0.129***
Steinfurt -0.265*** -0.0931*** -0.0724*** -0.103***
Bielefeld -0.106*** 0.0135 -0.0312* 0.00202
Gu¨tersloh -0.0858*** 0.0263 -0.0158 0.00303
Detmold -0.139*** -0.0285 -0.0431** -0.0539**
Minden -0.142*** -0.0197 -0.0435** -0.0295
Paderborn -0.201*** -0.0510** -0.0707*** -0.0665***
Bochum -0.127*** -0.00508 -0.0290 -0.00891
Dortmund -0.192*** -0.0493** -0.0452** -0.0459**
Hagen -0.126*** 0.0133 -0.0481** 0.00787
Lu¨denscheid -0.0550* 0.0429* -0.00163 0.00470
Meschede -0.218*** -0.0240 -0.0387* -0.0549**
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Siegen -0.161*** -0.0276 -0.0372* -0.0426*
Olpe 0.0124 0.0164 -0.00832 -0.0153
Soest -0.179*** -0.0559** -0.0506** -0.0773***
Korbach -0.132*** -0.0522* -0.0975*** -0.0833***
Kassel -0.216*** -0.0453* -0.0567*** -0.0512**
Eschwege -0.337*** -0.185*** -0.161*** -0.214***
Schwalm-Eder -0.258*** -0.108*** -0.100*** -0.123***
Hersfeld -0.167*** -0.147*** -0.144*** -0.154***
Marburg -0.178*** 0.00148 -0.0210 -0.0103
Lauterbach -0.247*** -0.0842** -0.0257 -0.104***
Fulda -0.175*** -0.113*** -0.101*** -0.111***
Wetzlar -0.156*** -0.0627** -0.0589*** -0.0771***
Gießen -0.248*** -0.0389 -0.00562 -0.0450*
Limburg -0.149*** -0.0454 -0.0555** -0.0470*
Wiesbaden 0.0414 0.0688*** 0.0309* 0.0716***
Frankfurt/Main 0.143*** 0.118*** 0.0804*** 0.120***
Hanau -0.00379 0.0509** 0.0275 0.0415*
Darmstadt -0.0261 0.0658*** 0.0316* 0.0631***
Erbach -0.208*** -0.0567 -0.0782*** -0.0671*
Altenkirchen -0.284*** -0.120*** -0.0184 -0.140***
Montabaur -0.204*** -0.132*** -0.0528** -0.151***
Neuwied -0.131*** -0.0739*** -0.0817*** -0.0994***
Ahrweiler -0.377*** -0.239*** -0.111*** -0.256***
Koblenz -0.185*** -0.0815*** -0.0689*** -0.0850***
Bad Kreuznach -0.286*** -0.0927*** -0.108*** -0.0983***
Idar-Oberstein -0.295*** -0.157*** -0.142*** -0.170***
Cochem -0.270*** -0.0975** -0.0766** -0.103***
Simmern -0.199*** -0.135*** -0.119*** -0.150***
Trier -0.469*** -0.0951*** -0.0583** -0.100***
Bernkastel-Wittlich -0.257*** -0.122*** -0.0741*** -0.150***
Daun -0.236*** -0.180*** -0.0873** -0.201***
Bitburg -0.276*** -0.147*** -0.0672** -0.168***
Kaiserslautern -0.303*** -0.122*** -0.0669*** -0.125***
Landau -0.237*** -0.0856*** -0.0455* -0.0974***
Mainz -0.0135 0.0114 -0.0183 0.0165
Alzey-Worms -0.134*** -0.0456* -0.0465** -0.0501*
Pirmasens -0.235*** -0.116*** -0.0914*** -0.136***
Ludwigshafen -0.100*** -0.0161 -0.0268 -0.0198
Germersheim -0.152*** -0.0209 0.0295 -0.0487
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Merzig -0.216*** -0.0689** -0.0442 -0.0829**
St. Wendel -0.233*** -0.147*** -0.110*** -0.163***
Saarbru¨cken -0.162*** -0.0668*** -0.0579*** -0.0695***
Homburg/Saar -0.0802** -0.0579** -0.0582** -0.0780***
Stuttgart 0.0552** 0.107*** 0.0786*** 0.0909***
Go¨ppingen -0.00978 0.0439* 0.0210 0.0232
Heilbronn -0.305*** -0.171*** 0.0331* -0.171***
Schwa¨bisch Hall -0.0182 0.00351 0.00999 -0.0199
Tauberbischofsheim -0.127*** -0.0427 -0.0171 -0.0789**
Heidenheim -0.0150 0.0792** 0.0340 0.0444
Aalen -0.0757** 0.00763 0.00942 -0.0237
Baden-Baden -0.0480 0.0295 0.0324 -0.00269
Karlsruhe -0.242*** 0.0331 0.0260 0.0273
Heidelberg -0.0971*** 0.0199 0.0231 0.0104
Mannheim -0.0457* 0.0322 0.0205 0.0270
Mosbach -0.253*** -0.149*** -0.0643** -0.168***
Pforzheim -0.0694** 0.0430* 0.0289 0.0107
Calw -0.118*** -0.0717** -0.0182 -0.0890***
Freudenstadt -0.0750* -0.0453 -0.00679 -0.0713**
Freiburg -0.115*** -0.0190 -0.0121 -0.0328
Offenburg -0.0939*** 0.0166 0.0187 -0.00340
Rottweil -0.134*** -0.00149 -0.0172 -0.0393
Villingen-Schwenningen -0.0988*** 0.0168 0.00478 -0.0131
Tuttlingen 0.0727* 0.104*** 0.0861*** 0.0415
Konstanz -0.0992*** 0.0710*** 0.0320 0.0522**
Lo¨rrach 0.0361 0.0668** 0.0569** 0.0392
Waldshut 0.0357 0.0608* 0.0421* 0.0303
Reutlingen/Tu¨bingen -0.108*** -0.00108 0.0151 -0.0189
Balingen -0.131*** -0.0129 -0.0245 -0.0389
Ulm 0.0262 0.0633*** 0.0253 0.0529**
Biberach 0.0496 0.0428 0.0302 0.00827
Friedrichshafen 0.0663** 0.0730*** 0.0577*** 0.0379
Ravensburg -0.0134 0.0310 0.0179 0.0113
Sigmaringen -0.0602 0.0145 -0.000675 -0.0208
Bad Reichenhall -0.00970 0.0173 -0.0265 0.000708
Traunstein 0.0136 0.00794 -0.0113 -0.0181
Burghausen -0.0157 0.0362 0.00254 0.0173
Mu¨hldorf -0.0612 -0.0170 0.0139 -0.0399
Rosenheim 0.0365 0.0254 0.00927 0.0107
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Bad To¨lz 0.0261 0.0656** 0.0504** 0.0480*
Garmisch-Partenkirchen 0.0653 0.0487 0.0235 0.0374
Weilheim 0.0134 0.0383 0.0596** -0.00234
Landsberg 0.0371 0.0274 0.0301 0.0119
Mu¨nchen 0.209*** 0.172*** 0.0980*** 0.169***
Ingolstadt 0.0821*** 0.106*** 0.0572*** 0.0855***
Kelheim-Mainburg -0.0900** 0.00147 0.0126 -0.0317
Landshut -0.0351 0.0427 -0.0130 0.0303
Dingolfing -0.0835* -0.0350 0.0338 -0.0869**
Eggenfelden/Pfarrkirchen -0.161*** -0.0452 -0.0105 -0.0705**
Passau -0.148*** -0.0774*** -0.0552** -0.0961***
Freyung -0.159*** -0.0543 -0.0374 -0.0849**
Regen-Zwiesel -0.0632 -0.0772** -0.0886*** -0.106***
Deggendorf -0.0981** -0.0274 -0.0473** -0.0493*
Straubing -0.0545 0.0164 -0.0254 -0.00170
Cham 0.0255 0.00677 -0.0215 -0.0334
Regensburg -0.0478 0.0655*** 0.0190 0.0506**
Schwandorf -0.0211 -0.0134 -0.0496** -0.0385
Amberg -0.0185 -0.0202 -0.0677*** -0.0478
Neumarkt -0.0144 0.0139 -0.00735 -0.0122
Weiden -0.158*** -0.00711 -0.0572** -0.0347
Marktredwitz -0.118*** -0.0303 -0.0657*** -0.0734**
Hof -0.161*** -0.0591** -0.0939*** -0.0853***
Bayreuth -0.127*** -0.0278 -0.0648*** -0.0321
Bamberg -0.137*** -0.0358 -0.0478** -0.0561**
Kulmbach -0.0791* -0.0297 -0.0472* -0.0660*
Kronach -0.225*** -0.0962** -0.0723** -0.152***
Coburg -0.0303 0.00468 -0.0651*** -0.0369
Lichtenfels -0.00637 -0.0103 -0.0503* -0.0426
Erlangen 0.0651** 0.0804*** 0.0369* 0.0522**
Nu¨rnberg 0.0104 0.0532** 0.00498 0.0439**
Weißenburg-Gunzenhausen -0.0502 -0.0109 -0.0605** -0.0366
Ansbach -0.0157 0.0208 -0.0310 0.00109
Neustadt/Aisch -0.157*** -0.0914** -0.0452 -0.111***
Kitzingen -0.145*** -0.0409 -0.0267 -0.0702**
Wu¨rzburg -0.136*** -0.0375 -0.0374* -0.0403
Schweinfurt -0.0316 0.0394 -0.0407* 0.0188
Haßfurt -0.312*** -0.145*** -0.0519** -0.184***
Bad Neustadt/Saale -0.180*** -0.0551 -0.0875*** -0.0839**
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Bad Kissingen -0.306*** -0.126*** -0.0500** -0.151***
Lohr am Main -0.163*** -0.0125 -0.0231 -0.0512*
Aschaffenburg -0.142*** -0.0122 -0.00769 -0.0292
Donauwo¨rth-No¨rdlingen -0.0357 0.0483 0.00582 0.0238
Dillingen -0.101** -0.0149 -0.0550* -0.0455
Gu¨nzburg -0.0164 0.0217 0.00272 0.00296
Augsburg -0.0627** 0.0692*** 0.0211 0.0554**
Memmingen 0.0816** 0.0456* -0.000761 0.0231
Kaufbeuren 0.0121 -0.0152 0.000285 -0.0368
Kempten -0.0186 -0.0219 -0.00993 -0.0299
Lindau 0.106** 0.0430 0.0158 0.0110
Berlin -0.0981*** -0.0325 -0.0888*** -0.0305
Potsdam-Brandenburg -0.278*** -0.207*** -0.231*** -0.210***
Cottbus -0.414*** -0.270*** -0.326*** -0.281***
Frankfurt/Oder -0.319*** -0.204*** -0.256*** -0.212***
Eberswalde -0.323*** -0.214*** -0.225*** -0.221***
Luckenwalde -0.155*** -0.116*** -0.165*** -0.128***
Finsterwalde -0.409*** -0.362*** -0.336*** -0.381***
Oranienburg -0.200*** -0.156*** -0.181*** -0.167***
Neuruppin -0.268*** -0.226*** -0.236*** -0.232***
Perleberg -0.237*** -0.239*** -0.277*** -0.243***
Prenzlau -0.353*** -0.234*** -0.250*** -0.229***
Rostock -0.360*** -0.228*** -0.273*** -0.230***
Schwerin -0.381*** -0.241*** -0.285*** -0.251***
Mecklenburgische Seenplatte -0.440*** -0.325*** -0.351*** -0.330***
Nordvorpommern -0.378*** -0.323*** -0.335*** -0.318***
Su¨dvorpommern -0.395*** -0.284*** -0.304*** -0.290***
Chemnitz -0.434*** -0.227*** -0.272*** -0.217***
Erzgebirgskreis -0.476*** -0.331*** -0.342*** -0.354***
Mittelsachsen -0.407*** -0.297*** -0.303*** -0.316***
Vogtlandkreis -0.364*** -0.281*** -0.296*** -0.301***
Zwickau -0.486*** -0.359*** -0.366*** -0.376***
Dresden -0.367*** -0.236*** -0.275*** -0.234***
Bautzen -0.366*** -0.230*** -0.303*** -0.249***
Go¨rlitz -0.392*** -0.261*** -0.325*** -0.279***
Meißen -0.393*** -0.288*** -0.286*** -0.308***
Leipzig -0.472*** -0.328*** -0.265*** -0.340***
Dessau-Roßlau -0.308*** -0.256*** -0.321*** -0.252***
Halle -0.450*** -0.314*** -0.297*** -0.320***
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Magdeburg -0.340*** -0.208*** -0.249*** -0.216***
Salzwedel -0.409*** -0.252*** -0.293*** -0.259***
Anhalt-Bitterfeld -0.354*** -0.285*** -0.287*** -0.301***
Burgenlandkreis -0.426*** -0.288*** -0.275*** -0.299***
Harz -0.374*** -0.294*** -0.322*** -0.308***
Mansfeld-Su¨dharz -0.383*** -0.316*** -0.315*** -0.330***
Salzlandkreis -0.397*** -0.281*** -0.321*** -0.298***
Stendal -0.340*** -0.272*** -0.303*** -0.282***
Wittenberg -0.398*** -0.303*** -0.319*** -0.319***
Erfurt -0.419*** -0.231*** -0.277*** -0.224***
Gera -0.427*** -0.315*** -0.324*** -0.315***
Jena -0.395*** -0.280*** -0.311*** -0.290***
Suhl -0.426*** -0.278*** -0.313*** -0.293***
Weimar -0.368*** -0.247*** -0.278*** -0.244***
Eisenach -0.277*** -0.237*** -0.271*** -0.259***
Eichsfeld -0.483*** -0.337*** -0.343*** -0.368***
Nordhausen -0.398*** -0.304*** -0.311*** -0.313***
Mu¨hlhausen -0.407*** -0.298*** -0.357*** -0.309***
Sondershausen -0.402*** -0.317*** -0.350*** -0.323***
Meiningen -0.393*** -0.288*** -0.323*** -0.309***
Gotha -0.338*** -0.249*** -0.300*** -0.271***
Arnstadt -0.342*** -0.197*** -0.257*** -0.236***
Sonneberg -0.341*** -0.272*** -0.305*** -0.291***
Saalfeld -0.348*** -0.300*** -0.339*** -0.321***
Po¨ßneck -0.332*** -0.287*** -0.329*** -0.322***
Altenburg -0.448*** -0.376*** -0.313*** -0.404***
Husum 0 0 0 0
Constant 3.954*** 3.705*** 3.423*** 3.555***
Individual FE yes yes yes yes
Year FE yes yes yes yes
Occupation controls no no yes no
Industry controls no no no yes
Education controls no yes yes yes
Incl. part-time empl. yes yes no yes
Observations 23175028 16555698 12178375 16553522
* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
Notes: The dependent variable is the log wage. Clustering of standard errors is at the worker level.
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Table A.2: Estimates of agglomeration elasticities (different controls and calibrations)
∆ log employment ∆ log employment ∆ log employment ∆ log employment
OLS IV IV IV
∆ log density spline low 0.506∗∗∗ 0.718∗∗∗ 0.522∗∗∗ 0.517∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.164) (0.144) (0.136)
∆ log density spline medium 0.394∗∗∗ 0.620∗∗∗ 0.507∗∗∗ 0.511∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.201) (0.138) (0.130)
∆ log density spline high 0.368∗∗∗ 0.696∗∗∗ 0.492∗∗∗ 0.486∗∗∗
(0.100) (0.227) (0.177) (0.167)
∆ log wage -1.5 -1.5 -1.0 -0.75
N 410 205 205 205
State-Decade FE no no yes yes
Adj R-squared 0.69 0.87 0.87 0.85
Spline knots (percentiles) 50,75 50,75 50,75 50,75
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Clustering of standard
errors is at the labor market region level.
Table A.3: Estimates of agglomeration elasticities (different spline knots)
∆ log employment ∆ log employment
IV IV
∆ log density spline low 0.460∗∗∗ 0.551∗∗∗
(0.130) (0.141)
∆ log density spline medium 0.548∗∗∗ 0.529∗∗∗
(0.166) (0.195)
∆ log density spline high 0.524∗∗∗ 0.738∗∗
(0.190) (0.240)
∆ log wage -1.5 -1.5
N 205 205
State-Decade FE yes yes
Adj R-squared 0.91 0.90
Spline knots (percentiles) 33,60 60,85
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Clustering of standard
errors is at the labor market region level.
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Table A.4: Estimates of agglomeration elasticities (including East Germany)
∆ log employment ∆ log employment
OLS OLS
∆ log density spline low 0.332∗∗∗ 0.467∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.096)
∆ log density spline medium 0.301∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗
(0.095) (0.105)
∆ log density spline high 0.257∗∗ 0.382∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.122)
∆ log wage -1.5 -1.5
N 258 205
State-Decade FE yes yes
Adj R-squared 0.23 0.26
Spline knots (percentiles) 50,75 50,75
Regions All West only
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Clustering of standard
errors is at the labor market region level. In order to be able to include East Germany, I use the years
1993, 2000 and 2010 instead of decadal observations (re-unification took place in 1990). However, this
leaves me unable to instrument for density since I miss a fourth observation for each region.
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Table A.5: Estimates of agglomeration elasticities (linear splines)
∆ log employment ∆ log employment
OLS IV
∆ linear density spline low 0.0237∗∗∗ 0.0228∗∗∗
(0.00407) (0.00884)
∆ linear density spline medium 0.00671∗∗∗ 0.0111∗∗∗
(0.00246) (0.00417)
∆ linear density spline high 0.00208∗∗∗ 0.00178
(0.000608) (0.00117)
∆ log wage -1.5 -1.5
N 410 205
State-Decade FE yes yes
Adj R-squared 0.70 0.90
Spline knots (percentiles) 50,75 50,75
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Clustering of standard
errors is at the labor market region level.
A.3 Data Appendix
Figure A.11: Labor market regions (borders as defined in 2011)
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A.3.1 List of equalization payments aggregated (in German)
General equalization payments include
• Schlu¨sselzuweisungen vom Land, Bedarfszuweisungen vom Land, Bedarfszuweisungen
von Gemeinden/Gemeindeverba¨nden
• Sonstige allgemeine Zuweisungen von Bund, Land und Gemeinden/Gemeindeverba¨nden
• Ausgleichsleistungen nach dem Familienleistungsausgleich
• Leistungen des Landes fu¨r Dienstleistungen am Arbeitsmarkt
• Leistungen des Landes aus dem Ausgleich von Sonderlasten bei der Zusammenfu¨hrung
von Arbeitslosen- und Sozialhilfe
Investment subsidies include
• Zuweisungen und Zuschu¨sse fu¨r Investitionen und Investitionsfo¨rderungsmaßnahmen
– von Bund, LAF, ERP-Sondervermo¨gen, vom Land, von Gemeinden (Gemeinde-
verba¨nden), von Zweckverba¨nden und dergleichen, vom sonstigen o¨ffentlichen
Bereich
– von kommunalen Sonderrechnungen, von sonstigen o¨ffentlichen Sonderrechnungen
– von o¨ffentlichen, wirtschaftlichen Unternehmen, von privaten Unternehmen, von
u¨brigen Bereichen
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Appendix B
Appendix to chapter 2
B.1 Institutional details
Indicator formulas
The following formulas describe the indicator used to evaluate the economic performance of
labor market region r across regimes
indicator1997r = (infr1995r )0.1 × (wage1995r )0.4 × (unemp1995r )0.5
indicator2000r = (infr1999r )0.1 × (wage1997r )0.4 × (unemp1996−1998r )0.4 × (empforecastr)0.1
indicator2007r = (infr2005r )0.05 × (wage2003r )0.4 × (unemp2002−2005r )0.5 × (empforecastr)0.05
where infrtr measures the quality of a regions’s infrastructure1 assessed at time t, wage
represents per-capita earnings, unemp the average unemployment rate, and empforecast is
an employment rate projection.
Construction of cutoff samples
Tables B.1, B.2 and B.3 illustrate the indicator rankings and cutoffs for the years 1997, 2000
and 2011. If there is more than one county that has e.g. rank 13 below a cutoff, we use all
counties that have that rank. When counties merge, we take the average of the individual
counties’ indicators. Table B.4 reports a county’s rank for each reform along with treatment
intensities. Due to missing data, three indicator values are unavailable.
1 The infrastructure indicator is explained in section 2.2.
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Table B.1: Counties around the cutoff (year 1997)
County Indicator Subsidy cut
...
Saale-Orla-Kreis 99.713 no
Ma¨rkisch Oderland 99.714 yes
KS Frankfurt/Oder 99.714 no
Oder-Spree 99.714 yes
Mittelsachsen 99.725 no
Gotha 99.757 yes
Zwickau 99.767 no
Magdeburg 99.801 no
Jerichower Land 99.801 no
Boerde 99.801 no
Ludwigslust-Parchim 99.868 yes
Salzlandkreis 99.902 yes
Rostock 99.904 no
Chemnitz 99.914 no
Spree-Neiße 99.926 no
KS Cottbus 99.926 no
Dahme-Spreewald 99.926 yes
Halle (Saale) 100.003 yes
Leipzig Lkr. 100.069 yes
Nordsachsen 100.069 yes
Schwerin 100.096 yes
Weimarer Land 100.162 yes
KS Weimar 100.162 yes
So¨mmerda 100.173 yes
KS Erfurt, Landeshauptstadt 100.173 yes
Meissen 100.326 yes
Saale-Holzland-Kreis 100.442 yes
KS Jena 100.442 yes
Leipzig 100.476 yes
Dresden 101.073 yes
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. Notes: Only counties above
indicator value 99.7 are shown.
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Table B.2: Counties around the cutoff (year 2000)
County Indicator Subsidy cut
...
Saalekreis 99.712 yes
Mittelsachsen 99.724 yes
Hildburghausen 99.724 no
KS Suhl 99.724 no
Eichsfeld 99.728 no
Gotha 99.742 yes
Vogtlandkreis 99.752 no
Jerichower Land 99.765 no
KS Cottbus 99.774 no
Spree-Neiße 99.774 no
Dahme-Spreewald 99.774 yes
Bautzen 99.813 yes
Saale-Orla-Kreis 99.854 no
Teltow-Fla¨ming 99.856 yes
Zwickau 99.884 yes
Rostock 99.902 no
Nordwestmecklenburg 99.951 no
Chemnitz 100.008 yes
Ludwigslust-Parchim 100.034 yes
Boerde 100.070 yes
Magdeburg 100.070 yes
Nordsachsen 100.083 yes
KS Weimar 100.144 yes
Weimarer Land 100.144 yes
Wartburgkreis 100.151 yes
KS Eisenach 100.151 yes
Halle (Saale) 100.169 yes
Saechsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge 100.177 yes
Sonneberg 100.181 yes
KS Erfurt, Landeshauptstadt 100.246 yes
So¨mmerda 100.246 yes
KS Jena 100.256 yes
Saale-Holzland-Kreis 100.256 yes
Leipzig Lkr. 100.377 yes
Schwerin 100.388 yes
Meissen 100.444 yes
Potsdam-Mittelmark 100.496 yes
Leipzig 100.563 yes
Dresden 101.117 yes
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. Notes: Only counties above indicator
value 99.7 are shown.
107
Table B.3: Counties around the cutoff (year 2011)
County NUTSII-region Subsidy cut GDP per capita (e)
...
Greiz Thueringen no 20662
Ilm-Kreis Thueringen no 20662
Hildburghausen Thueringen no 20662
Saalfeld-Rudolstadt Thueringen no 20662
Eisenach, Stadt Thueringen no 20662
Sonneberg Thueringen no 20662
Weimar, Stadt Thueringen no 20662
Erfurt, Stadt Thueringen no 20662
Kyffhaeuserkreis Thueringen no 20662
Schmalkalden-Meiningen Thueringen no 20662
Gera, Stadt Thueringen no 20662
Eichsfeld Thueringen no 20662
Saale-Holzland-Kreis Thueringen no 20662
Suhl, Stadt Thueringen no 20662
Nordhausen Thueringen no 20662
Jena, Stadt Thueringen no 20662
Gotha Thueringen no 20662
Unstrut-Hainich-Kreis Thueringen no 20662
Weimarer Land Thueringen no 20662
Altenburger Land Thueringen no 20662
Saale-Orla-Kreis Thueringen no 20662
Soemmerda Thueringen no 20662
Wartburgkreis Thueringen no 20662
Magdeburg, Stadt Magdeburg no 20822
Jerichower Land Magdeburg no 20822
Altmarkkreis Salzwedel Magdeburg no 20822
Boerde Magdeburg no 20822
Harz Magdeburg no 20822
Salzlandkreis Magdeburg no 20822
Stendal Magdeburg no 20822
Vogtlandkreis Chemnitz no 20914
Chemnitz, Stadt Chemnitz no 20914
Zwickau Chemnitz no 20914
Mittelsachsen Chemnitz no 20914
Erzgebirgskreis Chemnitz no 20914
Mansfeld-Suedharz Halle yes 21228
Burgenlandkreis Halle yes 21228
Halle (Saale), Stadt Halle yes 21228
Saalekreis Halle yes 21228
Elbe-Elster Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Cottbus, Stadt Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Teltow-Flaeming Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Dahme-Spreewald Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Havelland Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Brandenburg an der Havel, Stadt Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Potsdam-Mittelmark Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Oberspreewald-Lausitz Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Spree-Neisse Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Potsdam, Stadt Brandenburg-Suedwest yes 22572
Goerlitz Dresden no 22919
Meissen Dresden no 22919
Saechsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge Dresden no 22919
Bautzen Dresden no 22919
Dresden, Stadt Dresden no 22919
Nordsachsen Leipzig yes 23028
Leipzig, Stadt Leipzig yes 23028
Leipzig Leipzig yes 23028
Source: Statistical Offices of German States (Laender), Deutscher Bundestag (2007). Notes: Only counties whose GDP per capita is
above e20 660 are shown. 108
Figure B.1: Ranking of counties based on indicator (year 2000)
98
.5
99
99
.5
10
0
10
0.
5
10
1
in
di
ca
to
r
0 20 40 60 80
rank
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs. Notes: This figure plots indicator values and the ranks of counties in the year
2000. The cutoff was formally at indicator value 100 (however some counties below the cutoff still lost eligibility for the
highest assistance rates).
109
Table B.4: Cutoff ranks and maximum assistance rates by subsidy rate regime and firm size
County s97 m97 l97 r97 s00 m00 l00 r00 s07 m07 l07 r07 s11 m11 l11 r11
Brandenburg an der Havel, Stadt .5 .5 .35 B29 .5 .5 .35 B39 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Cottbus, Stadt .5 .5 .35 B3 .5 .5 .35 B7 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Frankfurt (Oder), Stadt .5 .5 .35 B14 .5 .5 .35 B18 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B47
Potsdam, Stadt .43 .43 .28 .43 .43 .28 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Barnim .43 .43 .28 B45 .43 .43 .28 B35 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B47
Dahme-Spreewald .43 .43 .28 B1 .43 .43 .28 B9 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Elbe-Elster .5 .5 .35 B47 .5 .5 .35 B42 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Havelland .43 .43 .28 B27 .43 .43 .28 B38 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Maerkisch-Oderland .43 .43 .28 B16 .43 .43 .28 B20 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B47
Oberhavel .43 .43 .28 B49 .43 .43 .28 B33 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B47
Oberspreewald-Lausitz .5 .5 .35 B22 .5 .5 .35 B45 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Oder-Spree .43 .43 .28 B15 .43 .43 .28 B19 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B47
Ostprignitz-Ruppin .5 .5 .35 B50 .5 .5 .35 B32 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B47
Potsdam-Mittelmark .43 .43 .28 B28 .43 .43 .28 A20 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Prignitz .5 .5 .35 B51 .5 .5 .35 B47 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B47
Spree-Neisse .5 .5 .35 B2 .5 .5 .35 B8 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Teltow-Flaeming .43 .43 .28 B24 .43 .43 .28 B4 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A5
Uckermark .5 .5 .35 B46 .5 .5 .35 B50 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B47
Rostock, Stadt .5 .5 .35 B5 .5 .5 .35 B2 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B39
Schwerin, Stadt .43 .43 .28 A4 .43 .43 .28 A18 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B39
Mecklenburgische Seenplatte .5 .5 .35 B55 .5 .5 .35 B49 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B39
Landkreis Rostock .5 .5 .35 B35 .5 .5 .35 B22 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B39
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Vorpommern-Ruegen .5 .5 .35 B60 .5 .5 .35 B43 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B39
Nordwestmecklenburg .5 .5 .35 B36 .5 .5 .35 B1 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B39
Vorpommern-Greifswald .5 .5 .35 B59 .5 .5 .35 B51 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B39
Ludwigslust-Parchim .43 .43 .28 B7 .43 .43 .28 A2 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B39
Chemnitz, Stadt .5 .5 .35 B4 .43 .43 .28 A1 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B1
Erzgebirgskreis .5 .5 .35 B37 .5 .5 .35 B26 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B1
Mittelsachsen .5 .5 .35 B13 .43 .43 .28 B16 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 B1
Vogtlandkreis .5 .5 .35 B30 .5 .5 .35 B11 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B1
Zwickau .5 .5 .35 B11 .43 .43 .28 B3 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B1
Dresden, Stadt .43 .43 .28 A13 .43 .43 .28 A22 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 A15
Bautzen .5 .5 .35 B34 .43 .43 .28 B6 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 A15
Goerlitz .5 .5 .35 B43 .5 .5 .35 B36 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 A15
Meissen .43 .43 .28 A9 .43 .43 .28 A19 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 A15
Saechsische Schweiz-Osterzgebirge .5 .5 .35 B23 .43 .43 .28 A11 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 A15
Leipzig, Stadt .43 .43 .28 A12 .43 .43 .28 A21 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A20
Leipzig .43 .43 .28 A2 .43 .43 .28 A17 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A20
Nordsachsen .43 .43 .28 A3 .43 .43 .28 A5 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A20
Dessau-Rosslau, Stadt .5 .5 .35 B38 .5 .5 .35 B30 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B26
Halle (Saale), Stadt .43 .43 .28 A1 .43 .43 .28 A10 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A1
Magdeburg, Stadt .5 .5 .35 B8 .43 .43 .28 A4 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B6
Altmarkkreis Salzwedel .5 .5 .35 B41 .5 .5 .35 B28 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B6
Anhalt-Bitterfeld .5 .5 .35 B32 .5 .5 .35 B44 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B26
Boerde .5 .5 .35 B9 .43 .43 .28 A3 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B6
Burgenlandkreis .5 .5 .35 B42 .5 .5 .35 B34 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A1
Harz .5 .5 .35 B44 .5 .5 .35 B27 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B6
Jerichower Land .5 .5 .35 B10 .5 .5 .35 B10 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B6
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Mansfeld-Suedharz .5 .5 .35 B61 .5 .5 .35 B52 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A1
Saalekreis .43 .43 .28 B25 .43 .43 .28 B17 .5 .4 .3 All .4 .3 .2 A1
Salzlandkreis .43 .43 .28 B6 .5 .5 .35 B46 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B6
Stendal .5 .5 .35 B56 .5 .5 .35 B48 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B6
Wittenberg .5 .5 .35 B40 .5 .5 .35 B31 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B26
Erfurt, Stadt .43 .43 .28 A8 .43 .43 .28 A14 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Gera, Stadt .5 .5 .35 B19 .5 .5 .35 B24 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Jena, Stadt .43 .43 .28 A11 .43 .43 .28 A16 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Suhl, Stadt .5 .5 .35 B20 .5 .5 .35 B15 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Weimar, Stadt .43 .43 .28 A5 .43 .43 .28 A7 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Eisenach, Stadt .43 .43 .28 .43 .43 .28 A9 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Eichsfeld .5 .5 .35 B54 .5 .5 .35 B13 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Nordhausen .5 .5 .35 B58 .5 .5 .35 B37 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Wartburgkreis .5 .5 .35 B31 .43 .43 .28 A8 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Unstrut-Hainich-Kreis .5 .5 .35 B48 .5 .5 .35 B41 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Kyffhaeuserkreis .5 .5 .35 B57 .5 .5 .35 B53 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Schmalkalden-Meiningen .5 .5 .35 B39 .5 .5 .35 B21 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Gotha .43 .43 .28 B12 .43 .43 .28 B12 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Soemmerda .43 .43 .28 A7 .43 .43 .28 A13 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Hildburghausen .5 .5 .35 B21 .5 .5 .35 B14 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Ilm-Kreis .5 .5 .35 B53 .5 .5 .35 B29 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Weimarer Land .43 .43 .28 A6 .43 .43 .28 A6 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Sonneberg .5 .5 .35 B26 .43 .43 .28 A12 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Saalfeld-Rudolstadt .5 .5 .35 B33 .5 .5 .35 B23 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Saale-Holzland-Kreis .43 .43 .28 A10 .43 .43 .28 A15 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Saale-Orla-Kreis .5 .5 .35 B17 .5 .5 .35 B5 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
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Greiz .5 .5 .35 B18 .5 .5 .35 B25 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Altenburger Land .5 .5 .35 B52 .5 .5 .35 B40 .5 .4 .3 All .5 .4 .3 B13
Source: Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs, Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bundestag (2007).
Notes: This table shows county-specific maximum assistance rate for each firm size group and subsidy regime (e.g. s97 is the maximum rate for small firms in year 1997).
A county’s rank below (B) or above (A) a cutoff is contained in r97 for year 1997 and analogously for other years.
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Table B.5: Eligible industries for GRW subsidies
Production, processing and preserving of meat and meat products
Processing and preserving of fish and fish products
Processing and preserving of fruit and vegetables
Manufacture of vegetable and animal oils and fats
Manufacture of dairy products
Manufacture of grain mill products, starches and starch products
Manufacture of prepared animal feeds
Manufacture of other food products
Manufacture of beverages
Manufacture of tobacco product
Preparation and spinning of textile fibres
Textile weaving
Finishing of textiles
Manufacture of made-up textile articles, except apparel
Manufacture of other textiles
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted fabrics
Manufacture of knitted and crocheted articles
Manufacture of leather clothes
Manufacture of other wearing apparel and accessories
Dressing and dyeing of fur; manufacture of articles of fur
Tanning and dressing of leather
Manufacture of luggage, handbags and the like, saddlery and harness
Manufacture of footwear
Sawmilling and planing of wood; impregnation of wood
Manufacture of veneer sheets; manufacture of plywood, laminboard, particle board, fibre board and other panels and boards
Manufacture of builders’ carpentry and joinery
Manufacture of wooden containers
Manufacture of other products of wood; manufacture of articles of cork, straw and plaiting Materials
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paperboard
Manufacture of articles of paper and paperboard
Publishing
Printing and service activities related to printing
Reproduction of recorded media
Manufacture of coke oven products
Manufacture of refined petroleum products
Processing of nuclear fuel
Manufacture of basic chemicals
Manufacture of pesticides and other agro-chemical products
Manufacture of paints, varnishes and similar coatings, printing ink and mastics
Manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products
Manufacture of soap and detergents, cleaning and polishing preparations, perfumes and tollet preparations
Manufacture of other chemical products
Manufacture of rubber products
Manufacture of plastic products
Manufacture of glass and glass products
Manufacture of non-refractory ceramic goods other than for construction purposes; manufacture of refractory ceramic products
Manufacture of ceramic tiles and flags
Manufacture of bricks, tiles and construction products, in baked clay
Manufacture of cement, lime and plaster
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Manufacture of articles of concrete, plaster and cement
Cutting, shaping and finishing of stone
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products
Manufacture of basic iron and steel and of ferro-alloys (ECSC1)
Manufacture of tubes
Other first processing of iron and steel and production of non-ECSC1 ferro-alloys
Manufacture of basic precious and non-ferrous metals
Casting of metals
Manufacture of structural metal products
Manufacture of tanks, reservoirs and containers of metal; manufacture of central heating radiators and boilers
Manufacture of steam generators, except central heating hot water boilers
Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal; powder metallurgy
Treatment and coating of metals; general mechanical engineering
Manufacture of cutlery, tools and general hardware
Manufacture of other fabricated metal products
Manufacture of machinery for the production and use of mechanical power, except aircraft, vehicle and cycle engines
Manufacture of other general purpose machinery
Manufacture of agricultural and forestry machinery
Manufacture of machine-tools
Manufacture of other special purpose machinery
Manufacture of weapons and ammunition
Manufacture of domestic appliances n.e.c.
Manufacture of office machinery and computers
Manufacture of electric motors, generators and transformers
Manufacture of electricity distribution and control apparatus
Manufacture of insulated wire and cable
Manufacture of accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries
Manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps
Manufacture of electrical equipment n.e.c.
Manufacture of electronic valves and tubes and other electronic components
Manufacture of television and radio transmitters and apparatus for line telephony and line telegraphy
Manufacture of television and radio receivers, sound or video recording or reproducing apparatus and associated goods
Manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances
Manufacture of instruments and appliances for measuring, checking, testing, navigating and other purposes, except industrial process control equipment
Manufacture of industrial process control equipment
Manufacture of optical instruments and photographic equipment
Manufacture of watches and clocks
Manufacture of motor vehicles
Manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semitrailers
Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines
Building and repairing of ships and boats
Manufacture of railway and tramway locomotives and rolling stock
Manufacture of aircraft and spacecraft
Manufacture of motorcycles and bicycles
Manufacture of other transport equipment n.e.c.
Manufacture of furniture
Manufacture of jewellery and related articles
Manufacture of musical instruments
Manufacture of sports goods
Manufacture of games and toys
Miscellaneous manufacturing n.e.c.
Recycling of metal waste and scrap
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Recycling of non-metal waste and scrap
Wholesale an a fee or contract basis
Wholesale of agricultural raw Materials and live animals
Wholesale of food, beverages and tobacco
Wholesale of household goods
Wholesale of non-agricultural intermediate products, waste and scrap
Wholesale of machinery, equipment and supplies
Other wholesale
Hotels
Camping sites and other provision of short-stay accommodation
Activities of other transport agencies
Hardware consultancy
Software consultancy and supply
Data processing
Database activities
Maintenance and repair of office, accounting and computing machinery
Other computer related activities
Research and experimental development an natural sciences and engineering
Research and experimental development an social sciences and humanities
Legal, accounting, book-keeping and auditing activities; tax consultancy; market research and public opinion polling; business and management consultancy
Architectural and engineering activities and related technical consultancy
Technical testing and analysis
Advertising
Radio and television activities
Source: Deutscher Bundestag (1997), Deutscher Bundestag (2000), Deutscher Bundestag (2007).
Notes: This table shows eligible industry branches according to the classification of economic activities in year 1993 (3-digit industries). For the shown industries,
eligibility for GRW subsidies is guaranteed whereas other industries are eligible only if the conditions mentioned in section 2 are met.
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B.2 Additional figures
Figure B.2: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment by skill
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment by skill on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes
the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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Figure B.3: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (different cutoff samples, refined
treatment)
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20 in window (44 in total)
16 in window (38 in total)
all (76 counties)
Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). State-year fixed effects are
included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure B.4: Event study estimates: low-skilled manufacturing wages (different cutoff samples,
refined treatment)
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20 in window (44 in total)
16 in window (38 in total)
all (76 counties)
Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log low-skilled
wages on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). State-year fixed effects are included.
Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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Figure B.5: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (different treatment intensities)
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate. Treatment is discrete as in equation (2.1) or
refined as in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included.
Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure B.6: Event study estimates: low-skilled manufacturing wages (different treatment intensi-
ties)
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Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log low-skilled
wages on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate. Treatment is discrete as in equation (2.1) or refined as
in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of
standard errors is at the county level.
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Figure B.7: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (different cutoff samples, discrete
treatment)
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baseline: 26 counties in window (49 in total)
20 in window (44 in total)
16 in window (38 in total)
all (76 counties)
Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.1). State-year fixed effects are
included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure B.8: Event study estimates: low-skilled manufacturing wages (different cutoff samples,
discrete treatment)
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Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log low-skilled
wages on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.1). State-year fixed effects are included.
Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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Figure B.9: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (further robustness checks)
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49
counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure B.10: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (only first reform)
-.04
-.02
0
.02
.04
ln
 m
an
uf
ac
tu
rin
g 
em
pl
oy
m
en
t
(r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 p
re
-r
ef
or
m
 p
er
io
d 
t=
-1
)
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2
baseline only first reform
Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes all
counties in East Germany. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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Figure B.11: Event study estimates: manufacturing employment (including controls)
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log manufacturing
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). Controls are either
contemporaneous or lagged by one year. The sample includes the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are
included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure B.12: Event study estimates: low-skilled manufacturing wages (including controls)
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Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log low-skilled
wages on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). Controls are either
contemporaneous or lagged by one year. The sample includes the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are
included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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Figure B.13: Event study estimates: subsidies received by municipalities at county level
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Source: Statistical Offices of German States (Laender). Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence
intervals of a regression of log municipal subsidies on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in
equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of
standard errors is at the county level.
Figure B.14: Event study estimates: employment by industry
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Source: BHP. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log industry
employment on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). “Miscellaneous” represents
remaining industries other than manufacturing (agriculture, energy and mining are excluded). The sample includes the 49
counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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Figure B.15: Event study estimates: GDP at county level
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Source: Statistical Offices of German States (Laender). Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence
intervals of a regression of log GDP on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4),
controlling for log population. The sample includes the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included.
Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure B.16: Event study estimates: unemployment rate at county level
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Source: Statistical Offices of German States (Laender). Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence
intervals of a regression of the unemployment rate (divided by 100) on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance
rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49 counties closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included.
Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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Figure B.17: Event study estimates: wages by skill in sectors other than manufacturing
-.03
-.02
-.01
0
.01
ln
 w
ag
e
(r
el
at
iv
e 
to
 p
re
-r
ef
or
m
 p
er
io
d 
t=
-1
)
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5
low skill medium skill
high skill
Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of log wages by skill
on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49 counties
closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
Figure B.18: Event study estimates: Gini coefficient
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Source: SIAB. Notes: This figure plots coefficients along with 95 % confidence intervals of a regression of the Gini coefficient
on leads and lags of a change in the maximum assistance rate as in equation (2.4). The sample includes the 49 counties
closest to cutoffs. State-year fixed effects are included. Clustering of standard errors is at the county level.
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B.3 Additional tables
Table B.6: Event study estimates: first stage at county level
(1) (2)
ln subsidized investment ln GRW subsidies
F4 -.0254 -.0177
(.0169) (.0165)
F3 -.0079 -.004
(.0174) (.0179)
F2 -.0251 -.0134
(.0156) (.0155)
L0 -.0639 -.0772
(.0217) (.0216)
L1 -.0657 -.0917
(.0176) (.0178)
L2 -.0364 -.0659
(.0221) (.0208)
L3 -.0731 -.0992
(.0238) (.0224)
L4 -.0436 -.0679
(.0239) (.0238)
L5 -.0628 -.0916
(.0256) (.0247)
Obs 1351 1351
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure 2.3) for detailed information.
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Table B.7: Event study estimates: log employment by sector
(1) (2) (3)
manufacturing other overall
F4 .0014 .0046 .0038
(.0067) (.0025) (.0024)
F3 -.0017 -.0003 -.0005
(.004) (.0016) (.0016)
F2 -.0013 -.0001 -.0001
(.0032) (.0014) (.0014)
L0 -.0039 -.0014 -.0018
(.0026) (.0011) (.0009)
L1 -.007 -.0002 -.0015
(.0032) (.0014) (.0012)
L2 -.0093 .0004 -.0016
(.0034) (.0016) (.0014)
L3 -.0113 -.0005 -.002
(.0047) (.0017) (.0017)
L4 -.011 -.0001 -.0019
(.005) (.002) (.002)
L5 -.0138 .0044 .0012
(.0062) (.0026) (.0023)
Obs 882 882 882
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure 2.7) for detailed information.
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Table B.8: Event study estimates: log manufacturing employment (long run)
(1)
F4 .0029
(.0058)
F3 -.0011
(.0042)
F2 -.0013
(.0032)
L0 -.0043
(.0029)
L1 -.0079
(.0034)
L2 -.0101
(.004)
L3 -.0124
(.0051)
L4 -.0124
(.0065)
L5 -.0141
(.0073)
L6 -.0146
(.008)
L7 -.0153
(.012)
L8 -.0182
(.013)
L9 -.0175
(.0135)
L10 -.0179
(.0187)
Obs 882
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
See event study graph (figure 2.4) for
detailed information.
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Table B.9: Event study estimates: log number of manufacturing establishments
(1)
F4 .0019
(.0021)
F3 -.0009
(.0014)
F2 -.0004
(.0012)
L0 -.0008
(.001)
L1 -.0013
(.0012)
L2 -.002
(.0014)
L3 -.0021
(.0017)
L4 -.003
(.0019)
L5 -.0028
(.0024)
Obs 882
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
See event study graph (figure 2.5) for
detailed information.
129
Table B.10: Event study estimates: log wages by skill in manufacturing
(1) (2) (3)
low skill medium skill high skill
F4 .0012 .001 .0038
(.0069) (.0023) (.0036)
F3 -.0024 .0002 .0033
(.0081) (.0014) (.0032)
F2 -.0062 .0024 .0001
(.0042) (.0012) (.0028)
L0 -.0073 -.0004 -.0025
(.0038) (.0014) (.0027)
L1 .0019 .0027 -.0032
(.0071) (.0012) (.003)
L2 -.0028 .0026 .0021
(.0075) (.0013) (.0035)
L3 -.0154 .0014 .0057
(.0096) (.002) (.0038)
L4 -.0062 .0017 -.0043
(.0113) (.0019) (.005)
L5 -.0269 .0031 .0012
(.0111) (.0023) (.0048)
Obs 882 882 882
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure 2.6) for detailed information.
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Table B.11: Event study estimates: measures of inequality
(1) (2) (3)
gini coefficient p75p50 p75p25
F4 -.0002 .0039 -.0025
(.0003) (.0019) (.0153)
F3 .0004 .0022 .0193
(.0002) (.0017) (.0155)
F2 0 .0027 .008
(.0002) (.0015) (.0133)
L0 .0003 .0005 .0115
(.0002) (.0011) (.0113)
L1 .0001 .0005 .0058
(.0003) (.0013) (.0164)
L2 -.0001 -.0003 -.0018
(.0004) (.0015) (.0185)
L3 .0004 .0027 .0155
(.0005) (.0021) (.0287)
L4 .001 .0047 .0503
(.0005) (.0021) (.0335)
L5 .0009 .0053 .0271
(.0006) (.0035) (.0357)
Obs 882 882 882
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graphs (figures 2.8 and B.18) for detailed
information.
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Table B.12: Event study estimates: log labor market region manufacturing employment
(1)
F4 .0004
(.006)
F3 -.0021
(.0026)
F2 -.0004
(.0021)
L0 -.0029
(.0024)
L1 -.0039
(.0028)
L2 -.0057
(.0031)
L3 -.0059
(.0039)
L4 -.0044
(.0043)
L5 -.005
(.0059)
Obs 558
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
See event study graph (figure 2.9) for
detailed information.
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Table B.13: Event study estimates: log manufacturing employment by skill
(1) (2) (3)
low skill medium skill high skill
F4 .009 -.0014 .0059
(.0094) (.0065) (.0083)
F3 .0053 -.0037 .0004
(.0066) (.0036) (.006)
F2 .0018 -.0024 .0007
(.0047) (.0029) (.0049)
L0 -.0018 -.0041 -.0044
(.0033) (.0028) (.0029)
L1 -.0058 -.0062 -.0062
(.0059) (.0031) (.0033)
L2 -.0102 -.008 -.0086
(.0064) (.0032) (.0038)
L3 -.0117 -.01 -.007
(.009) (.0043) (.0055)
L4 -.0082 -.0107 -.008
(.0107) (.0044) (.006)
L5 -.0089 -.0131 -.0111
(.0102) (.0054) (.0081)
Obs 882 882 882
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.2) for detailed information.
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Table B.14: Event study estimates: log manufacturing employment (different cutoff samples,
refined treatment)
(1) (2) (3)
all counties 20 in window 16 in window
F4 .0005 .005 .0083
(.0042) (.0072) (.0076)
F3 -.0026 0 .0015
(.0025) (.0045) (.0046)
F2 -.0015 -.0001 .0012
(.002) (.0035) (.0037)
L0 -.0019 -.0044 -.0058
(.0022) (.0028) (.0029)
L1 -.0025 -.0081 -.0092
(.0024) (.0036) (.0039)
L2 -.004 -.0109 -.012
(.0028) (.0038) (.0042)
L3 -.004 -.0135 -.0117
(.0036) (.0052) (.0052)
L4 -.0018 -.0132 -.0147
(.0038) (.0055) (.0057)
L5 -.0022 -.0175 -.0214
(.0039) (.0066) (.0069)
Obs 1368 792 684
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.3) for detailed information.
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Table B.15: Event study estimates: low-skilled log manufacturing wages (different cutoff samples,
refined treatment)
(1) (2) (3)
all counties 20 in window 16 in window
F4 .0019 -.0009 -.0015
(.0045) (.0076) (.0081)
F3 -.0038 -.0036 -.0014
(.0051) (.0089) (.0094)
F2 -.0056 -.0067 -.0048
(.0036) (.0045) (.0049)
L0 -.0053 -.0079 -.007
(.0042) (.0042) (.0049)
L1 .0001 .0025 .0006
(.0058) (.0076) (.0072)
L2 -.0006 -.0022 -.0051
(.0063) (.0082) (.0082)
L3 -.0112 -.0144 -.0166
(.007) (.0106) (.0111)
L4 -.0006 -.0069 -.0001
(.0099) (.0126) (.0143)
L5 -.0155 -.0318 -.0283
(.0088) (.0125) (.0138)
Obs 1368 792 684
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.4) for detailed information.
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Table B.16: Event study estimates: log manufacturing employment (different cutoff samples,
discrete treatment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline all counties 20 in window 16 in window
F4 -.0244 -.0216 -.0001 .0244
(.046) (.03) (.049) (.054)
F3 -.0336 -.0378 -.0214 -.0064
(.036) (.024) (.04) (.042)
F2 -.0214 -.0203 -.0127 -.0013
(.031) (.022) (.035) (.037)
L0 -.0273 -.0154 -.0286 -.0307
(.016) (.012) (.019) (.021)
L1 -.0494 -.0218 -.0536 -.0524
(.02) (.015) (.023) (.024)
L2 -.0666 -.0361 -.0733 -.0699
(.018) (.017) (.02) (.022)
L3 -.068 -.0279 -.0796 -.0605
(.031) (.025) (.035) (.033)
L4 -.0655 -.0158 -.0787 -.0823
(.03) (.024) (.033) (.035)
L5 -.0693 -.0039 -.091 -.107
(.038) (.034) (.041) (.044)
Obs 882 1368 792 684
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.7) for detailed information.
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Table B.17: Event study estimates: low-skilled log manufacturing wages (different cutoff samples,
discrete treatment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
baseline all counties 20 in window 16 in window
F4 -.0055 .0012 -.0151 -.022
(.053) (.04) (.06) (.063)
F3 -.0772 -.049 -.0931 -.0652
(.064) (.041) (.071) (.076)
F2 -.0206 -.0172 -.0256 -.0064
(.034) (.033) (.037) (.038)
L0 -.0453 -.0238 -.0449 -.0387
(.03) (.028) (.032) (.036)
L1 .0236 .0186 .0308 .0158
(.053) (.046) (.057) (.054)
L2 -.0193 .0015 -.0104 -.0295
(.058) (.05) (.064) (.063)
L3 -.112 -.0771 -.104 -.119
(.072) (.055) (.08) (.084)
L4 -.0433 .0019 -.0445 -.0001
(.081) (.072) (.092) (.104)
L5 -.172 -.0884 -.203 -.174
(.087) (.069) (.098) (.107)
Obs 882 1368 792 684
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.8) for detailed information.
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Table B.18: Event study estimates: log manufacturing employment (further robustness checks)
(1) (2)
never treated dropped partially treated dropped
F4 .0022 -.0016
(.0073) (.0059)
F3 -.0016 -.0039
(.0056) (.0039)
F2 -.0014 -.0039
(.0045) (.003)
L0 -.005 -.0058
(.0036) (.0039)
L1 -.0093 -.0079
(.0043) (.0045)
L2 -.0097 -.0115
(.0041) (.0047)
L3 -.0141 -.0155
(.0063) (.0056)
L4 -.0132 -.0118
(.0068) (.0058)
L5 -.0114 -.0208
(.0077) (.0081)
Obs 702 576
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.9) for detailed information.
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Table B.19: Event study estimates: log manufacturing employment (only first reform)
(1)
F4 -.0006
(.0133)
F3 .0039
(.0041)
F2 .0008
(.0019)
L0 -.0064
(.0038)
L1 -.0103
(.0047)
L2 -.0167
(.0062)
Obs 456
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses.
See event study graph (figure B.10) for
detailed information.
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Table B.20: Event study estimates: log manufacturing employment (including controls)
(1) (2)
contemporaneous controls lagged controls
F4 .0028 .003
(.0055) (.0045)
F3 .0004 .0017
(.0036) (.0022)
F2 -.0002 .0014
(.0028) (.0013)
L0 -.0048 -.0025
(.003) (.0032)
L1 -.0079 -.0063
(.0037) (.0046)
L2 -.01 -.0087
(.0038) (.0046)
L3 -.0132 -.01
(.0057) (.0066)
L4 -.0132 -.011
(.0062) (.0074)
L5 -.0156 -.0133
(.0069) (.0072)
Obs 866 817
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.11) for detailed information.
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Table B.21: Event study estimates: low-skilled log manufacturing wages (including controls)
(1) (2)
contemporaneous controls lagged controls
F4 .0059 .0074
(.0063) (.0068)
F3 .0009 .0027
(.0082) (.0084)
F2 -.0039 -.0018
(.004) (.0036)
L0 -.0076 -.006
(.004) (.0059)
L1 .0015 .0035
(.0071) (.009)
L2 -.0047 -.0036
(.0074) (.009)
L3 -.017 -.0153
(.0095) (.011)
L4 -.0082 -.0061
(.0114) (.0121)
L5 -.0294 -.0278
(.0116) (.0116)
Obs 866 817
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.12) for detailed information.
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Table B.22: Event study estimates: other outcomes
(1) (2) (3)
ln other subsidies unemployment rate ln gdp
F4 -.0132 .0002 -.0019
(.0073) (.0004) (.002)
F3 -.0088 .0003 -.0032
(.0064) (.0003) (.0017)
F2 -.0076 .0001 -.002
(.004) (.0002) (.0013)
L0 .0001 -.0003 -.0012
(.0039) (.0001) (.0011)
L1 -.0068 -.0003 -.001
(.0055) (.0002) (.0014)
L2 -.0013 -.0003 -.0001
(.0057) (.0002) (.0015)
L3 .0128 -.0005 .0008
(.0056) (.0002) (.0023)
L4 .0031 -.0006 .0011
(.0074) (.0003) (.0025)
L5 .0139 -.0006 .003
(.0079) (.0005) (.0031)
Obs 795 882 882
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graphs (figures B.13, B.15 and B.16) for
detailed information.
142
Table B.23: Event study estimates: log employment by industry (different cutoff samples, discrete
treatment)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
construction commerce services miscellaneous
F4 -.0005 .0033 .0041 .0017
(.0052) (.0025) (.0032) (.0039)
F3 -.0003 .0006 -.0027 -.0002
(.0028) (.0019) (.0028) (.002)
F2 -.002 -.0002 -.0014 -.0004
(.0025) (.0015) (.0025) (.0015)
L0 -.001 .0004 -.0027 -.0005
(.0022) (.0011) (.0014) (.0015)
L1 -.0031 -.0008 -.0006 .0008
(.0024) (.0014) (.0017) (.0021)
L2 -.0034 -.0022 .0008 .0007
(.003) (.0017) (.0021) (.0024)
L3 -.0028 -.0055 .0001 .0007
(.0035) (.0024) (.0025) (.0027)
L4 -.0035 -.0045 .0013 .0007
(.0041) (.0031) (.0026) (.0032)
L5 .0002 -.001 .0032 .0047
(.0057) (.0043) (.0034) (.0045)
Obs 882 882 882 882
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.14) for detailed information.
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Table B.24: Event study estimates: log wages by skill in sectors other than manufacturing
(1) (2) (3)
low skill medium skill high skill
F4 -.0026 .0006 .0002
(.003) (.001) (.002)
F3 -.0044 .0006 0
(.003) (.0011) (.0018)
F2 -.0034 .0003 .0014
(.0023) (.0007) (.0014)
L0 -.0035 -.0007 .0001
(.0026) (.001) (.0016)
L1 -.0065 -.0012 -.0008
(.0039) (.0009) (.0014)
L2 -.0054 .0015 -.0011
(.0034) (.0008) (.0018)
L3 -.009 .0008 .0015
(.0038) (.001) (.0023)
L4 -.0107 -.0007 .0044
(.0053) (.0016) (.0025)
L5 -.0107 .0006 .0029
(.0061) (.0015) (.0031)
Obs 882 882 882
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. See event study graph (figure B.17) for detailed information.
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Appendix C
Appendix to chapter 3
C.1 Additional results
Table C.1: Event study estimates: parties represented
(1) (2) (3)
reform F3 0.112 -0.011 -0.099
(0.079) (0.084) (0.299)
reform F2 0.021 -0.052 0.135
(0.058) (0.060) (0.240)
reform L0 0.261∗∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 1.525∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.034) (0.149)
reform L1 0.310∗∗∗ 0.083∗ 1.566∗∗∗
(0.047) (0.043) (0.153)
reform L2 0.611∗∗∗ 0.478∗∗∗ 1.947∗∗∗
(0.075) (0.111) (0.178)
reform L3 0.684∗∗∗ 0.596∗∗∗ 2.065∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.133) (0.196)
Size-Year-FE yes yes yes
Size of municipalities all small large
Observations 9689 6825 2864
Adjusted R2 0.290 0.018 0.490
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 1. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
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Table C.2: Difference-in-differences estimates: effective number of parties and Herfindahl index
(1) (2) (3) (4)
effective effective herfindahl herfindahl
reform 0.020 -0.003
(0.028) (0.005)
small × reform -0.012 0.001
(0.031) (0.005)
large × reform 0.231∗∗∗ -0.029∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.006)
Size-Year-FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 9689 9689 9689 9689
Adjusted R2 0.157 0.158 0.076 0.077
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 1. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
Table C.3: Difference-in-differences estimates: log revenue
(1) (2)
reform 0.024∗∗∗
(0.005)
small × reform 0.018∗∗∗
(0.005)
large × reform 0.060∗∗∗
(0.015)
Size-Year-FE yes yes
Linear state trends by size yes yes
Observations 172912 172912
Adjusted R2 0.108 0.108
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 2. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
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Table C.4: Difference-in-differences estimates: log revenue (excluding credit)
(1) (2)
reform 0.026∗∗∗
(0.005)
small × reform 0.020∗∗∗
(0.005)
large × reform 0.060∗∗∗
(0.015)
Size-Year-FE yes yes
Linear state trends by size yes yes
Observations 171342 171342
Adjusted R2 0.112 0.112
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 2. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
Table C.5: Difference-in-differences estimates: log expenditure (further robustness checks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
small × reform 0.021∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗ -0.006 -0.008
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
large × reform 0.077∗∗∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ 0.079∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.030) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.008) (0.017)
Size-Year-FE yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Linear state trends by size yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Excluded state NW HE SL TH RP MV SH
Observations 168153 166469 173019 161147 134463 165474 154789
Adjusted R2 0.092 0.092 0.091 0.089 0.126 0.087 0.081
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 2. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
Table C.6: Difference-in-differences estimates: composition of log expenditure
(1) (2) (3)
personell material investment
small × reform 0.111∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗ -0.046∗∗
(0.007) (0.006) (0.022)
large × reform 0.063∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.017) (0.026)
Size-Year-FE yes yes yes
Linear state trends by size yes yes yes
Observations 173555 173574 169403
Adjusted R2 0.274 0.171 0.103
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (* p < .1, ** p < .05, *** p < .01). Sample: sample 2. Small
municipalities: 10 000 inhabitants or fewer. Clustering of standard errors is at the municipality level.
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C.2 Survey evidence from the German Internet Panel
In wave 30 of the GIP (Blom et al., 2018) I have asked the following questions related to
municipal elections. Results can be found below (see also figure 3.7 above).
• At the last federal election in 2013, a five percent electoral threshold was in place.
Suppose such a threshold hadn’t existed: does one of the following statements apply
to you?
– I would have been more likely to cast a vote.
– I would have voted for a different party.
– None of the above statements applies.
• An electoral threshold is the minimum vote share that a party needs to obtain in order
to be able to receive seats in a parliament or council. In your state of residence, does
there exist an electoral threshold for municipal elections?
• At the European election in 2014, Germany was eligible for approximately 100 seats in
the European Parliament and no electoral threshold applied. What vote share do you
think a party had to achieve at a minimum in order to obtain a seat?
– 0.1 percent
– 0.5 percent
– 1 percent
– 5 percent
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Figure C.1: Counterfactual behavior in federal elections without explicit threshold
Election participation more likely Would have voted differently
None of other statemens applies
Would your voting behaviour have been different?
Source: Wave 30 of the German Internet Panel (Blom et al., 2018)
Figure C.2: Presumed implicit threshold for Germany in European Parliament election of 2014
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Source: Wave 30 of the German Internet Panel (Blom et al., 2018)
C.3 Data sources and election dates
C.3.1 Election data sources
Municipal election data used in sample 1 is available publicly via state statistical offices:
• Nordrhein-Westfalen: http://www.it.nrw/
• Baden-Wu¨rttemberg: http://www.statistik-bw.de/
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• Saarland: http://www.saarland.de/62919.htm
• Sachsen: http://www.statistik.sachsen.de/
• Thu¨ringen: http://wahlen.thueringen.de/
C.3.2 Election dates
Table C.7: Election years after 1990
State Years
Schleswig-Holstein (SH) 1994 1998 2003 2008 2013
Niedersachsen (NI) 1991 1996 2001 2006 2011
Nordrhein-Westfalen (NW) 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Hessen (HE) 1993 1997 2001 2006 2011
Rheinland-Pfalz (RP) 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Baden-Wu¨rttemberg (BW) 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Bayern (BY) 1996 2002 2008 2014
Saarland (SL) 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Brandenburg (BB) 1993 1998 2003 2008 2014
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern (MV) 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Sachsen (SN) 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Sachsen-Anhalt (ST) 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Thu¨ringen (TH) 1994 1999 2004 2009 2014
Notes: Elections with threshold in place in bold.
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